

## ***CIVILIANS IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS: BETWEEN POLEMOMOLOGY, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY***

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*Abstract: The issue of protecting civilians in theaters of operations is an important concern since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. It is correlated to the desire to build stability and, therefore, safety in areas affected by military conflict, with the cooperation between both the local civilian population and, where appropriate, the local policy-makers, and military forces deployed in those theaters.*

*The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify and analyze the status and role of the local civilian population, but also the factors and relationships that it has with the other two categories of actors in a theater of operations (peacekeepers and enemy forces). The analysis will assume that, on the one hand, the local civilian population is affected by both types of forces acting in the space, and on the other hand, the cultural models of the actors mentioned, in most cases, are not similar. Following the thread of conceptual developments arising here and entering the definition of the conflict as an open opposition between different categories of stakeholders that affects the social interaction, the theme of this paper directs our attention to other areas outside the strictly military one, namely Polemology, Social Psychology and Anthropology.*

**Keywords:** local civilian population, peace operations, stability operations, counterinsurgency, cultural models.

### **Foreword:**

Peace operations, stability operations, counterinsurgency operations are now instruments to support the countries along the difficult way from conflict to peace. This terms are used by the United Nation (UN), but also by both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Such operations include military, police and civilian personnel and they aim at providing security in areas affected by conflict.

The issue of civilian populations in theaters of operations is not a new concern; it existed since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century<sup>1</sup>. The situation is particularly complicated because the civilian population is subject of conflicting messages both from the peace forces and enemy forces, and their ethnic, religious and cultural models place them mainly in the area initially altered by the enemy forces. Relations between these three main actors in a theater of operations are complex; the local population is affected by both types of main forces acting in this space. One of the stakes is public support for peace operations, but unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve this objective due to the many different factors influencing the human individuals.

Following the thread of conceptual developments - specifically by entering in the analysis the definition of conflict as an open opposition between different categories of stakeholders to affect social interaction - the theme of this study directs our attention to areas outside the strictly military one, namely Social Psychology and Anthropology.

### **1. Conflict and war – more than Polemology**

According to the commonly used definition in Social Sciences, conflict is an open opposition, a struggle between individuals, groups, classes, communities, states with incompatible or divergent interests of different natures (political, economic, ethnic, religious etc.) whose effects on social interaction are disruptive and destructive<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, war is a form of interaction between not only the armed parties, but also a form of social interaction that is primarily between two or more communities; it manifests in the form of violent conflict, often armed and circumscribed to a strict set of rules<sup>3</sup>. In both definitions, there are two key-words: *social interaction* and *community*.

Social interaction requires the existence of an interference between actions initiated by human individuals or groups, by which it/they influence each other in three possible forms: cooperation, opposition (competition or conflict) and accommodation.

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<sup>1</sup> This issue is also developed in the research study “Abordări teoretice și practice asupra obținerii sprijinului populației locale în teatrele de operații: studiu de cercetare științifică” published by the author at the NDU Publishing House (Bucharest) in 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Elena ZAMFIR, “Conflict”, in *Dicționar de sociologie*, C. Zamfir and L. Vlăsceanu (eds.), Ed. Babel, 1998, pp. 128-129.

<sup>3</sup> Alfred BULAI, “Război” in *Op. Cit.*, C. Zamfir and L. Vlăsceanu (eds.), Ed. Babel, 1998, pp. 487-488.

It is noted that both war and conflict include civilian population that represents an essential component parts of the stake, but also a victim. In the case of an armed conflict, as a form of opposition, the population in theater of operations may undergo a process of habituation, which means adjusting the actions and interactions between itself and one of the conflicting parties in order to increase compatibility between them<sup>4</sup>.

The local population is affected by conflict not only physically, but also psychologically; the conflict induces fear, despair, and alienation, destroys the social order (in terms of institutional and social systems, such as family and community). So, the issue of local population in theaters of operations is not a simple one and a wide range of issues are need to be clarified: from problems of legitimacy of the intervention to the psychosocial representation on intervention troops and human relationships.

The end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century were marked in terms of military strategy by the approach promoted by French general Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey<sup>5</sup> who, in an article that became a landmark study of military strategy, “Du rôle colonial de l’Armée”<sup>6</sup>, correlates the colonial conquest with an economic role, trying to bring together the economic interest of military colonial operations with the interests and habits of the local population. According to time’s chronicles and Lyautey’s writings<sup>7</sup>, his idealistic approach, which was implemented in Morocco, has not been successful: no points organized by French soldiers as shopping areas for Moroccans, no military doctors who provide consultations to local people have helped dissolve the dissident groups, but, on the contrary, the locals boycotted the measures that Lyautey considered as constructive.

