

***FAILED MODERNITY. THE WIGHT-INSTITUTION AND THE SUFFICIENT REASONING OF
THE POLITICAL BODY***

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Abstract: The pronounced tendency of the political systems of „privatizing” and further on of capturing the hierarchization systems and those of social accrediting of values does not confirm the thesis of conversion towards a reflexive modernity (Ulrich Beck⁵¹ 1986), but it rather appears as the clearest symptom of the failure of the Western modernity. The moment when Beck requests a rational analysis of rationality and defines the world in which we live as a society of risks, he admits the failure of a thinking being in a deadlock. Failed modernity (reflexive or not) is directly confronted with a problem of trust (of ontological security)

The leader without face is the armoured vehicle that the new political elite has hired out. The wight-institution is the reaction (anti-democratical, but natural) of some systems devoid and exhausted of democratic errors. The most plausible argument by virtue of which this thinking is not totally outdated by the various tactics of institutionalization (it is not about genuine rationalization) wherein the modern world excels in, herein serves as a work hypothesis: the political body is the natural consequence of the spirit and inclinations of a homo religiosus. Modern society offers the wight-institution as conjunctural substitute – an ersatz that is meant to soothe the collective lack of satisfaction towards the corruption of the pyramidal political body.

Keywords: failed modernity, wight-institution, political elite.

1. The anthropological grounding of the ideas regarding the political body. The mythical-sacral principle of instituting the „master without a face”.

Modern political philosophy has never concealed the concern for several topics which, to the common sense were traditionally incurred on the metaphysicians or theologians. The referential thinkers who have worked out political thought systems (beginning with the Greek-Roman Antiquity) have grounded their own views upon the state starting from prior theoretizations with regard to human nature. Without making extended reference, it is enough to invoke here the series of answers which the question „What is man?”⁵² got all through the history of political thought. Under the pressure of a certain reductionism with a practical value, we might briefly sum up two views. The two key positions („people are equal and good by nature” or „*homo homini lupus est*”) have always been epochally reinforced, but have not known varied alternatives, nor did they know delineations without conditions. Simplifying the interpretation out of functional reasons, one can easily identify two perspectives of common usage upon humankind:

1. human nature is good (in its quality of work of an almighty and good Creator), whereas man as a being who has failed his destiny (by falling into the sin or by having degraded his pure condition through social life) – is to recover – in this position – an original [primary] condition (a „golden age” placed *illo tempore*, [in the wrong time]).

51 Ulrich Beck, *La société du risque: sur la voie d'une autre modernité*, Ed. Aubier, Paris, 2001

52 The question has not always had its Kantian significance. For all that, long before the great philosopher had formulated it, its importance was not at all made silent.

2. human nature is bad and man, as a debased being *ab origine* (marked by the „ancestral sin”, owing everything to the pre-requisites devolving from here: fear, selfishness, aggressiveness) is asked to look for a solution for redemption, alone or within the community.

Regaining the moral dimension of human existence (man meeting Good) is, in the case of modern man, a political mission. The idea according to which any ideology is a civil expression of convictions with sacral architecture, is not new: The Antiquity is dominated by sacred monarchies, and closer to us nowadays, Frederic Jameson theorizes „the inversed millenarism”⁵³ as a brand of the new „salvation myths”. The real successors (in modernity) of the archaic myths are the ideologies: owing to their eschatologic structures and to their pronounced evasionist⁵⁴ function they theatrically and mobilizingly screenplay a historical project.

Any systematic view upon the origin and architecture of the political body implies a founding story. The founding stories, in spite of the continuous modernizing of expressions, are grounded by a mythical thinking⁵⁵. Moreover, the great themes of gnostic nuance are to be found again in the major ideologies of modernity: the lack of significance and perenity of the real, as a masterpiece of an evil demiurge; the keen consciousness of a double decline of the world and of the self, associated to the revolt against this decayed condition; the two „people” separated by the personal relationship with salvation (the *chosen ones* and the others); salvation through the theoretical cognition (*gnosis*) of the cosmo-anthropical and historical laws; the existence of an own morals (the exteriority of the evil with regard to man), different from the common one⁵⁶. A myth matters under a political aspect to the extent to which it can abilitate hierarchies. Any myth structures ethically (and implicitly politically). The mythic-political invariants are to be drawn out both through the „hard” hermeneutic, of a phenomenological nature (*patterns*, configurations „exemplary models”) or psycho-analytical (*Jung*-ian archetypes), as well as by structuralist or cognitivist semiologies (implementing at the level of the cognitive structures of a „set of rules”⁵⁷). Contrary to the mood of starting from an initially skeptical standpoint, the ideology does not follow the stages of an epistemic progress severely controlled, but the way the faith stakes on an axiomatic. In spite of the common architecture, the ideology and faith have different regimes of functioning, but they respond, nevertheless, to similar psychological needs.⁵⁸ Even if one cannot assume without objections the idea of Guy Debord, one can admit that both stakes on an emotional response, but nevertheless, the commitments implied are of a different nature.

