VERBUM IMITANDI AND LITERARY IMITATION IN THE WORK OF FERNANDO DE HERRERA (1534-1597)

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Abstract: Recent studies in European Renaissance literature agree that poetic arts cannot be conceived outside the concept of imitation, as a key item of artistic mastery. Having surpassed its association with the lack of originality during the XVIII and XIX centuries, imitation is nowadays regarded as the main process of Renaissance literary creation and as a result it is studied in its various manifestations. Modern scholars, such as George Pigman and Richard McKeon, have identified a series of versions of imitation, encompassing pure following (sequi), imitatio, aemulatio and eristic imitation. Such versions, set on basis of the relation established between the poet and its models, also arise subsequent to the polemics launched by Erasmus’s Ciceronianus (1528), these debates spicing up the sixteenth century literary circles, their core being mainly in Italy.

Sixteenth century Spanish literates, although rather immune to such confrontations, while remaining under the domain of Italian thought and erudition, which leads to their subscription to the Italian models in imitation apart from the Ancient ones, also assume Erasmus’s “open-mindedness”, especially as it suits their purpose of cultural expansion and progressive expression at a time when the overseas conquering was at its peak.

Fernando de Herrera’s Anotaciones a la obra de Garcilaso de la Vega (1580) is the main poetic art to account for the various types of expression and practice of poetic imitation during the Spanish Renaissance. Herrera’s commentaries to the poems of Garcilaso include a wide variety of poetic genealogies which display topoi, figures of speech and moreover neo-platonic ideas subject to being imitated.

By taking as main criterion the various verbs employed by Herrera to render the significance of imitation in his genealogies, this paper is aiming at identifying which version of imitation his work is putting forward and as a result which is the literary and political ideology he is serving in the benefit of Spanish letters’ later development.

Keywords: Spanish literature, Renaissance, poetic arts, imitatio auctorum, F. de Herrera.

Whenever we hear the word “imitation” we tend to still pay tribute to our Romantic cultural heritage on the matter and to picture in our minds something which is rather a form of a copy, by all means inferior to its original, to smile at it in a condescended manner, even if indulgent with its imperfections and await patiently for this intermediary state of affairs to reach its ultimate stage of manifestation of pure art, communicating emotion above everything else and keeping as much as possible void of any interferences. Nevertheless, there was a time when such imitations were a legitimate presence in all forms of art and literatures and nowadays, recent investigations are revisiting the original meanings of imitation, as it has become more and more obvious that it is an intrinsic feature of any form of art not only to refer to but also to build itself upon references to other forms of art, to the extent that the whole system of literature is based on such borrowings and reprocessing of previous artistic traditions. Hence, the study of the its functional mechanism has been taking over the leads, as imitation is still leaving us intriguingly unaware of the ways a poetic creation could be rearranging its sources so that it survives independently from them on one hand, and on the
other remaining indicative of the writer’s peculiar style in such a way that it could not be taken for another’s.

