

**THE “FAILURE OF MULTICULTURALISM” IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.
IDENTITY-SECURITY NEXUS. EU MEMBER STATES - COMPARATIVE VIEW**

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Abstract: In the context of globalization, the relationship identity-security takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations in the economic, political, social, demographic and societal fields. Amid the economic crisis and political instability, this situation generated an efficient political instrument, “the fear of immigrants”. When Angela Merkel admitted that multiculturalism “utterly failed” in Germany, the French state model became a viable model of multiculturalism, however this theory showed its limitations in the practical application, especially in 2010.

The purpose of this research aims to demonstrate that, in the context of the economic crisis in EU, the “management of multiculturalism” reflects a broader political discussion on EU’s identity and social policy. In this case: Should EU take the leading role? Is this a case of national policy or a comunitarian one? How important is the EU political identity project?

Keywords: identity, security, multiculturalism, imigration, muslims.

The need to examine the identity-security relationship is conditioned by a series of political events on the internal arena in recent years, starting with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent aftermaths in Europe.

Social pressures of the EU citizens against the asylum seeker and immigrant waves have determined the national policymakers to initiate harsh policies towards the immigrants, which led to the idea of a “fortified Europe”¹.

The threats of terrorism, organized crime aggravated fears of immigration, while the prospect of Turkey and other Western Balkans states’ accession (with serious issues in interethnic relations or a large number of Muslims, such as Albania) highlighted the importance of identity securitization and led to a permanent employment of identity in the migration-security logic.

In the current context, marked by an economic crisis, migration has been elevated to the level of meta-issue², the boundaries between threats to internal and external politics becoming more ambiguous.

The migration driven by the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism and the outbreak of ethnic-political conflicts in the Western Balkans led to the emergence of “bridgeheads” that were constantly fed new waves of immigrants, giving rise to a “chain of immigration” which became impossible to control at a national level, requiring the origin and

¹ Yannis A. Stivachtis, „International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security” , *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2008, on-line: <http://www.scientificjournals.org/journals2008/articles/1387.pdf> , accessed 12.10.2013, p. 3

²Dider Bigo, „Migration and Security” in Virginie Guiraudon, Christian Joppke, eds., *Controlling a New Migration World*, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 121-122.

host states' concerted intervention within the legal international institutional framework created under the umbrella of the European Union.

The complex dynamics between the states and the immigrant influxes led to the ongoing transformation of identity and security structures. Identity, the binding element of migration and security, is often interpreted as a source of conflict and, at the same time, as an effect of conflict. The Copenhagen School theorists³ have developed a comprehensive analysis framework for grasping the significance of the causality relationship identity-security, under the name of societal security sector, in which the main role is played by Weaver's theory regarding securitization as a speech act. With societal security, the protection of identity is seen as a priority issue of security, in terms of survival⁴.

Identity innovates the migration-insecuritycausality relation, conferring it flexibility and referential value both at a sub- and a supranational level, giving rise to a trans-disciplinary research agenda. Within the "(in)securityspiral" (concept taken by Claudia Aradău from the "spiral model" used by Jervis to explain the interstate security dilemma⁵), identity has a dual role: cause and effect of migration and (in)security.

On the medium and long-term, the uncontrolled migration has an impact upon the ethnic composition of the population, culture and public order, social, economic and societal security. Regarding the borders, migration also affects the states' ability to control their own borders, making necessary a concerted intervention at European level. According to statistics, between 1945 and 2000, Western Europe had received over 50 million immigrants⁶.

The foundation of Europe of tomorrow cannot be achieved without reaching a consensus regarding international migration and its effects on the medium and long-term. Regarding uncontrolled migration, the states have taken different measures depending on the extent and severity of the problem. The EU Member States (attractive to immigrants due to the social protection system or the economic opportunities) are constantly concerned with the improvement of legislation on migration. For example, Germany introduced a citizenship test, while states like Baden-Württemberg pleaded for the need to test Muslim immigrants, regarding gender equality, domestic violence, forced marriage, homosexuality and freedom of speech. In the same Germany, in June 2010, Peter Trapp from among the German Christian-Democrats suggested that potential immigrants should be subjected to IQ tests⁷. Interesting to observe that these measure were only taken for certain categories of immigrants who

³ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea, un nou cadru de analiză*, Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010.

⁴ Branka Panic, „Societal security-Security and Identity”, *Western Balkans Security Observer*, No.13, April-June 2009, p. 33.