53 Frederic Jameson talked about „inversed millenarism” making reference to the way in which the concept of ideal centres and dominates any discourse about ideology

54 From a myth-analytical point of view, for instance, the communist ideology is structured on two levels: the myth of the Golden age (that lies at the ground of the constituting of a classless society and the consecutive disappearance of the historical tensions) and the Judeo-Christian mesianic ideology, within the sequence of a homology Messiah = proletariat, class fight = the apocalyptic conflict Christ-Antichrist. The scenario argues with gnostic pretentions to the definitive victory of the Good and the eschatologic hope of an absolute end of History (the classless society, marked by the „dictatorship” of moral conscience).

55 Of course that the old *forte* [i.e. *strong*] ideologies, outdated and unacceptable in the nowadays democratic world are replaced with other, more gelly ones, through the manoueuvering of the myths, of the symbolic figures, try to convince the people *to believe that it wants* what the power elites think it is better for themasses (according to Giorgio Negrelle).

56 According to Alain Besançon, *Originile intelectuale ale leninismului* [*The Intellectual Origins of Leninism*], Ed. Humanitas, București, 1993, pp.13 – 20

57 in Ioan Petru Culianu, *Călătorii în lumea de dincolo*, Nemira, 1995, cap.I. with reference to Pascal Boyer, *Tradition as Truth and Communication. A Cognitive Description of Traditional Discourse*, Cambridge University Press, 1990

58 According to Guy Debord, *Ideologie și adevăr*, (source Internet) „Les déductions rationnelles ne sont qu'un mode d'hallucination du principe de plaisir, un escamotage de la réalité qui ne se manifeste comme Réel qu'à surgir dans la représentation, à y faire tâche, à surprendre le savoir, à ex-sister comme singularité.”

The political thought heeds upon the „degraded man”(either by birth, because of the „original sin”⁵⁹, or once with the appearance of property, money or the society⁶⁰) or reasons declared-different from those that religion asserts or holds. The political and the religious encounter on an ethical level since they both project, identify and locate the Good (either in this world – the political, or, in The World After – religion) Even then, when the modern political societies claim total autonomy from religion, the ethical field remains common. The different interpreting of the stakes of the interest with regard to the human nature, has nevertheless, not prevented the entire Middle Ages to maintain a consensual horizon, there politics and religion have produced and enabled value judgments ready and able to defend a common cause. The medieval Society on the whole (seniors, vassals, clerics) was characterized by a profound heteronomy⁶¹. This thing was possible only based on a discrete teleologic agreement: man must be lead along his way to redemption and no price can seem to be unjustified⁶². The modern political regimes did not change the essence of the exercise of governance: as an act of authority (independent of the force and value of the arguments or the sources of legitimacy) it becomes possible on the grounds of an unequal ration. Power imposes and self imposes – any means that can be used to this aim acquires political value. The institutions (both civil and religious alike) are dominated by hierarchical logic, and the stricter the hierarhical relationships, the higher their political value. The political *corpus*, irrespective of its nature and form, is grounded on institutions with a seniorial character. The political power develops a pyramidal architecture and not even the most modern forms of democracy cannot suspend the decisional power disproportion: the wight-institution is not the invention of the dictatorial regimes⁶³, it subsists in various avatars even there where the democratic choices already have a sound tradition.

The mythical-sacral⁶⁴ scheme is pretty transparent here, upon the model of which the political philosophy carries out its own sistematic discourse. Certainly, the way Mircea Eliade shows, it can happen „even in the archaic cultures for a myth to be devoid of its religious significance”.⁶⁵ If we wish to identify the profile of the grounds of this way of legitimating the political body, there's no need to turn back to the past, using a ritualic *regressum* (the past is interesting from the point of view of the general models), we rather lack a critical examination of the thinking that legitimates and sustains institutions (and other practical governing instruments). Institutions as products of the political construction, reflect precisely a

59 Hobbes,

60 Locke, Rousseau

61 The Society hereby characterized as being *heteronomous* is characterized by a social and moral „Orthodoxy” grounded on laws and norms of religious origins. The moral of traditional, „Orthodox” societies is a divine derivative. It is always grounded through a mythical formula. The prestige of such a socio-political authority is maintained by epiphanic proofs and various rituals.