Over nearly half a century, the approach is used again in the so-called Malayan crisis (1948-1960), where the British troops have provided medical and food aid to the locals<sup>8</sup>, and also in Vietnam, where American troops and South Vietnamese officials have designed programs and

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<sup>4</sup> Lazăr VLĂȘCEANU, “Interacțiune socială” in *Op. Cit.*, C. Zamfir and L. Vlăsceanu (coord.), Ed. Babel, 1998, p. 305.

<sup>5</sup> Peter PARET, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986, pp.376-407.

<sup>6</sup> The original paper to be found on URL: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5700991m> (Colonel H. LYAUTEY, “Du rôle colonial de l’Armée”, in *Questions du temps présent*, Armand Colin & C<sup>ie</sup>, Paris, 1900).

<sup>7</sup> Hubert LYAUTEY, *Vers le Maroc*, Paris, 1937 apud Peter PARET, *Op. Cit.*, 1986, p. 391-392.

<sup>8</sup> Australian War Memorial, *Malayan Emergency, 1950–60*, URL: <https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/malayan-emergency/>, accessed on 07.04.2015.

strategies aimed at winning popular support and countering the insurgency of Viet Cong<sup>9</sup>. Called “winning hearts and minds”, the approach was used in theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the aim to provide confidence in the security forces and security to the local population while defeating insurgent forces.

Later, in 2006, US officials - developing the proposals made by Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson in a previously published article (*An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs*<sup>10</sup>) - approved the funding of five test-teams called “Human Terrain Team” (HTT), comprised of specialists in Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science, Linguistics, etc., whose purpose was to provide military commanders with accurate description of local people. The experts<sup>11</sup> have identified three levels of cultural knowledge - which though do not meet the requirements of scientific description, explanation and prediction - offer information about the population in the theaters of operations: the cultural knowledge (first level and the easiest to provide, needed at tactical level, that implies general information about language, religion and local rules); the cultural understanding (only a few commanders said they had reached this level with the help of HTT; involves explaining behavior through perception, attitudes, and habits) and the cultural intelligence (understanding the effects of behaviors identified in the previous step, which helps the theaters decision making process).<sup>12</sup>

The program did not deliver the expected results; it was disputed by specialists in Anthropology and, at the same time, it raised suspicions, proven in terms of fraud and sexual and racial harassment, so that in the autumn of 2014, the program has been closed<sup>13</sup>. One of the most critical evaluation of the HTT system and activities was conducted by the Association of American Anthropologist (AAA) and the US Security and Intelligence Communities

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<sup>9</sup> Jeremy Patrick WHITE, *Civil Affairs in Vietnam*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, URL: [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090130\\_vietnam\\_study.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090130_vietnam_study.pdf), accessed on 07.04.2015.

<sup>10</sup> Montgomery McFATE, Andrea JACKSON, “An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs”, in *Military Review*, July-August 2005, URL: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mcfate2.pdf>, accessed on 09.01.2015.

<sup>11</sup> Arthur SPEYER, Job HENNING, “MCIA's Cultural Intelligence Methodology and Lessons Learned”, in *Socio-Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm*, Virginia, 2006, apud Christopher J. LAMB, James Douglas ORTON, Michael C. DAVIES, Theodore T. PIKULSKY, „The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams”, in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 70, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2013, p.26.

<sup>12</sup> Christopher J. LAMB, James Douglas ORTON, Michael C. DAVIES, Theodore T. PIKULSKY, *Op. Cit.*, 2013, p.26.

<sup>13</sup> Tom Vanden BROOK, “Army Kills Controversial Social Science Program”, in *USA Today*, 29 June 2015, URL: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/29/human-terrain-system-afghanistan/29476409/>, accessed on 21.04.2015.

(CEAUSSIC), whose Joint Report synthesized that this activity is not a legitimate exercise of the profession of anthropologist; ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions: it cannot be externally assessed, the data are collected in the context of war, it is integrated into counterinsurgency, and the environment has a coercive potential<sup>14</sup>.