Leaving apart the Aristotelian sense of mimesis, the rhetorical concept used by Quintilian, *imitatio auctorum*, is the one about which, during the European Renaissance, most poetic theories proclaimed three important aspects: imitation as a pedagogical method used to teach children in schools, further on in life as a literary technique for poets aspiring at perfecting their art, and last but not least, the theory on imitation as a battlefield for poetry theorists, whom one may be called today, literary critics. Each of these aspects was more or less to be depicted in poetic treaties usually bearing pretty much the same title: *On imitation*. The classification of such Renaissance poetic arts treaties used by Victoria Pineda (1994) clearly and vividly unveils the first aspect of the rhetorical imitation as a pedagogical method, and speaks about writings for *puerilis imitatio* and for *virilis imitation*. *Puerilis imitatio* consisted of a sum of early modern pedagogical exercises imposed in practice through the manuals written by school masters for their pupils. A very interesting example shows how the pupils were supposed to “decompose” the model text several times taking into account the invention, disposition and elocution. First he had to identify types of demonstrations and arguments, secondly to dissect the parts of discourse into very small pieces and to study their collocation and disposition, which meant to divide it into smaller and smaller pieces, and thirdly to jot down words and expressions that had impressed him, to find all their meanings inside the text, to make an inventory of all topoi used and of all types of prosody items. It seems like a complicated, fruitful and efficient study which was eventually meant to make the scholar achieve as close as possible the same style as his model or models. The second type, *virilis imitation*, continues the first, but envisages imitation as a practice and acquisition of *copia rerum et verborum* by already trained adult poets, which leads us to the second aspect, imitation as literary technique. In terms of purposes, its practice encompass ideas such as imitation being a path to the sublime in Longinus, the reinforcement of one’s natural inclinations in Poliziano, a substitute for undesirable inclinations in Cortesi, a method for enriching one’s writing with stylistic gems, the surest way to learn Latin in Delminio, a means to provide the competitive stimulus for achievement in Calganini, or the means for illustrating a vulgar language in Du Bellay. But no matter its purpose, the ways in which imitation builds the relationship between the poet and its model, the type of rapport established between them is thoroughly studied on basis of the metaphors of imitation appearing in the works of various ancient, medieval and renaissance authors’ writings by George Pigman (1979). He analyses the divisions of the species of imitation in *sequi*, *imitari*, *aemulari*, the categories introduced by Bartolomeo Ricci in his *De imitatione* (1541). He shows how *sequi* refers to the mere follower, who feels overwhelmed by his master model and usually takes over his style without trying to improve his own in any way. *Imitari* is an adoption of style but in full understanding of the process, an appropriation and recognition of the model’s dominion over the poet’s creations, while the *aemulari* is the utmost stage in which the poet manages to surpass his models over a combat of skills, also resulting out of a feeling of envy, which makes Pigman refer to this last type of relation between the poet and his model with the term of “eristic imitation”. All of the above and much more are usually dealt with in reflective writings produced by poets involved in acute debates during the XV and XVI centuries, which leads us to briefly describe the third aspect of imitation as a battlefield of ideas. By
merely synthesizing the impressive work of García Galiano (1992) on the matter, one must point out that these debates have at their core Erasmus’s *Ciceronianus* and his defence against the simple imitation of one author only, namely Cicero. Although it might seem nowadays obvious that this is the reasonable path to follow, back then it was considered that Cicero, as the epitome of ethics, given that he placed his utterly developed linguistic and rhetorical technique in the benefit of the community. He was considered the utmost model of stylistic purity and hence the absolute measure for human reasoning, which anyway had long before the Renaissance exhausted all topics of style. As a result, there were poets who decided to imitate Cicero only, and this was so to such an extent that the Belgian poet, Christophe Longueil, decided to emulate his works, which had been thoroughly dissected by Lorenzo Valla in his *Elegantiae*, for long ten years, so that he would never be “contaminated” with the writings of others. Historical adequacy (*decorum*) was the main argument Erasmus brought in favour of multiple imitation, advocating that one could not speak of things of the present when he does not have at hand but things of the past. In Italy, as Garcia Galiano shows, this controversy was developed in three stages, first between Poggio Bracciolini and Lorenzo Valla (1452), then Paolo Cortese and Angelo Poliziano (1480) and eventually Pietro Bembo and Pico della Mirandola (1513). Whereas in Spain, where the Italian Renaissance serves as the very definition of the origin of culture, these matters were taken over much more diplomatically, and the main treaty developing the doctrine of *imitatio auctorum*, and bearing the title of *De imitatione* (1554) by Fox Morcillo, while already taking for granted the concept of multiple imitation, is enriching it by introducing the concept of *consensio naturae*. Morcillo argues that it is not so much that a poet is supposed to imitate more than one model, but he is entitled to choose those models on the criterion of the harmony of natures, the sympathy of minds, arguing that one could not imitate but models with whom one has a similar form of expression and reasoning. Taking into account that treaties on imitation were written by scholars concerned with the theories of styles and philosophy of language and were addressing other scholars and poets who aimed at improving their style, the above brief description of the main meanings poetic treaties provide for the rhetorical imitation, which as we have seen include imitation as pedagogical technique, both for children and adults, as literary technique, given that trained scholars continue their studies of poetry and as battlefield for reflection on the art of poetry, all of which essentially makes them look like some sort of manuals intended and used for individual study and practice.

