THE INTERPRETATION IS FREE OR CONTROLLED

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Abstract: This study analyzes the relation between the text and the interpreter. The starting premise lies on the fact that the issue solved by the interpreter while lecturing the text is related to identification of meanings and meaning conferment. The method used is multiply-articulated: it deals with elements specific to the meta-analytic method, elements of hermeneutics and elements belonging to the comparative method. The conclusion we reach is that on the one hand, by means of the text generated, the author controls some of the interpretation’s reference points and on the other, that, as the text itself is an interpretation as well, any interpretation is at least in part the interpretation of an interpretation, that is a superior interpretation.

Keywords: interpretation, text, interpreter, law of hermeneutics, free interpretation, controlled interpretation, against interpretation, beyond interpretation, limits of interpretation

1. How the text controls the interpreter

The control of the hermeneut by the text is recurent. Taking into account the issue raised by the approach of such an aporia, Matei Călinescu (2003, p. 180), it proceeds to the segregation of two extreme positions: “the radical disbelievers” and „brave traditionalists.” The former insist on the unsolvable non determination of the text’s signification, the unsolvable signification of the text, sustaining that the hermeneut has the unlimited freedom to generate meaning. According to the latter, the meaning is entirely determined by the author, whereas the hermeneut’s job is to “recover exactly the meaning intended by the author.” From among the traditionalists, Călinescu mentions E. D. Hirsch Jr. The latter formulates in “Interpretation and Validity” (1967) the following axiom: the text has a fixed meaning and a variable signification, dependent on the specific, historical and personal context, where the interpretation takes place. The axiom has power only if we associate fixity with the notion of non determination.

In terms of life event, the text draws a parallel between its features. Life is made up of acts and facts. The intentional undertakings stand for acts and the unintentional ones represents facts. The text encompasses a part related to acts and other part related to facts. By associating this considerations with Compagnon’s notion of dissociation ( Le Demon de la theorie, Paris, Seuil, 1998), we can say that the internalists (such as Lanson, De Sanctis, Sainte-Beuve) structure their demarche on acts, whereas the non internalists semioticians focus on facts. The intentionalist critique does not deal with facts. The semiotic demarche does not deal with acts. Everything in the text is totally intentional or totally unintentional. Paul Ricoeur speaks on the one hand of the author’s intentions and on the other hand of the text’s intentions. These never coincide in the written text. Ricoeur, right during the illusory death of the author, draws attention on the fact that the dissociation of the two types of intention does not mean that “we can conceive a text without an author.” The relation between the locutor and the discourse is not abolished, but it turns into a relaxed and complex relation (...). “The text goes beyond the finite horizon where the author leaves.”
The text speaks for itself. We cannot say if it conveys what the author wants, or if it conveys a different thing, as even when it conveys the author’s intentions, the author is not taken on faith. What he intended to communicate is considered to be a part of the work he speaks about. The author’s interpretation is an additional contribution to the text he talks about. The author’s interpretation can be assimilated to a foreword or afterword. The author can do one thing: add a paratext to a text. “The architext” would be the object of poetics, while the “text,” as an individualized work, would represent the field of research of the literary critique. In the preamble of the ample synthesis dedicated to “the second degree literature,” that came out in 1997 (“Palimpsests: literature in the second degree”), G. Genette (1997) offers details on the concept mentioned. Together with the intertextuality, (the presence of a text inside another text, by means of quotations, references, pastiches, etc), paratextuality, (reuniting the title, the subtitle, the foreword, the notes), metatextuality, (the commentary, the critical relation) and hypertextuality, (that is related to the very “second degree literature,” the texts derived from preexistent texts), architextuality is seen as part of the comprehensive space of transtextuality or textual transcendence. In this ensemble, it could be considered the “most abstract and implicit type,” covering the “genetic perception” of a text. Besides the intentions, a very large range of presuppositional phenomena is involved within the process concerned with the interpretation of a text. These cannot be reduced to the encyclopedic signification, or to the defined descriptions and proper nouns. Contemplative mechanism, inferential complex, the discourse is an invitation to the updating of its message. The hermeneut comes to “fill it” with multiple message related cogitations, that have to do with an ample ensemble of presuppositions, defined by the open communication (knowledge base, background assumptions, schema elaboration, relations between schema and the text, system of values, elaboration of one’s point of view, etc.).