The American initiative has yet not started from flawed premise; the tools that transcend the sphere of military intelligence, originating in Social Psychology and Anthropology are necessary in assessing population in theaters of operations. Furthermore, the categories of military intelligence operations, defined by the American *Joint Publication 2-0* (planning and conducting, data collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, evaluation and feedback)<sup>15</sup>, include such tools especially in the areas of collection, processing, analysis and feedback. The actions before peace, stabilization, and counterinsurgency operations could benefit from the application of methods, techniques and tools such as participative or non-participative observation, sociological survey by questionnaire or interview, anamnesis, social analysis of documents, etc. Data and information resulting from here would serve not only to the intelligence strategic level, but also to the operational and tactical ones. At a strategic level, the intelligence evaluates foreign state and non-state actors' intentions, and investigates the military, economic, political, and social areas in connection with that space geography and demography.

## 2. Some facts on present

Currently, the UN, EU, and NATO are operating with a number of tools that aim to achieve and maintain peace and stability in war-affected countries. It is about peace, stabilization and/counterinsurgency operations. At EU level, integration is promoted as a way to support peace, prosperity and reduce the number of conflicts around the world. The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the Union supports peace, its values and the well-being of people and aims to promote peace, conflict prevention and strengthening international security<sup>16</sup>. EU is moving

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<sup>14</sup> American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), *Final Report on The Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program*, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-0. Joint Intelligence*, 2013, URL: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp2\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf), accessed on 22.04.2015.

<sup>16</sup> *Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2012)*, 2012, URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal->

towards developing a civilian component of crisis management in four key areas - police, rule of law, strengthening civil administration and civil protection - whose specific capabilities can be used in autonomous EU missions or operations under UN or OSCE<sup>17</sup>. These goals are achieved through conflict prevention, peace building and mediation. At NATO level, such operations are circumscribed to the more comprehensive category of non-Article 5 operations, i.e. crisis response operations and peace support operations, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace building, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. These operations are conducted in support of a UN or OSCE mandate or at the request of a sovereign government, and involve military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies<sup>18</sup>.

According to the range of NATO missions<sup>19</sup>, conflict prevention is conducted under the Chapter VI of UN Charter, and includes actions from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of forces to prevent escalation of disputes in armed conflicts, including fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring. Peacekeeping refers to operations under the same Chapter VI of the UN Charter that are conducted with the consensus of the parties of the conflict in order to facilitate the monitoring and implementation of a peace agreement. Peace restoration covers diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict in order to achieve a quick ceasefire or imposing peace through activities whose range varies from good offices, mediation, and conciliation to diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions. Peace building refers to those actions that support the political, economic, social and military measures and arrangements aimed at strengthening the policy agreements in order to correct the causes of conflict. Peace enforcement is conducted under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter; it has a binding nature, is driven by mutual consent, and its goal is to maintain or restore peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. Humanitarian operations are aimed at alleviating human suffering and may precede or accompany activities like the ones of some civil organizations.<sup>20</sup>

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content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN, accessed on 25.04.2015.

<sup>17</sup> European Union, *European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management*, 2009, URL: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20management%20-%20version%203\\_EN.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20management%20-%20version%203_EN.pdf), accessed on 25.04.2015.

<sup>18</sup> NATO, *Topic: Crisis management*, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49193.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49193.htm), accessed on 26.04.2015.

<sup>19</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>20</sup> *Idem*.

Therefore, in this field, the terminology is vast, dealing with the terms such as peace operations, stability operations, and reconstruction operations. For example, during the phase of peace or preventing conflict, both the political and diplomatic relations and the development aid dominate. During the escalation phase can be carried out both preventive military or police operations and activities of mediation. At the level of crisis or conflict management, there can be deployed: humanitarian aid, military or police forces, and mediation. In the post conflict phase, the range of operations that can be performed is much wider than in previous stages: humanitarian aid; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; rule of law, reconstruction, public administration reform, political stabilization, gender and human rights; civil protection; infrastructure rehabilitation. Follows the post conflict and the prevention of a new conflict phase in which humanitarian aid, reconciliation and democratization are prevailing.<sup>21</sup>

Overall, the more comprehensive strategic imperative that corresponds to this type of operation emphasizes the activities that provide population in the theater of operations with benefits at the expense of traditional direct actions on enemy forces. The conceptual change from “enemy-centered” to “people-centered” is reflected in the core elements of stability operations.

The Multinational Force or the military units participate in the execution of these operations in accordance with international law on the use of armed forces, with the obligations of that state for achieving international security and stability, and internal regulation. In such actions, the military force enhances the instruments of the international power that has been entrusted to manage a crisis in a given area<sup>22</sup>.