All things considered, irrespective of which of the three aspects one might address, it stands out clearly that the Renaissance theory and practice on imitation was above everything else a textual enterprise, the main concern was for language, while poetry was the proper manner of improving expression. Through the works of Pietro Bembo and Francisco Petrarca, the *questione della lingua* becomes a crucial stage in the history of Italian culture, and besides the practice of rhetoric and aesthetics, many of these treaties circulating in Europe were mainly aiming at drafting a linguistic doctrine. They share this common idea, that every vernacular language can achieve the dignity of a language of culture and the arts, provided that it is cultivated with care, effort and thought, hence the values of polishing, refining, and adorning the spoken language, just as Romans had done with Latin. With the massive and organized reproduction of past traditions and styles, the translation, imitation and selective adoption of past values, we can no longer speak exclusively of a mere exercise of individual
development and enhancement of knowledge, but rather of imitation as a way to enrich the spoken language with the proper tools for also managing new concepts and eventually develop an altogether new cultural legacy, which is already an expansion to the collective level of understanding. Binotti (2012) in her study on the formation of Spanish cultural canon and usage of collective cultural capital contributes with useful explanations on the mechanisms of cultural transference of knowledge between Italy and Spain: “There is no doubt that through the questione della lingua debates Italian intellectuals created a language capable of developing the discursive strategies necessary for the conceptualization of new knowledge, new disciplinary boundaries and new audiences/consumers. In other words, the Italians created the template within which to construct the European vernaculars. What they sold were the tools to transform a vernacular into cultural capital and with it they sold a manual, the theoretical reflection that explained how to make a language a precious vehicle that ultimately would explain more effectively the value of the product it advertised.” (Binotti: 2012, 14) This model-imitator relationship between Italian and Spanish scholars was nurtured by a long-lasting competition, a controversial engagement and an internal polemical intention that Spain shows against the same Italian culture that had originally served as a model. Binotti also shows a very interesting mechanism through which the vernacular became in Castile, Portugal and Aragon the language of the empire, long before Spain was even a territorial concept: “The Spanish elite, Boscán, Garcilaso and Herrera, used the Italian linguistic framework to reflect their own language, as well as to project its prestigious image to the rest of the world.” By advocating for a political icons creating view on imitation, Binotti’s perspective widens the concept towards the legitimization of a culture and the concurrent formation of a pre-national identity through cross-border imitation of linguistic reflection. The following practical part seeks at proving her assumptions.