62 The promised paradise or the Fortress [City]of God offers to anyone who can reach that place something that the worldly communitries cannot ensure for the time being.

63 In the dictatorial regimes, the individual-institution primitively requires to be more closely identified symbolically with authority.

64 It is assumed that the ideologies become in this context, substitute expressions for religious beliefs, wherefrom they take over the axiomatic enthusiasm and the hope of the advent of a perfect world. As a result, it is to be understood the fact that the religious disguises itself beneath the social and the political becomes the depository of sacred meanings. The religious symbols, hard in ontologic order, due to their hierofanic grounding, are substituted for signs of the profane (the various materializations of the „symbolism” of power). These signs bear sound and valuable ontological claims to it and sustain these claims by means of a massive escort discourse. The commercial-like knowledge, however, are not specific to the modern world. The various initiation rituals that the anthropologists describe imply, irrespective of the society we talk about, an association of the knowledge with power.

65 Mircea Eliade, *Aspecte ale mitului [Aspects of the Myth]*, Romanian translation, Paul G. Dinopol, Ed. Univers, București, 1978, p. 105

preliminary vision with regard to the human nature. The social life can be conceived of, only on the grounds of some possibilities: any being moves on the coordinates pre-determined naturally by its very essence. Any analysis of the political (no matter how modern would attempt to be) indicates towards (implicitly or explicitly) an axiomatic structure on the grounds of which the human condition can become an object of moral judgment. The very question „what sufficient reason lies at the ground of the criterion with relation to which one asserts of a man that he is good and another one bad?” is itself in interested relationship with a power that controls the dominant flux of ideas and judgments about the world and life⁶⁶. This flux constitutes the body of a culture. Any thinking yields judgments in the pre-determined horizon of this culture⁶⁷. The political man does not reason (in the strong sense of this term) since the will to dominate (the competitive instinct) contains within this instinct any other form of judgment, inclusively certain judgments with which the scientific research operates. Such an assertion would not longer seem abusive once we admit that any of the big modern corporations „do not maintain specialized personnel in research and development out of an abstract love of cognition, but for money”⁶⁸. Yet money is the most versatile form of power.

There are several theorizations (appeared particularly after Machiavelli) that prefer (and accept) the thesis according to which the political body (and particularly the ideological discourse) has taken its own way, breaking any bridge between the political power (meant to govern over the citizens' body) and the dogmatic authority (institutions concerned with the „management” of the spirit (soul)). Despite this, we are witnessing nowadays modern states in the situation of transferring consistent political missions onto the cultural-religious discourse task.⁶⁹ The institutional discourse is always perceived as a form of referential discourse—thus it deliberately assumes a public mission. These very premises made Mircea Eliade to be hesitant with regard to the hypothesis of suppressing the mythical thinking in modern societies. The way he asserts, the mythical thinking „managed to survive, though radically changed (if not perfectly camouflaged)”⁷⁰. The relationship with the great stories (*grands récits*) seems defining for any political community: modern ideologies germinate on the ground of an apparent crisis of the Christian epistem and of the secularization of the religious tradition (doubled, however, by the complementary movement of re-cyphering through technologization.⁷¹

No reason would justify the suppressing of mythical thinking – as long as it can be used with minimum costs as a medium of consolidating the political power. The modern political man does not legitimate himself as a mandatary of Gods, yet has not given up at all to the sacralizing of power. The Law (with its entire array of institutional instruments) above any man (and sometimes even beyond men) has sacral consistency. The institutions deposit

66 It is not simply the problem of the logical value of a support – in the society of globalized communication, the value of a judgment grows proportional to the range of the dissemination area.

67 „*La raison est sensible et la sensibilité rationnelle.*” according to Herbert Marcuse, *Eros et civilisation*, chapitre IX, Le domaine de l'esthétique, Boston 1955, Paris, Minuit, 1963, p. 159

68 Francis Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om [The End of History and the Last Man]*, Ed. Paideia, București, 1994, p. 77

69 The Muslim world is but the most visible example. Perhaps also the papal public discourse can be taken into account here.