⁵ Paul Roe, „The Interstate Security Dilemma”, *apud. Claudia Aradău, Migration: The Spiral of (In)Security*, *International Forum of Electronic Publications*, Rubikon, March 2001, On-line:

<http://web.archive.org/web/20070403192142/http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia1.html>, accessed 12.10.2013 p. 5.

⁶ Ionel Nicu Sava, *Teoria și practica securității*, Universitatea din București, Facultatea de Sociologie și Asistență Socială, București, 2007, Ediția on-line:

http://www.romaniaeuropa.com/cartionline/carti_psihologie/teoria_si_practica_securitatii_ionel_nicu_sava.php, accessed 25.09.2013, p. 55.

⁷ Agnes Czajka, Annie Rebekah Gardner, The 'Age of Security?' Foucault, *Frontex and the Governance of European Migration*, p.5 on-line:

http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/9/9/2/6/pages499266/p499266-1.php, accessed 19.08.2013.

represent a burden to the German social system (it is not a secret that Germany is facing severe social integration issues concerning the Turkish immigrants whose number was getting close to 4,3 million ethnics⁸ in 2011 and we only refer here to those legally settled, from the 7 million foreigners living in Germany)

A similar situation in Denmark, where for obtaining citizenship learning Danish language is compulsory, in Spain and France case the laws allow the immediate expulsion of illegal immigrants or Italy where in 2002, the new law regarding migration stipulates fingerprint identification for all non-EU citizens who wish to remain in Italy and the list of examples can continue.

In March 2011, Claude Guéant, the French Interior Minister, (starting with February 2011), stated that: “Due to uncontrolled immigration, the French no longer feel at home”⁹. In his article, *The Case for Leadership*¹⁰, Stanley Hoffman argues that the West is invaded “not by armies and tanks, but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other Gods, belong to other cultures, [coming to take] their jobs, [to] occupy their lands, living away from the prosperity system and threatening the [European] lifestyle”.

In the same train of thought, against an economic crisis, when it comes to immigrants, the Spanish society increasingly uses expressions such as “the immigrant invasion/flood”, “we become strangers in our own country” or “there will come a time when the number of immigrants will exceed that of the Spaniards”¹¹. The number of Spaniards wishing for a tightening of laws on immigrants is increasing, so, if in 2000, 36% believed that the laws on immigrants were “too tolerant”, by 2004, their number increased to 56%, and in 2008 it reached 76%¹².

The multicultural dialogue crisis symptoms are obvious in Spain, expressed through the increasing anti-immigration, xenophobia and racism feelings on the one hand and the newcomers’ assimilation trends, on the other. The large influx of immigrants in the second half of the 90s (393,000 in 1993, in 2001 their number reaching 1,109,000¹³) determined the transformation of the immigrants’ social integration issue into one of the main concerns of the Spanish socio-political life.

The target set by the Council of Europe, at Lisbon on 23rd-24th march 2000, according to which “...the EU economy [will become] the most competitive and dynamic in the world, characterized by a sustainable growth, more and higher quality employment and an enhanced social cohesion”¹⁴ implies the need of contextualization and gradation in the manner of relating to the immigration phenomenon, both as a threat to security and as a solution to the

⁸Alan Hall, „Multiculturalism in Germany has 'utterly failed', claims Chancellor Angela Merkel”, *Daily Mail*, 18.10.2010, on-line: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1321277/Angela-Merkel-Multiculturalism-Germany-utterly-failed.html>, accessed 19.09.2013.

⁹ Andreea Nicutar, În umbra eșecului multiculturalismului [In the shadow of the failure of multiculturalism] *Civitas Politics*, 28.07.2011, on-line: <http://civitaspolitics.org/2011/07/28/in-umbra-esecului-multiculturalismului>, accessed 23.10.2013.

¹⁰ Staley Hoffman, „The Case for Leadership”, *Foreign Policy* 81 (1990-1991):30.

¹¹ Serguey Jenkin, Prueba del multiculturalismo: experiencia de España en el contexto Europeo, *Iberoamerica*, №3, 2011, p. 121, http://www.ilaran.ru/pdf/2011/Iberoamerica/IbA_2011_3/Jenkin.pdf., accessed 12.11.2013.

¹²*Ibidem*,. p.121.

¹³*Ibidem*, p.117.

¹⁴*Concluziile Președinției Consiliului European de la Lisabona, 23 și 24 martie 2000* [Presidency Conclusions, Council of Europe in Lisbon, March 23rd and 24th 2000], online: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/policies/lisbon/article_7207_ro.htm, accessed 08/01/2013.

pronounced ageing of the Western states' population, as well as a solution to the effects of economic recession (drain of unqualified labour force, of overqualified people, sharing of good practices, international pilot programs).