Herrera’s Annotations to the poetry of Garcilaso de la Vega are not a poetic art, neither a treaty on imitation, such are the ones written in Latin and meant to analyse this topic, as it was usual especially consequent to the Erasmist polemics and during the 60-70 years prior to the Annotations being published. Therefore, he does not discuss types of imitation, does not intend to create of a definition for imitation nor does he present the practical process in its various stages, as the pedagogical approach would have imposed. Nevertheless, most of the scholars who have investigated his works are very determined to state firmly that his comments altogether are not only an overwhelming synthesis – at least for Spain – of the science of poetry as it was known at the time, but also that imitation represents the main core of the Annotations, its basic structure articulating its framework meant to transfer knowledge, that it is the mere purpose of having the Annotations written and published, the alpha and omega of this impressive work. As current studies include no demonstration of this statement, there is no alternative but inquiring ourselves how it is that such conclusion was reached. So, on the hypothesis that what we have here is true, we should try to answer several questions: firstly, what are the ideas on imitation that Herrera is sending over to us? Is his text an argumentation in favour of a certain type of imitation? Which are his arguments? And if so, which is this type of imitation? Secondly, is this type of imitation a new one? Could we be speaking of a paradigm change? And thirdly, what use would this new type of imitation be of and what might be the purpose of such an argumentation?
Before anything else, it is very much true that the 700 hundred pages corpus – leaving aside Garcilaso’s works – make constant reference to imitation, almost on every page. And as it is difficult to talk about a geometrical structure of the Annotations, as they are very eclectic and no attempt has been done so far to put them in some kind of order, one might see the occurrences on imitation from two perspectives: on one hand large passages including reflective impulses advocating from various perspective the practice of imitation and on the other hand prodigal examples of the such practice. The analysis of the first group of excerpts, which are included in the introductory comments to the each of the poetic category he studies, the sonnet, the elegies, the eclogues written by Garcilaso, comprise a series of ideas which Herrera sends over with regards to imitation. These are as follows: there is no absolute model, therefore simple imitation of one model alone is out of the question; no language has the absolute dominion of poetry and moreover, inside a language elocution is inexhaustible; imitation’s object, *inventio*, is in its turn inexhaustible; languages do not always display *consesio naturae* between them, so we could speak of a certain incompatibility of languages nature, and eventually imitation is before anything else a process of fighting and competition. The second category of inputs, the more practical ones, include approximately two hundred examples of imitations and the study of the vocabulary Herrera uses to refer to it, might as well be an important contribution to the set of idea he puts forwards on the matter. These occurrences are either mere specifications of the sources Garcilaso uses for his poems, or enriched, contextualized comparisons of Garcilaso usage of various objects of imitation and his sources or other poets having made use of the same type of objects of imitation. In more than half of these cases, no matter if the indication of the source is accompanied by a smaller or larger comment, Herrera uses either no verb at all to indicate the process of imitation or simply states that ¨this is/seems to be imitated from...¨. but even when he offers the sources he is not stating in all certainty that they were the actual models Garcilaso imitated, there is no proof to that, but he is offering a pool of choices which we induce were at hand for any poet wishing to get inspiration in his works. The rest of the occurrences, nevertheless, include, besides the object of imitation, the subject of it, and as a result Herrera uses a verb to indicate such subject. A natural conclusion might be that such verb could be no other but ¨imitar¨ (to imitate), and it is in fact so, but only in less than a quarter of the eighty cases left. The other verbs he uses are ¨seguir¨ (to follow), ¨traer¨ (to bring) and ¨traducir¨ (to translate), although the latter does not always appear as such, but under various forms having the same meaning. While, again, it is of no surprise that he employs ¨seguir¨ for the process of imitation, as it remits immediately to Ricci’s ¨sequi¨ or following, especially that Herrera mainly uses it inside the phrase ¨seguir la opinion de...¨, and he is in most of the times referring to the simple taking over of information, without anyhow reworking it, the other two left deserve special attention. As previously mentioned, ¨traducir¨ does not always appear as such, it can also be represented by phrases such as: ¨hecha española¨; ¨lo cual hizo natural de nuestra lengua...¨; ¨volvio en nuestra lengua deste modo¨. But in all cases the meaning refers to what we know today as translations, and Herrera also mentions who the translator was, mostly Diego Girón, professor in Seville. Whenever he himself is the translator of Virgil or Ovid, he feels an acute need to apologize in all modesty “por el/la rudeza del temerario i [acrilego atrevimiento de penjar traduzillos”, arguing that he only wishes to make the concepts underlying the antique works of wisdom, well-known for the ones who cannot understand Latin. So far, nothing out