70 Mircea Eliade, *Aspecte ale mitului [Aspects of the Myth]*, p. 107

71 The Age of the Enlightenment – according to Lyotard - has made a myth out of the rational cognition, as follows: „the rule of consensus between the sender and the receiver of an utterance having a value of truth shall be considered as acceptable if it falls within the perspective of a possible unanimity of the rational spirits: this was the story of the Enlightenment in which the hero of cognition contributes to the achieving of a grand ethical-political myth, the universal peace.” Jean Francois Lyotard, *Condiția post modernă [The Post-modern Condition]*, Romanian translation Ciprian Mihali, Ed. Babel, București, 1993, p. 15 On the other hand, we see very clearly the fact that modern societies do not accept the breaking away from the myth, not even when the characters can no longer cultivate the exceptionalism and noblesse of the classical heroes.

without exception the political power and will of a decision-making body who does not account for the imperative mandate of a general will⁷², but works convergent to a natural conservation instinct. This mechanism has reproduced and perpetuated within the system the *power without face*. The leader without face did not penetrate the modern systems, but in his quality of wight-institution, is the very product of modern political environment. The wight-institution imposes the collective memory civic standards and manipulates the social imaginary through setting the essential themes (topics). For all this, he is not, and does not mean to be a hero.

The wight-institution has lost the altitude and charm of the chivalrous destiny from the classical epoch (age). The adherence to „the system”, without conditions castrates him and erases any vanity. The modern political leader, like any abstract contour, is rather a generic character. Since he is not able to be stately, imposing, it can never be tragic. For if we assist, at times, to a relapse to the archaic paradigm and to the subsequent „victim mechanism”⁷³ – it does not have as an object faces, but only significances⁷⁴: the re-bewitching of the world entered into the era of the technological temptations. The wight-institution takes something from the righteous entitlement without a right to appeal of the calculation machine, it always has that pretention, claim of impersonal detachment in front of which any revolt seems and abuse against reason. The impersonal character of domination has, however, nothing to do with the man being in the situation of exercising his power. Is he that objective as he claims to be? It is very likely that he is not. Despite this, the „technocrat” fully takes advantage of that plus of social authority which that *primus inter pares* makes without right of appeal.⁷⁵ *He is familiar with the system* – the institution that guarantees the functioning of the system depends on his availability of working. This „rationalization” of society „is in correlation to the institutionalizing of the scientific and technical progress”, and as „technique and science enter the institutional fields of the society and transform by this the very institutions, the ex-legitimations are out of use”⁷⁶. Knowledge does not legitimate and does not confer man an authority directly proportional to the truth, but it is in a privileged relationship to the imperative and useful character of information, an immediate gain of it in a competition without licence and truce. The rational action is permanently qualified with regard to a particular aim and in this respect it is a form of exercising the control and domination. The political body, as a confrontation space, creates a market of the power instruments: has the wight-institution become such an instrument ?

The leader without face is the armoured vehicle that the new political elite has hired out. The wight-institution is the reaction (anti-democratical, but natural) of some systems devoid and exhausted of democratic errors. The most plausible argument by virtue of which this thinking is not totally outdated by the various tactics of institutionalization (it is not about genuine rationalization) wherein the modern world excels in, herein serves as a work hypothesis: the political body is the natural consequence of the spirit and inclinations of a *homo religiosus*. Modern society offers the wight-institution as conjunctural substitute – an *ersatz* that is meant to soothe the collective lack of satisfaction towards the corruption of the pyramidal political body.

72 The term is used herein the way it is understood by Rousseau.

73 Overbidding the mechanism « of the scapegoat » (according to René Girard) remains specific to the mythical rationality and the archaic religious behaviour, but is brought round in substitution formulae and at the level of totalitarian modern societies.

74 Modern world no longer convicts one to death – but to irrelevance.

75 Jürgen Habermas, *Cunoaştere și comunicare*, .Romanian translation Andrei Marga, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1983, p. 167-177 The way Habermas observes, the technocrat is the exponent of out-turn, he brings us into the situation of practicing science for the sake of science, of being the defenders of a science which is actually reduced to technique.

76 Jürgen Habermas, *Cunoaştere și comunicare*, p. 142

2. *Failing of modernity in the West. The Master without face and the sufficient reason.*

In modern world the essence of the political body does not have a modern content. Even if we reject the hypothesis (righteously thought as simplistic) whereby the „civilizations are the product of a long fight against fear” (G. Ferrero⁷⁷) we do not have sound proofs to take to pieces the thesis of the interested character of the most objective forms of manifestation of the sufficient reason of any living human being: the wish to live, to remain alive (by any means). This is, after all, the natural instinct that no form of life does repress naturally. If reason can provide at times explanations with regard to the heroic death, these judgments always come from those who are still alive. For – the way Heidegger noticed⁷⁸ – it is impossible for us to have an experience of death (we perceive it as a inept and collective witness of the disappearance of the one who dies) we talk about death and we do it under the burden of fear and alarm. No form of reason does shelter or accommodate man from this fear and any man lives day by day in its presence. The consciousness of the death peril (and of the inescapable death) does not offer the individual better reasons to sacrifice himself than Falstaff once had⁷⁹: even if honour cannot place back a leg or a hand or not even the pain from a wound, if honour has no idea of surgery –perhaps it is but a word and anyone knows that words are to be found in the marketplace (*agora*) at a good price.