The system that organizes the discursive cogitation can be represented encyclopedically. Thus, the message stands for a sort of idiolectal mechanism that establishes significations valid for only a certain kind of lecture. This is what Eco (1994) defines as hyper codification: the text shapes a particular semantic description that represents the possible textual world, with its individuals and properties (Popescu, 2001; Popescu, 2002).

2. The high level interpretations and the consciousness of the legitimate meaning

The hermeneut is guilty when he thinks that, within the text, he can turn into the author. Human beings are not interchangeable. Interpreting a discursive production, the hermeneut gives himself shape to a discursive production. According to the ability of staging in a proper and revealing manner the signification of the primary work, the interpretation is established as comprehension, as a second degree text. Moreover, a production, an interpretation itself, can turn into a hermeneutic object of a second degree interpretation, that is a third degree text (Palmer, 1967; Habermas, 1990; Smith, 1997; Caputo, 2000).

When we interpret the interpretation given by Heidegger to Parmenide, Kant or Nietzsche, we make a second degree interpretation, that is a third degree text. If we agree with the fact that any kind of text is shaped into an interpretation. The fact that the texts’s degree and that of the interpretation balance out, becomes obvious. We can individualize here the axiom of the finite interpretation: the interpretation of an interpretation is an interpretation as well. The interpretation represents an infinite process. We are interested in reading different interpretations, we are in search of certain interpretations. Although we do not think that an interpreter can understand the author “better than he understood himself,” the fundamental principle of F. D. E.
Schleiermacher (2001, p. 52), we admit that an interpretation can turn into an interpretation that is more valuable and revealing than the text whose interpretation it stands for.

The interpretation can be sometimes aimed to reading, without presenting any interest in the object of interpretation. While reading G. Călinescu and R. Barthes, we remain stuck in their language, so that the theme or the epistemic object have no importance. By Heidegger, for example, even the epistemic object is lost. The final revenge of Hermeneutics resides in reading with pleasure the interpretation instead of the interpreted text. The author cannot be understood better than he understands himself, but it can be interpreted much better than he interprets himself. The author is for himself an unprivileged and disagreeable, but sometimes useful interpreter. The chain of interpretation provides for the initiation of the work, in the same way that it is guaranteed by the change of perspective.

The interpretation stands for the reading of an interpreted object. As Richard Rorty proved: “any kind of thinking consists in recontextualisation” (Rorty, vol. I, 2000, p. 201), consequently, any interpretation is a recontextualisation. Without taking into account the other factors, active within the interpretational process, we can say that the novelty of interpretation derives from the context’s novelty. The work is endowed with creative value, the interpretation can also have creative value. The theoretical discourse represents the generalizing and conceptualizing interpretation of the object. By derivation, the theoretical discourse can have a creative value, bringing about the interpretative delight. The theoretical discourse ranges, similar to any other type of discourse among the language and meditative factors. The authenticity of thinking following the path of language aesthetics brings about interpretative delight. Selfishness and egocentrism have strong roots. Actually, poetics and hermeneutics of celebrated death can only be configurations of the projects related to the human being’s possibilities. Each word, noun, adverb or verb is accompanied by an ego. Moreover, an ego takes shape. We can notice that the author has not been trusted for a period of 20-25 years. The distrustful hermeneut, projected by the masters of doubt, of distrust (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), did his duty: very late (Ricoeur, 1976). The author without any letters of credit represents the work of a suspicious, insidious, bad-tempered and fastidious hermeneut. Distancing from the text only as a figure of style belonging to evanescence, the author cannot come back (Manolescu, 1966; Sontag, 1966; Negrici, 2015).

Why do we lay so much stress on the presence or absence of the author, on his power or vainness? The author is essentially concerned with fundamental hermeneutics. There is no work without an author, as there is no interpretation of a work without an author. An interpreting being projects herself into a text. It is there that she will find only the things she brought by meaning observation. The way the work functions is not the author’s job, it is the hermeneut’s job. The work can be illustrated as a fixed machinery, that can be modified by the purchaser under certain circumstances.