of place, were it not to have encountered cases where “traducir” and “imitar” seem interchangeable. The first two cases are in his comments to Eglogue I, “busquemos – […] parece toda si no traduzida, a lo menos contrahecha de la…”, “altísimo - Assi dixo Petrarca en una canción […]. Esta bellíssima egloga quiso imitar o traduzir Lodovico Paterno”, and the third one in the comment to Eglogue II, “que montaña - […] Bien creo, esta tratada esta traslacion de la caça con grande elegancia i hermosura de versos, es imitada o antes traduzida del Sanazaro”. Whereas the first case speaks of a counterfeit inferior to translation, the second one displays translation and imitation on the same level, and the third one sees the latter as superior to the former. Anyhow, Herrera places a doubt on the actual process he is describing, which, if not anything else for the moment, shows he meant at least an approximation between translation and imitation, if not clear superimposition in some cases. This idea is also supported by the actual object of imitation. Had we had the sole case of Latin poetry being translated for the audience who does not speak Latin, it would have been all fine. But in the examples under study, “traducir” is used not only for this cases, that is, it is not only verses or lines of verses that the translator imitated for the reader, but also Cristoval Mosquera de Figueroa and Luis Barahona de Soto or don Diego de Mendoza themselves “translate” when using certain ideas, images, commonplaces, expressions or verses which had been previously used by Garcilaso or the Italian and the Ancient poets, as Garcilaso himself does in his turn when imitating others. Here are several examples: Elegia I, “reciproco lazo - los cuales traduzio el licenciado Cristróbal Mosquera de Figueroa”; Elegia II, “en fragua - parece traduzido este lugar del I de Pontano”; Egloga I, “después - La traduccion es de aquellos versos suavíssimos i hermosíssimos de la Egloga 5”; Egloga II, “eco - el cual, traído a nuestra lengua por el maestro Francisco de Medina, dize desta manera”; Egloga II, “el passo - es traslacion, Ovidio, en el 10, que lo traduzion don Diego de Mendoca”; Egloga III, “osado marido - el cual hizo natural de nuestra lengua Luis Barahona de Soto, estendiendo el conceto”; Egloga III, “viento - hecha española por Cristoval Mosquera dize assi...”. In all of the above cases, even if the verb used refers to translations, the actual example show it actually refers to imitation. An even more interesting group is the one in which the imitation verb is “traer”. First thing that must be mentioned is that this group is the largest, so we can state that the verb mostly used by Herrera to refer to imitation is this one, which in itself is of extreme interest. The idea of things being brought over could be foreseen even before when we referred to “traducir”, as it was replaced by “brought over to our language”, “turned Spanish”. The contexts which prefer the verb “traer” to refer to imitation could be in their turn classified on basis of the object of imitation. Very few of them refer to items of style, such as an entire verse as in Eglogue II, “i estavate – i estavate mirando aquel tirano” which Herrera comments that seems brought over from Eglogue VI of Virgil, or a diction or phrase which is borrowed for its resonance as in Eglogue I, “Salid - El modo de hablar traxo Garci Lasso de las Lamentaciones del dulcíssimo i maravillosamente afetuso poeta Garci Sanchez de Badajos: Lágrimas de mi consuelo, / qu’aveis hecho maravillas / i hazéis. / Salid, salid sin recelo, / i regad estas mexillas. / que soléis.” The actual phrase imitated from Garci Sanchez de Badajoz is hereby modified by Garcilaso into “Salid sin duelo, lágrimas, corriendo.” Moreover it is repeated at the end of every stanza and is named by Herrera “antecanto”. In this case the imitation is not really an import from another culture, but rather a form of reediting the work and invention of a previous poet of the same nationality, therefore
promoting the values at home. A second category of imitation using the same verb “traer” is the one importing descriptive passages such as in Elegy I, “Oeta - lo mismo trae Tito Livio en el Libro 6 de la Guerra de Macedonia” or in Eglogue I, “Salien - cronografia o descripcion del tiempo traída de la mesma egloga de Virgilio”. They are both ways of importing “scientific” information or ways to describe it into the national cultural capital. The last and most extensive category using the verb “traer” consists of ideas brought over into the poetic cultural heritage Herrera considers Spain is entitled to. Here are several representative examples: Canción I, “sospiros – traxo GL este lugar de Valerio Flaco en el Libro 8”; Canción III, “fieras naciones – parece traído este lugar del Libro I de Arriano, que dize que corre el Danubio por naciones belicas”; Canción IV, “mostralle – trae esta semejanza de la fabula de Tantalo, que estaba en el infierno con l’agua a la boca I cuando llegava a bever se le huía. Toco esta fabula aquel vulgar poeta español Juan de l’Enzina con al rudeza i poco ornamento que se permitía en su tiempo”; Egloga II, “ansar – Eliano, en el Libro 14, cap. 25, trae la historia que refiere Tito Livio en el Libro 5 de la Edificación de Roma”; Egloga II, “cisne – Auenque el mismo [Ovidio] trae en el 12 al hijo de Netuno, muerto por Aquiles, i buelto en cisne.”; Egloga III, “Filodoce – No es nuevo a los poetas traer pinturas. Virgilio, en el primero, trae la de Troya, y en el sexto la de Dedalo. Ovidio, la contienda de Palas i Araña; Geronimo Vida en la Egloga Davalo, i Aristó en el Canto ultimo, i otros muchos”; Egloga II, “osado marido [Orfeo] – Otros dizen que por aver enseñado a los ombres profanos i rudos los secretos misterios de los sacrificios e ceremonias de su religion, fue muerto con un rayo, como trae tambien Diogenes Laercio en el Libro primero; i Marulo, en el 2, es de la mesma sentencia en este epigrampa”; Egloga II, “cuando – Geronimo Cardano, en los Aforismos de Ipocrates, trae otra pintura i divide a Favonio Zefiro.”