Constrained by his very nature, man (either antique or modern) has maintained a constant relationship with fear. The king or the most humble beggar account in front of it. In the modern Western world it is more and more widespread the idea that, once with the development of sciences and generally once with enlarging the field of knowledge – people would be less exposed to perils and as such, fear is less present. History does not confirm this logical thread, on the contrary, Jean Delumeau noted „an increase of fear in the West in the eve of the Modern Times”⁸⁰ and closer to our times, Michel Foucault remarked the impetus taken by the „normalization devices” and denounced the geopolitical dimension of the new objectivity (sustained by a science which is at the disposal of institutions). The power of standardization is directly linked to institutional mechanisms beyond which a class is hidden: thus the „institutions of repression, of non-acceptance, of exclusion, or marginalization are not adequate to describe the formation, in the very heart of the *carceral* city, of the insidious indulgence, of the despicable wickedness, of petty slyness, of calculated procedures, of techniques and after all, of the *sciences* that enable the making of the disciplinary

77 The resort to legitimacy has the role of turning the order human and of conferring power an appearance of democratic mildness. Legitimacy is a form of exorcism headed against fear. Power has always to do with the fear from the subject who has the exclusivity of the orders. Fear is always present since any power knows that revolt is latent, even in the most conformist discipline and can explode one day or another, under the pressure of unforeseen circumstances. (for extended observations Guglielmo Ferrero, *Principles of Power. The Great Political Crises of History*, Nova York, Putnam, 1942)

78, „Moving on to the fact of not being *Dasein* retracts *Dasein* the very possibility of experimenting this moving and of understanding it as something that has been experimented ” Martin Heidegger, *Ființă și Timp*, Romanian translation Gabriel Liiceanu and Cătălin Cioabă, Ed. Humanitas, București 2012, p. 317

79 „Honour pushed me ahead. But when it stabs me to death when I step ahead? What then? Can honour heal a broken leg? No way! Or a hand? No way! That is to say, honour has no healing skills or abilities. None whatsoever. What is honour? A saying. What lies within this saying? Nothingness. Great deal! Who is full of honour? The one who passed away on Wednesday! Does he feel it, does he? No way! Can he harken it? No way! Then it seems that honour cannot be felt. Right, the deceased don't feel it. Or maybe the living? No. What for? Slander resists to it. As such, I make no use of it: honour is like a prapure at the funeral.” in Shakespeare, *Henry the IV-th*, part I, (V, 1), Romanian translation Dan Duțescu p. 78

80 Jean Delumeau, *Frica în Occident (sec. XIV-XVIII) O cetate asediată*, Romanian translation Modest Morariu, Ed. Meridiane, București, 1986 p. 17

individual.”⁸¹ Beyond them there is something else. Modernity has conceived a new economy of power, but has not changed the position (hence neither the essence) of the political body. In its very center it keeps the exercise of punishment and this exercise remains essential, the more so as reason (with its all array of consequences) has multiplied the grounds of fear⁸² and has thus determined an increase of sensitivity towards it.

The concept of *balance of the three powers* remains a claim of the modern world – it is a rational construct. Rationalism as a revolving bend of political modernity, bears within itself, however, the reason of betrayal. Reason yields judgments and the fact that it *judges* brings it in the situation of asserting its privileged condition: from a political point of view, the balance of powers speaks in fact about the possibility of dethroning judgment (removing the *judge* from power) through actions decided over by a will capable of imposing itself and does not necessarily imply a knowledge base, or another objective form of certification. This is the sense in which Michel Foucault understands the slogan „la torture c’est la raison”⁸³. The political reason is a concept that acquires sense – exclusively when it expresses itself under the umbrella of a form of power. From a discourse point of view, the political reason{ing} appears as being linked to legitimacy, any legitimacy is morally grounded and any morals is constituted within a culture. This pyramid shies away at the level of its architecture an essential constructive vice: the moral culture of a society – based upon which one distinguishes the Good and the Good ones – it is never configured beyond or outside power interests. Before the intellectual democratic discourse having remarked the virtues of the moral education and the power of culture, Europe has written with the swords' sharp blade, code signs (language) of a culture of power. Reason does not simply unify judgments with regard to the world and life, it politically charges the relationships in a society and through the judgments it devolves, it describes power structures and relationships.