However, initially, the military interventions for humanitarian purposes were considered “aberrations” in the IR, but gradually became an important item of the foreign policy agendas of the great powers<sup>23</sup>. Since 1994 it has been suggested the concept of *sovereign responsibility to protect civilians*, but only in the context of environmental problems and natural disasters (the

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<sup>21</sup> European Union - Directorate-general for external policies of the Union, *Standard briefing towards an EU peacebuilding strategy? EU civilian coordination in peacebuilding and the effects of the Lisbon Treaty*, 2010, URL: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260410peacebuildingstrategy/sede260410peacebuildingstrategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260410peacebuildingstrategy/sede260410peacebuildingstrategy_en.pdf), accessed on 25.04.2015.

<sup>22</sup> Grigore ALEXANDRESCU and Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, *Operații militare expediționare*, NDU Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 28-30.

<sup>23</sup> Taylor S. SEYBOLT, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 1.



Yokohama Strategy and Action Plan for a Safer World). The Strategy states “each state has the sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens against natural disasters”<sup>24</sup>. Later in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty launches *Responsibility to Protect*, completed in December with a Report with the same title<sup>25</sup>. It shows that any approach to intervention, which aims to protect people, must meet at least four basic objectives: setting rules, procedures and clear criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene; establish the legitimacy of military intervention when it is necessary and after all other approaches have failed; ensuring that the military intervention, when necessary, seeks only the established goals and the effective and necessary measures were taken to reduce human and institutional costs; helping to remove the causes of conflict, as are improved conditions for lasting peace. The latest debates focus on the recognition that it is not about the right to intervene, but about the responsibility to protect each state where people are suffering because of disasters that can be avoided, such as mass killings and rapes, ethnic cleansing, deliberate starvation, exposure to contagious diseases, etc. This leads to the idea that when national governments are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens against such catastrophes, the responsibility should be taken by the international community.

### **3. Instead of conclusions: peace forces – local population – enemy forces**

The relations between the three main players in a theater of operations – the peace forces, the local population and the enemy forces - are extremely complex; the local population is affected by both types of forces acting in that space. The stakes in this context is public support for peace operations, but unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve it because the many factors influencing the human individuals.

Despite the fact that humanitarian aid and peace and stability operations are considered by most of the international community as a vital tool to support governments in fulfilling their responsibilities, the locals which become the object of protection often have an attitude of rejection of teams/military arriving on their territory.

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<sup>24</sup> UN, *Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World*, May 1994, Art. 7, Paragraph A, [http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about\\_isdr/bd-yokohama-strat-eng.htm](http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-yokohama-strat-eng.htm).

<sup>25</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect - Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001, <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>.



The balance between political and humanitarian issues is delicate and the relationship between military and civilian actors with humanitarian purposes is fragile, but very important. If these issues are not handled carefully, humanitarian interventions may cause loss of human lives and may perpetuate or exacerbate problems that they actually need to solve.

The efforts to obtain the support of the local population in theaters of operations was developed with a component of the local stabilization (Locally Focused Stability Operations - LFSO) designed to improve the local security, sustainable development and effective governance in localities strategically positioned, but they do not have a specific doctrine yet. However, this type of operation has been implemented since 2010 in Afghanistan with local Afghan police, based on a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy designed to achieve “security and stability bubbles” or “white spaces”<sup>26</sup> around villages, paying attention and support for governance and local development. In 2014, a group of experts from the RAND Corporation has developed LFSO definition as “mission, tasks and activities that build security, governance and development by and through the community directly affected in order to increase stability at local level”<sup>27</sup>. Both the definition and practice have proved the complexity of such operations whose purpose is to create sustainable stability not only in that locality, but also in the entire region. To do this, LFSO have some immediate goals that lead through a causal chain to the achievement of the main goal and a series of high-level goals:

- Immediate goals: establishing a local force, developing projects for that locality, setting up a local council;
- Main goal: a sustainable stability in the locality;
- High-level goals: sustainable stability in the region, reducing the threat to the host nation government, strategic advantage for the LFSO nation (i.e. USA).<sup>28</sup>

The causal chain that leads to the goal of the operation proves its complexity: from action in the economic and social areas (reducing unemployment) to actions in the political and military fields (better integration of the locality in the host nation, local government efficiency, enhanced security) taking place in an environment often characterized by the existence of anti-

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<sup>26</sup> Lisa SAUM-MANNING, *VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense*, National Defense Research Institute, RAND, 2012, p.7.


<sup>27</sup> Jan OSBURG, Christopher PAUL, Lisa SAUM-MANNING, Dan MADDEN, Leslie A. PAYNE, *Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations*, RAND Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, 2014, p. 2.