Angela Merkel admitted that Germany needs 400,000 trained specialists, but also workers of all sorts (without making here a strict reference to the Muslims living in Germany), but if it cannot "import workers" (due to social reasons), it can export factories, call-centers, medical analyses centres and IT support offices¹⁵ with much lower costs (this activity has especially flourished in the states of Central and Eastern Europe which joined the EU with the two waves of 2004 and 2007, but is also present with the last one, Croatia).

A UN statistics shows that in order to keep 3 active persons for a retired one and fill the vacant jobs, the European Union will have to "import" annually, between 2015 and 2040, about 6.1 million people. If this proportion is maintained, by 2050, approximately 40% of the European population will thus be made up of immigrants and "their first generation descendants"¹⁶.

The U.S. Migration Policy Institute estimates that in 2050, the Muslim population will represent more than 20% of the EU Member States' population and economist Mais Lorant, in a report to the European Parliament, states that, currently, the Muslims represent 25% of the population in Marseilles and Rotterdam, 20% of the population in Malmo, 15% in Brussels, 10% in London, Paris and Copenhagen¹⁷.

The relationship identity-security brings to the fore the multiple identities issue (that an individual acquires during his existence, some being more pronounced than the others). From a liberal perspective, the only fundamental identity is derived from the nexus to the human race, all the other, secondary, identities (which are not less important), deriving from the free will or are tributary to the relationship with other individuals (acquired identity – in the sense of alterity). In another train of thoughts, for constructivists, identity is constructed, it is an ongoing process and not a given "exogenously to the human nature or internal policies systems"¹⁸. The merit of constructivism is to reify identity as a referent object of security, creating a truly vicious circle, with societal security in its centre.

Starting from B. Anderson's theory, according to whom nations are abstract, „imagined communities"¹⁹, then the threats addressed to them are also social constructs, which can take a variety of forms depending on the actor performing securitization and the audience. Thus, in the case of the civic nation model, the societal securitization action involves the reference to the existential threat regarding the "symbolic territory"²⁰, which in the identity-migration relationship refers to the cradle of society/culture/identity, a territory full of history, that needs to be protected from the influences of immigrants.

¹⁵ George Friedman, "Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism", *Geopolitical Weekly*, 19/10/2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101018_germany_and_failure_multiculturalism, accessed 28.09.2013.

¹⁶ Călin Sinescu, Liliana Trofin, Impactul migrației asupra contextului internațional actual, *Sfera Politicii*, Nr.137, 2009, on-line: <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/137/art03-sinescu.html> . accessed 28.09.2013

¹⁷ http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/multiculturalism-integrare-comunitara-esecurile-ue-e-1_51a0732cc7b855ff5625137f/index.html accessed 28.09.2013

¹⁸ Alexander Wendt, „Collective Identity formation and the International State”, in *American Political Science Review*, No. 88, 1994, p. 385

¹⁹ For details, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991.

²⁰ Claudia Arădău, *Wo.Quote*, p. 3.

If the securitization of migration implies protecting the “home land” against disturbing identity factors, then desecuritization can be achieved only by changing the actor’s discourse on the immigrant threat and relocating the “symbolic territories”²¹.

The securitization of migration transforms “the imagined community” (in terms of identity) into a waterproof construction whose purpose is self-preservation. Securitization makes identity changes practically impossible²², which has major effects on the relationship immigrants-majority population. This relationship is also influenced by the perception of the latter for the former, given that the greater the cultural differences, the more reluctant and leaning towards identity securitization they will be. This situation is found in Western Europe which considers the East-Europeans immigrants more acceptable than those from Africa or Asia²³ (although towards greater groups of East-European immigrants, such as Polish plumbers, Romanian and Bulgarian strawberry pickers, Roma beggars, the reactions of Western Europe were different in each case). Thus, the issue of who is or not one of “us” is raised in similar identity or cultural terms (see the German initiatives related to the Turkish immigrants or the enactment of the law of July 2010, by the French Parliament, which prohibited – with one vote against and one abstention from the left wing parties, Verts, PS, PCF – the use of the burqa and niqab in public²⁴). This referent model “us”-“us”, “us”-“them” is an intersubjective one (specific to the Schimmitian logic friend-enemy) as what represents a cultural affinity with a group can represent an ideological, cultural or social threat with another.