The power of judgment and the judgment of power move onto a common passage way. There are obvious differences between the public consensus and an airborne division. Yet, within the area of the *agora* (which is all the same the fundamental political field) they both confer grounding and authority to the value judgments. In this sense, the sufficient reasoning of judgments dominating the public space (based on their politically grounded authority and not based upon a relationship determined by the truth or knowledge) conveys one, with no exception, to an elementary axiomatic: I judge only as long as I can do it (can = power) and in this sense, my judgment and power share the same fate. More clearly stated „the rational attitude towards the world is grounded on something that, in its turn, is not scientific: i.e. onto an interpretation prior to the predecessor world, which falls into a linguistic state, which in its turn, gives up the historical *a priori* as rational...” and this thing happens precisely because „the underpinning of rationality is something non-rational in itself”⁸⁴. Power is the sufficient reasoning (Leibniz⁸⁵) of judgment producing effects within the public space – our thesis is grounded onto this logical construction, according to which modernity does not have,

81 Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi*, Romanian translation Bogdan Ghiu, Ed, Paralela 45, Pitești, 2005, p. 390

82 Man knows himself that he will die, so „only man knows the fear to such a durable and awesome extent”.according to G. Delapierre, *L’Etre et la peur*, Toulouse 1974, p.17 (in Jean Delumeau, *Frica în Occident...*, note 46, on page 333)

83 To be seen in detail Manfred Franck, & et.al, *Postmodernismul . Deschideri filosofice*[*Post-modernism: Philosophical Openings*], Ed. Dacia, Cluj, 1995, p. 11

84 *Postmodernismul . Deschideri filosofice* [*Post-modernism: Philosophical Openings*], Ed. Dacia, Cluj, 1995, p. 19-20

85 According to Leibniz: „no fact can be true or real, no sentence [can be] veridical, without there existing some ground, a sufficient reason for which the things are the way they are and not otherwise, although these grounds, most of the times, are not known to us”, G.W. Leibniz, *Monadologia* in *Opere filosofice*[*Philosophical Works*], vol. I, translated into Romanian by C. Floru, Editura Științifică, București, 1972, §§ 31-32

for the time being, convincing answers in front of critiques⁸⁶. These critiques have been at the ground of certain conclusions that the force of premises is far from justifying it necessarily: Jean Francois Revel admits much too easily that „actually, it might be the case that democracy would prove to be a simple historical accident, a short paranthesis that closes itself before our eyes...”⁸⁷ The fears of this kind are in reality the intellectual expression of the suspicion that there is a close connection between the crisis of the Western rationalism and the political crisis of the XX-th century.

Even if we cannot accept to view democracy as a simple „historical accident”, I think we have all the reasons to wonder whether the Euro-Atlantic ethnocentrism (and the social sciences saturated with normative commitments as to the social order) did not play a key role in triggering the process of re-considering the power relations (political and military) that the West registers in 2015⁸⁸. Independently of the pragmatism to which history compels us (*Die weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*⁸⁹ – Alexandre Kojève) we have all the reasons to believe that the way in which the value judgments reverberate (thinking) in history is closely connected to the authority and wide circulation that a certain political power confers to them.

A society is dominated by a way of thinking about the world authorized by decisions that have no committed rational support, but a political reason(ing). The very concept of value itself, the way it resists in a society of the people, is imprinted structurally by power interests: „the conscience of one's own value and identity are closely connected to the value other people assign to it. He (man – n.m.) according to David Riesman, is essentially, necessarily *conformist*.”⁹⁰ The conformism is the direct consequence of fear. Modernity has proposed to the fear dominated conscience the idea of rational order and, and a given historical moment, this proposal was received without reserve as an expression of progress. The significances that the concept of order acquires within the public space have become, notwithstanding, instruments of legitimizing certain institutions or forms of authority. The institutions with conforming missions – accustom one to good discipline on the ground of procedures drawn up within the horizon of certain pre-determined values – and they serve, tacitly or explicitly, partisan power interests. The principle of the separation of powers within the state is, in this sense, a practical instrument of segregation of the power interests: the balance of powers in the state is a work hypothesis, in the political practice we see successive lack of balances and according to the translation of the weight center, the „political animal” is adaptively reacting.⁹¹ The pronounced tendency of the political systems of „privatizing” and further on of capturing the hierarchization systems and those of social accrediting of values does not confirm the thesis of conversion towards a *reflexive modernity* (Ulrich Beck⁹² 1986), but it rather appears as the clearest symptom of the *failure of the Western modernity*. The moment when Beck requests a *rational analysis of rationality* and defines the world in which we live as a *society of risks*, he admits the failure of a thinking being in a deadlock. *Failed modernity* (reflexive or not) is directly confronted with a problem of trust (of ontological security). The