Eugen Simion opts together with Barthes (2001) for „the death of the author” and for the idea of a “legal meaning of the work” (Simion, 1998, p. 221). Matei Călinescu prefers to talk about “various interpretations and legitimate imaginations” (Călinescu, 2003, p. 180). Taking into account the fact that both the meanings and the significations join together in the same message, the two options are unilateral, each in its own way. The balanced message is a legitimate, solid, legal, legible message. This message is not unique yet. If it were unique and unidirectional, he could stand for the discourse.

It would not be proper for us to show that a message replaces a discourse. As long as two different vocables continue to exist, there are two different realities that cannot die from the point of view of the language. We have to add an item to the message. The discourse impregnated with
unlimited meanings generated according to discursiveness is articulated irrepresibly as a message. Thus, the message appears as a remission of the discourse (Basic, 2015; Hart, 2016; Sandu, 2016; Grad & Frunza, 2016; Dumitru, Budica & Motoi, 2016). The interpretational spirit should operate within the hermeneutics of the discourse as a whole. Its limited, memorative resources forces it to make selections among the significations that make up the discourse. Another restraint of the discursive significational fission is achieved by the insinuation of the hermeneut into the role of the addressee. This figure of the consuming spirit aimed at by the producer can be reduced to the idea that I am the one something is conveyed to. This something represents the acknowledged limitation of what actually represents the discourse related to me as hermeneutic potentialities. The interpretation as “methodos” is reduced to the notion of message.

The discourse takes shape as world and within the linguistic cogitation of the world. The world as referential notion is unique, a world rather solitary than alone, or individual. A prisoner of solitude, the world built fictitiously must be meditated upon. However, according to the notion of cogitation, one of the two limits of discursiveness develops within the linguistic message. The epithet of the interpretation as reduction is the word mentioned. The idea according to which one of the “possible interpretations of the world,” “one single interpretation” is correct, is, in Nietzsche’s opinion (1994, p. 260) a silly idea, as it destroys “the expected character of existence.” “When we write – underlines Nietzsche (1994, p. 268) – we do not only want to be understood, we also want not to be understood.” He thinks that if somebody considers a book impossible to understand, that does not represent an objection against that book. The probability comes forth from the following aspect: maybe misapprehension itself was part of the author’s intention, more precisely the author did not want to be understood by everybody.

The innocent hermeneut is generally tempted to believe that the producer can reclaim and ratify the message of his own work and he can define himself this legitimate and legal message. He deals, in the name of the absent author, with an unfounded interrogation. He endues the work with the authority of the flawed author. He is in search of the signs, clues, hints and signifiers of the authorial intention (Boldea, 2002; Vattimo, 1997; Vattimo & Rovatti, 2012, Boldea, 2015). He intends to give credit to the message of his work. The author can address us as a person, but in his work, he is silent. The innocent hermeneut avoids to become aware of this thing. He forces the writer to interpret his own work. However, the text speaks to us. the innocent shapes a textual framework, where he asks the imagined author to talk (Gadamer, 2004; Nedelcu, 2015; Nedelcu, 2016).

When the whole work is justified by means of the biography data, the path of the hermeneutic error is discovered. The text obviously has a biographical ego (Herrmann, 2016). This represents the mind that writes and creates in the progressive present tense. Beyond the biographical ego, there is a creative, egotic spirit, the one that undertakes the past tense, animating it as interpretative present. Apart from the biographemes, a strictly personal component has always been present within the interpretation. The innocent hermeneut bases his interpretation on biographemes.

The specialized hermeneut goes beyond the biographical intentionality. He deals with the field of significations. The tendency to eliminate the author is coordinated with the autonomization of the text. However, the paragraph-opening line (that appears by itself at the bottom of a page or column, thus separated from the rest of the text) does not prove to be a judicious solution, either. Antoine Compagnon (1998) talks about the author’s intention and that of the text, the authorial project and the product’s significations. Besides the centripetal author, the work is centrifugal.
3. Conclusion
The linguistic product goes beyond the sphere of authorial control within the process of interpretation. In a work where the world signifies irrepressibly and where everything is impregnated with meaning, the textual product looks after itself. The text reveals the hermeneut its own intentions. The text must not be separated from its producer, (author). The interpreters that count on the author’s intentions are called by Compagnon (1998) intentionalists. Those who base themselves on the autonomy are called non-intentionalists.

References