<sup>28</sup> *Idem.*

government local militias, some local illegitimate powers, and government corruption<sup>29</sup>. Moreover, the causal chain may be affected by the fact that stability must be achieved before development, but at the same time, development triggers stability, and that effects are not always the desired ones; development leads, indeed, to the LFSO desired stability, but it can also lead to increased competition/conflict for the resources that become available. In this regard, the RAND experts have identified a few unwanted effects of implementing a LFSO: reducing violence can be an indicator of complete control of an area by an opposing force and not by the legitimate one; development of transport infrastructure improves access to health and food, but also the freedom of movement of opposing forces; greater ability to achieve security will reduce violence, but it is possible to increase the totalitarian tendencies and corruption; long-term presence of peacekeeping forces is the key for success, but it can create both resentment of the local population regarding them and dependence on their presence.<sup>30</sup>

Besides LFSO, the range of operations designed to achieve and consolidate peace and security includes Public Affairs (PA) or Public Relations (PR), Civil Affairs (CA) and Civil Relations (CR), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Information Operations (INFO OPS) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

Despite various campaigns of PA, CA, INFO OPS and PSYOPS, there are groups among the local population that threaten the security of both the locals and the peace forces.



**Fig. 1:** *The number of peace forces victims as a result of malicious actions (UN, 1990-2015)*<sup>31</sup>


<sup>29</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 29-50.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, *Fatalities*, 2015, URL:

According to statistics published by the UN, the number of victims in peacemaking missions is significant (Fig. 1). It is noted that, except 1993-1994, the average annual victims' number after malicious actions on peacemaking staff is about 16 people. Unfortunately, the statistics do not provide information on attackers in order to distinguish between those who are in the insurgency and those conducting unplanned actions.

The same statistics allow a comparison between the types of events that resulted in casualties among peace forces (Fig. 2).



**Fig. 2:** *The number of victims in peace forces on event type (UN, 1990-2015)*<sup>32</sup>

The number of victims as a result of malicious actions vary from year to year over the past 25 years, with a significant increase in the last five years (almost double compared to 2009).

It is obvious in this context that beyond the expected and planned effects, the peace operations can have unexpected results. Like any intervention from outside of a system, the peace operation brings changes to the complex social system represented by the locality in which such missions are conducted. The social system, regardless of the level of organization to which it refers, may have a variety of internal states according to the degree of stability characteristic of one or another state<sup>33</sup>. Achieving balance by such a system is a continuous process in which

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml>, accessed on 29.04.2015.

<sup>32</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>33</sup> Cătălin ZAMFIR, "Sistem social", in *Dicționar de sociologie*, C. Zamfir and L. Vlăsceanu (eds.), Ed. Babel, 1998, pp. 543-545.

balancing and rebalancing take place successively, and any outside factor affects the entire process. Systemic reactions to external intervention may be intended or unintended, meaning that the intervention was designed to bring about these changes or the changes to the system are completely unexpected.

Peace-building, stabilization and increasing the level of security efforts require cooperation between various agencies including governments, private sector, civil society, international organizations, thus they require an international and multi-agency environment. As the number and diversity of these actors are increasing, peace operations grow in complexity, so that it becomes increasingly more difficult as the premise from which they start - that neutrality of their effects - can no longer be demonstrated. Rather, as with any social system, we can talk about both intended and unintended effects, and positive and negative effects. Reducing uncertainty can be achieved to some extent by clarifying certain aspects of local population psychology. Furthermore, it is imperative that the entire analysis takes into account that people of a conflict environment can simultaneously have multiple roles: victim, perpetrator, witness, catalyst or protector<sup>34</sup>. The clarification of these roles is even more difficult as it is difficult to identify the real image, the psychosocial representation that individuals in theater of operations have towards security forces.

The complexity of this process is given by the complexity of the social system, the social relations, the relationship between peace forces - the local population - the enemy forces and, not least, the subject of this process - the human individual.

Obtaining the support of local population is impossible without a prior analysis of these issues and, we can say with certainty, it is particularly difficult given that such groups are subject to both internal and external influences that are originating from a different cultural understanding of reality.

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<sup>34</sup> Aditi GORUR, *Community Self-Protection Strategies. How Peacekeepers Can Help or Harm*, Issue Brief no.1, 2013, Stimson Center, URL: <http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/stimson-community-self-protection-strategies-how-peacekeepers-can-help-or-harm/>, accessed on 05.05.2015.

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