When we usually speak of bringing words and concepts over from another language, we refer to the phenomenon of neology. Herrera dedicates a large passage reflecting upon what we nowadays call neologisms in his comment to Eglogue II, under the quote “desbañe”. Herrera’s theory on neologisms, displayed in his comments to Eglogue II by Garcilaso, is relevant for the matter. He considers that it is natural to use new words in a language as Spanish, which is alive and flourishing, whereas in Latin it is quite risky because with the dead languages there are no records of the spoken but only of the written discourse, kept in the books written by wise people. Nevertheless, its imitation is an irrefutable proof of their intense power. As a result, GL had the boldness to use many Latin and new and old Italian words. And following his example, Herrera exhorts his contemporaries: “i temeremos nootros traer al ufo i miniferio della otras vozes eñrañas i nuevas, fiendo limpias, propias, finificantes, convinientes, manificas, numeroñas i de buen féndido, i que fin ellas no fe declara el pensamiento con una sola palabra? aparte fe eñro miedo de nueñro animo; fígamos el exemplo de aquellos antiguos varones, que enriquecieron el ferno Romano con las vozes Griegas i peregrinas, i con las barbaras meñnas. no feamos inicos juezes contra nootros; padeciendo pobreza de la habla. que mas merecieron los que comenzaron a introduzillas en nueñro language, abriendoles el pasño; que los exritores deña edad? porque no pensárán que es lícito a ellos lo que a otros, guardando modo en el ufo, i trayendo legítimamente a la naturaleza Española aquellas diciones con juicio i prudencia? tuvieron los pasños mas entera noticia de la habla, que los presentes? Fueron mas asßolutos señores della?” So far,
there is no indication that when he speaks about language development through neologism he refers to anything else but to the mere import of foreign words. He continues explaining his attitude through the fact that every language ever has had its own life consisting of childhood, young age, state of perfection and eventually old age. And every language had in its beginnings a state when words referred to things initially, but then, out of necessity they turned into figures of speech, such as metonymy, irony, metaphor and synecdoche. He further on adds that it is only licit to create a great number of tropes, and moreover that the figures of speech, which are to be found in sentences and phrases are common to all human kind, they are part of a common cultural heritage and they enhanced the development of the Greek language, which later on, through the art of Cicero continued in Latin and gave Latin its upmost force and abundance. He considers that there is no language so barbarian and poor that could not be enriched and adorned, as there are so many which have been polished through carefully following the steps of Cicero, thus increasing its own language with the wonders of his divine eloquence. And so, we can see he is no longer referring to the import of mere words, but to the rhetorical imitation as we know it today defined by Quintilian. Moreover, it is not about enriching one’s poetic style, but a matter of serving one’s country and native language, through an act of patriotically robbing the rhetorical jewels of the past: “con los más estimados de pojos de Italia i Grecia, i de los otros reinos peregrinos, puede vefír i aderçeç à patria, i amplialla con hermoíra; i el meñño produzir i criar nuevos ornamentos. What follows are explanations on the qualities of the person entitled to import new items, who is obviously a poet who has proved to be licensed to do so, that is one who has studied the art of poetry and who is able to decide if the new word has a proper, sweet sound or is rather strange and rough. At the same time, he has the right and authority to create new words, provided that he can adjust their sound to “the meat”, that is they have the power to properly represent the concept they refer to. In his view, the formation of new words is justified by two reasons: the need to express concepts of theology and philosophy on one hand and on the other, the need to express the new things of today. The second type of neology refers to ornamentation, which is essentially style. This last possibility only poets are entitled to and highly offended by the ones who are trying to prevent them from doing so, is based on the fact that poets speak a different language, speaking about things different from the ones treated by orators, for example, all together entitling them to use words and concepts from all languages, so that it can express “todos los pensamientos del animo”, all the thoughts of the soul and “todo lo que cae en sentirimiento humano”, everything underlying human emotions. He ends his discourse by classifying the sorts of neology processes: “las vozes fon ofíuras en nuêrro uño por muchos modos; de la gente; cuando traemos vocablos proprios i particulares de otra nacion; de l’arte; de las leyes i ritos i ceremonias; de la traslación; de la erudición; de mucha novedad; como di xeñemos con imitacion Latina ultimo por primero; i de mucha vegez; renovando las vozes deñadas. [...] i también hacen las diciones inüfitadas mas grave la oración; porque eñas admiramos, i de l’admiracion nace la jocundidad. Mas eñó tiene lugar con mayor frecuencia en la poeñia; por que las coñas i las perññas fon mas ecelentes i mas graves.”

As a result, he sees neology as a much wider process than what we perceive it to be nowadays. The import of words coming from other languages is only one category of
neologisms, the others include exchanges between various registers and jargons, importing words from arts for example, or from laws, rites and rituals, transfers of any kind, erudition could also be a source of new meanings, and also the uses of very old, extremely new or rare words are also a way to generate the playfulness of poetry. We can no longer speak of pure neology, but rather of intercultural and transcultural exchanges and transfers. In conclusion, while Spain tacitly acknowledges the scarcity of its own cultural capital, and in so doing, it also enables the appropriating mechanisms that would provide one among the many factors that came to advance its growing sense of a national character and facilitates its global ambitions, with Herrera we have the vivid proof that imitation is no longer seen as an individual approach to self-education or perfecting one’s style, but as an enhanced system of neology meant to import knowledge to one’s own language as cultural capital and mental representations of cultural identity.

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