Another example is the situation of Muslims in Spain, where a large part of the local population has a hostile attitude towards these immigrants due to the competition on the labour market (exacerbated because of the economic crisis), the fear of mixture between completely opposite cultures (the immigrants’ inability to adapt to Western culture and lifestyle), extremist actions (including terrorism), but most importantly, the reference to Islam, perceived as extremely aggressive, “the religion of violence”²⁵ (57% of the Spaniards, according to a survey conducted in June 2004, three months after the Madrid bombing²⁶).

Another difficulty in the identity-security relationship is represented, beyond the manner in which immigrants are perceived in terms of identity by the majority population, by the way in which they decide how to behave within the host state, if they are willing to integrate socially or if they opt for insularity and rule circumvention (the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany, Muslims in France, Great Britain or Spain). The most obvious issue in the Western societies is the visibility and large number of mosques, which according to the Spanish media, are believed to be also used as refuge for terrorists.

In a survey conducted by the IFOP on a representative sample of 983 French people over 18, between the 1st – 2nd December 2009, to the question “*Are you in favour, opposing or indifferent to the edification of mosques as the Muslim believers request?*”, 19% of those

²¹*Ibidem*, p. 6

²²*Ibidem*.

²³Yannis A. Stivachtis, *Wo.Quote.*, p.4.

²⁴Virginie Mamadouh, The Scaling of the ‘Invasion’, A Geopolitics of Immigration Narratives in France and The Netherlands, *Geopolitics*, 17:2, 2012, p.391 on-line: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.578268>., accessed 23.09.2013

²⁵Serguey Jenkin, *Wo.Quote.*, p.119

²⁶*Ibidem*.

interviewed answered “in favour”, 41% opposed, 36% declared “indifferent” and 4% did not answer²⁷. The results of the survey confirm a hostile attitude of Western Europe towards the immigrants of completely opposed cultures. In 2007, according to a survey conducted in Spain, 54% of those interviewed believed that immigrants should only retain those elements specific to their culture and religion that do not disturb the majority population, while the freedom of practicing the Muslim culture and religion was supported only by 12% of respondents²⁸. The results of a 2009 referendum in Switzerland stating that 57.5% of the Swiss pronounced themselves against the construction of new minarets in the country²⁹, only come to support this opinion.

The results of another survey commissioned by Le Monde and conducted by IFOP³⁰ (2011) shows that 68% of the French people and 75% of the German people believe that Muslims “are not well integrated into the society” (the main reason being their lack of willingness to integrate). According to the same survey, 55% of the French and 49% of the Germans consider that the Islamic visibility and influence within the society is “too high”, while 42% of the French and 40% of the Germans associate Muslim immigration with the attack on national identity.

The social construct of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relations³¹, which is why the national and the immigrants’ identity will clash only if the latter is strong and supported, as in the case of national minorities, by a “mother-state”³² near the host state. Concurrently, in his paper “*Multiethnic Society: pluralism, multiculturalism and foreigners*”³³, Giovanni Sartori analyzes the differences between the Islamic culture and the open, pluralistic Western society, questioning upon the latter’s (European) tolerance regarding its cultural enemies (the main being the Islamist immigrants).

Security is closely related to collective identity (seen as an intersubjective construct), which is why security has different meanings within different societies (depending on how they relate to the term of nation/national identity according to A. Smith). “Different societies present different vulnerabilities, depending on how their identity is constructed”³⁴. If identity is based on “distance and isolation” as in Finland, even a small number of immigrants will be perceived as a threat to identity. In France, where “the nation is closely related to the state”, vulnerability towards a political and social integration process is much greater than in the case

²⁷ Over 40% of the French refuse to have mosques and minarets in their country, 04.12.2009, *Frontpress* <http://www.frontpress.ro/2009/12/peste-40-la-suta-dintre-francezi-nu-vor-moschei-si-minarete-in-tara-lor.html>, accessed 17.11.2013

²⁸ Serguey Jenkin, *Wo.Quote*, p. 120

²⁹ Over 40% of the French refuse to have mosques and minarets in their country, *Frontpress*.....

³⁰ Islam now considered 'a threat' to national identity by almost half of French and Germans, according to new poll, Peter Allen, *Daily Mail*, 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344624/Islam-seen-threat-national-identity-half-French-Germans.html> accessed 17.11.2013

³¹ Yannis A. Stivachtis, *Wo.Quote*, p. 5.

³² For details, see Adrian L. Ivan, Claudia Anamaria Iov, “National And Ethnic Minorities In Central Europe And The EU Integration Process: Theories And Considerations”, în Runcan, P.L., Rață, G., Goian C. (Ed.), *Applied Social Science: Administration and Management*, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, pp.205-212.