86 A reference work in this respect is that of Alain Touraine - *Critique de la modernité* - Arthème Fayard 1992.

87 Jean Francois Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, Harper and Row, 1983, p. 3

88 The terrorist attacks, the Islamic fundamentalism and the war in Ukraine are but visible symptoms of a political process with a much wider span.

89 The world history is the arbiter who decides in the end on whose side justice is.

90 Francis Fuykuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om*, [The End of History and the Last Man] Ed. Paideia, București, 1994, p. 132

91 In ancient history (Ancient and Medieval) one can talk about a hypothetical separation at the most. The obvious lack of balance in the authoritarian political regimes, the judicial power being nothing but the puppet of a legislative that orders the executive in a discretionary way. In the European democracies, the balance of powers often proves to be precarious: this is how there were possible corruption and political imorality within states that are part of, or tend to get integrated within the Euroatlantic structures.

92Ulrich Beck, *La société du risque: sur la voie d'une autre modernité*, Ed. Aubier, Paris, 2001

way Anthony Giddens⁹³ noticed – this problem of trust implies two types of relationships: between individual and institutions, i.e. between subject and reason. But the two types of relationships, the way Cornelius Castoriadis underlines, are beneath the setting up: „*L'autotransformation de la société concerne le faire social – et donc aussi politique, au sens profond du terme – des hommes dans la société, et rien d'autre. Le faire pensant, et le penser politique – le penser de la société comme se faisant, - en est une composante essentielle.*”⁹⁴ The political construction of society based on the principle of efficiency claims for technical relationships. Thus, „certain aims and interests of domination are not only subsequently and from outside imposed to technique, they are already comprised within the construction of the technical apparatus; technique is always a social-historical project; here it is projected what the society intends to do – and the interests that dominate it – with people and things.”⁹⁵ The technical relationship between the authority of the forms of thinking and their political underpinnings cannot be denied⁹⁶. The institutions, beyond the abstract nature of procedures, remain forms of manifestation of a thinking with identifiable paternity. The *eidōs* that grounds the institutions sends one to a will of political nature associated to a power. This power dissimulates and distributes responsibilities towards certain symbolic „victims”. The Western modernity has failed in the intricate process of reproduction of the „systems” that have failed themselves, too, politically, but look for alternative expressions⁹⁷ of *aggiornamento* („bringing up to date/actualization”).

The abstract systems (inclusively the institutions – as expressions of the power without face) legitimate themselves based on the objective – scientific knowledge and their prestige is maintained with the help of the leaders' professional authority. Once with the development of new technologies, one can notice a visible trend of conferring an impersonal character to these relationships between individuals and institution. Nevertheless, the abstract systems are political constructs: they conceal the master without face. The lack of trust in the political class⁹⁸ (statistically proved) and in general, in the modern systems of governing and administration of societies, derive to a great extent from the highly dispersed nature of the responsibility of the political decision. At the shed of procedures – political or administrative decisions have a definite paternity – only for those cases in which they connote immediate image gains. That is why, modernity suffocated by procedures rationally grounded cannot be saved through reflexive re-setting. The modern man is devoid of trust and the most impersonal interaction with the institutions shall not regain his trust, since the most neutral procedures do not but foster and maintain the political fear. The master without face is the essential cause of our failed modernity: reason accustoms to good discipline methodically and has got to dominate beyond science and technique, a world in which the sufficient reasoning of any contesting or denial is *a priori* abolished.

93 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990

94 Cornelius Castoriadis, *L'institution imaginaire de la société*, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1975, p. 538

95 Jürgen Habermas, *Cunoaștere și comunicare*, p. 144

96 Sorin Borza, *Geometria consensului. Fundamentele politice ale autorității formelor de gândire [The Geometry of Consensus. The political underpinnings of the authority of the forms of thought]*, Ed. Eikon, Cluj, 2014

97 Stalin and Mao were never judged within analogous frameworks, as well as Hitler did not get the white cheques which the West granted to the Soviet power. The Pol Pot Experiment is another proof of these inconsistencies.