³³ Giovanni Sartori, *La Sociedad Multiétnica Pluralismo, Multiculturalismo Y Extranjeros*, Madrid: Taurus, 2001.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, *Wo.Quote*, p. 178.

of nations that have an experience “in operating independently from the state and having several political levels simultaneously” (such as Germany)³⁵.

The securitization of identity does not automatically imply a state of security for the host state’s society, but rather leads to the emergence and supply of a state of insecurity (the dilemma of societal security). One possible answer to this state of insecurity is the multiculturalism policy (a liberal and Humanist concept) promoted by the EU institutions (as desecuritization actor), starting from its motto “Unity in diversity!” (where diversity refers to the identities of various Member States, which are replenished, as a corollary, by the European identity/ European citizenship). Interculturality provides us with an interesting lesson of “transnational philosophy”³⁶, where new cultures come to enrich European culture. Multiculturalism, as a fundamental principle of the EU brings to the fore the Union’s role as migration desecuritization actor (given that the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital underlie the EU construction). An important part is taken by the report European identity – national identity, both bringing into discussion the issue of imaged community. If within the EU policymakers strive to promote multiculturalism, at the level of the European states with tradition, policymakers (amid the economic crisis of the welfare state and steady growth in the number of immigrants) admit the failure of social integration of the newcomers or descendants of the second or third generation.

The “Multikulti” failure in Germany was publicly recognized by Chancellor Angela Merkel (2010), who demanded the immigrants to make more efforts to integrate, along with an openness policy from the German authorities. Multiculturalism led to the permanent alienation of immigrants. By keeping their identity, they do not share a mutual interest in the fate of Germany and identify themselves with the origin state to a much larger extent than with the host state. Turkey means home, while Germany is an opportunity³⁷.

Attending the 49th Security Conference in Munich (2013), David Cameron shared Berlin’s and Paris’ position regarding the failure of multiculturalism and the threat of terrorist acts within the Western European states which bring the immigrants to the foreground: “Through the multiculturalism state doctrine, we have encouraged different cultures to live separately from the rest of the population” [which led and] prompted some of the young Muslims to adopt an extremist ideology³⁸.

As we can well observe from the examples provided in this article, there is a common (similar) position regarding the Islamic threat in terms of the failure of multiculturalism within the European states with a significant number of Muslim immigrants. In this context, the logic questions is *Are Muslims difficult to integrate due to the cultural and religious differences or due to a potentially terrorist risk? Do they represent a potential threat to the physical or societal security of Western societies?*

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp.178-179.

³⁶ J.P.Liegeois, *Romii în Europa*, București :Monitorul Oficial, 2008, p. 262.

³⁷ George Friedman, *Wo Quote*.

³⁸ Adrian Cochino, UK: the Prime Minister notes the failure of multiculturalism, Evenimentul Zilei [The Daily Event], 17.02.2011

<http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/marea-britanie-premierul-constata-esecul-multiculturalismului-920463.html> accessed 23.09.2013. For example, the town of Luton, where 15% of the 20,000 residents are Muslims, is considered the cradle of political and religious extremism in the UK.

The reaction of public authorities and policymakers on some of the Islamic religious insignia raises a series of dilemmas about the EU states' ability to implement the idea of "unity in diversity" (that appeared and was promoted long before the "failure of multiculturalism" issue within the EU). The identity-security relationship analysis placed migration (and immigrants) into a logic of security, perceived at a discursive level as a triple threat: to the welfare state, public order and the society's cultural identity.

National governments talk about the economic issues of these immigrants, their cultural and religious differences and their inability to integrate into Western societies, forming closed religious communities (leading to ghettorization and radicalization) and representing thus a potential or even a real threat to the European states. The awareness and evocation of the "failure of multiculturalism" by several different European leaders is not a solution to the present situation: the significant number of ethnic Muslims in the EU states, their ghettorization, poor education and inclusion on the labour market, and will neither stop to any terrorist threat. In this context, the question is: *Is EU a sufficiently powerful organization, able to take the lead in solving this issue? Can this situation determine the policymakers in Brussels to rethink the role of the EU, as a social actor and promoter of multiculturalism?*

Culture is the greatest value of man, providing his identity and social benchmark. The 21st century Europe must understand the fact that social marginalization of the others, regardless how big the cultural differences are, is not a solution³⁹, the Muslims' case being the best proof.

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³⁹ Geopolitical implications of the Roma migration regarding the Schengen area, *Geopolitics*, <http://geopolitics.ro/implicatii-geopolitice-ale-migratiei-romilor-privind-spatiul-schengen.>, accessed 23.10.2013.

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