98 Hans Magnus Enzensberger: „Les hommes politiques sont vexés que les gens s'intéressent moins à eux; ils feraient mieux de se demander à quoi cela est dû.” Cf. Ulrich Beck, *Le conflit des deux modernités et la question de la disparition des solidarités*, in *Lien social et Politiques*, Rioc 39, 1998, p. 23

The rational analysis of the sufficient reasoning⁹⁹ of the political body is an endeavour that has lost its credibility: it legitimates a hierarchical relation with immediate social effects and does not prove allegiance to any knowledge devoid of power interests. In this process of political engaging of the authority of the forms of thought, the Western modernity has failed its main pledge: it is not more guarded from the arbitrary of the „will for power”¹⁰⁰ than were the satraps of Antiquity or the inquisitors of the Middle Ages. In the public space, people seem to be ahead politically: they are well aware that the most objective institutional procedure and the most neutral institution bears with itself a power interest. Post-modernity and the entire veil of associated „cultural concepts”¹⁰¹ cannot hide the practical consequences of the transfer of political responsibility incurring on the abstract systems. The *Power without face* is the creation of the reason that has evacuated man out of his centre to the benefit of the principle of output or efficiency. When Herbert Marcuse talks about the „principle of the repressive reality”¹⁰² he realizes in fact the discriminatory role of the forms of rationality accredited by a dominant political system. The *Status quo* uses rationalism (in the sense given by the ruling political regime) as a „discrimination machine”¹⁰³ serving certain primary motivations¹⁰⁴. In the rush for efficiency, modernity fails (to the benefit of the *elites without face*) the moral articulation of the political body. The imminence of this peril was grasped in the XX-th century by Martin Heidegger. He is of opinion that the peril is bad, evil „and therefore the fiercest is the thought itself. It has to think against itself, which rarely is within its reach.”¹⁰⁵ This *thinking* is invited to *think against itself* and has to start commencing from its own failures.

The failed modernity can be overcome solely by the effort of a thinking that has recognized and yielded already the technical-political load of its own fundamentals. This yielding involves an endeavour of philosophical nature. The philosophical thinking must incline itself yet again upon those laws of sensitivity (*Sinnlichkeit*) of which Kant did not speak very clearly and is constrained to make it within a society in which he lives and develops reasonings through the critique of its own traditions¹⁰⁶ (Jurgen Habermas). Philosophy itself must accept to descend to that world wherein people want what a single reason does not have (R. Rorthy *welt ohne*

99 Ulrich Beck, the one who proposes it, has never brought the analysis to the end and has approached from a less pragmatist side its social-historical significance.

100 „The question regarding the values is *more fundamental* than the question regarding the certainty: the latter acquires its significance by the premise that the question regarding the values has got an answer”. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Voința de putere*, Romanian translation Claudiu Baciu, Ed. Aion, Oradea, 1999, p. 388

101 Beyond this aggressive metaphor, we can place the „soft thinking” (Gianni Vattimo), as „delayed modernity” (Alain Touraine),

102 In fact, Marcuse distinguishes between *repression* (which functions as a basic principle of the construction of mankind – a diminution of the quantity present out of pleasure with the aim of a subsequently enhanced report of happiness) and *over-repression* (as a historical function of maintaining and enhancing the domination of a social group upon the rest of mankind).

103 Herbert Marcuse, *Tolérance répressive*, Homnisphères, 2008, p. 36-40, or Herbert Marcuse, *Éros et Civilisation*, Boston 1955, Paris, Minuit, 1963,

104 The libidinal rationality (*rationalité libidineuse*) to which Marcuse makes reference to, does not appear to be, unfortunately, a pragmatic solution. „*Le principe de plaisir ne fut pas détrôné uniquement parce qu'il travaillait contre le progrès de la civilisation, mais aussi parce qu'il travaillait contre une civilisation dans laquelle le progrès assure la survivance de la domination et du labeur.*” Herbert Marcuse, *Eros et civilisation*, p. 46.

105 Martin Heidegger, *Originea operei de artă*, [The Origins of the Work of Art] Romanian translation Th. Kleininger, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 365

106 „At that period of time already [the end of the '50s] the issue that I was concerned with, was a theory of modernity, a theory of the pathology of modernity, from the point of view of the – deformed – fulfilment of reason in history” Jurgen Habermas would notice the determinant role of the „double function of the technical progress (as a production force and as an ideology)” in society and thus recognizing a way in which science and technique get loaded with political interest. p.142

Absolutes) and wherein the principle of reality was never dethroned by ideologies, words or abstract systems.