

BOOK REVIEWS by Al. Cistelecan / Iulian Boldea / Doina Butiurcă / Dorin Ștefănescu

Caius Dobrescu, Mihai Eminescu. *Imaginarul spațiului privat. Imaginarul spațiului public*, Editura Aula, Brașov, 2004

While the essay-writers are a praiseworthy caste (and for this reason an open one), the Eminescian specialists represent a caste of devotion (and for this reason a closed one). Eminescology became even long time ago a kind of esoteric sect, and its specialists act like some priests invested by sacraments rather than exegetes – even though they are extraordinary. As in every cult, there are all kinds of rituals of initiation and investment, mainly based upon apprenticeship and devotion and that forbid the profanes' access in the sacred matter of Eminescianism. When the lay men participate in a rebellion – quite rarely –, hierarchy punishes them, and when a profane dares going too far, till the dimensions of a monographic study, let's say, he is not given the go-by. Through this criteria of drastic separation between experts and profanes, one can justify the Eminescian experts' great silence that dropped on Caius Dobrescu's recent monograph (*Mihai Eminescu. Imaginarul spațiului privat. Imaginarul spațiului public*, Editura Aula, Brașov, 2004), leaving it in the hands of some other profanes, even young ones. But at least three of them (Paul Cernat, Andrei Terian and Bogdan Crețu) have done well their job, successfully replacing the busy experts and those that are dedicated to this field. eminescologists could better take account of Caius Dobrescu's book because it could have been useful. And this at least to get out of an irreparable mannerism or even of a crass hermeneutical "hollow". The new eminescology, since Ioana Em. Petrescu's period till now, does nothing but applies Eminescu's work to one new philosopher or another and ascertains satisfied that this philosopher perfectly matches Eminescian vision. This is the only way the eminescology understands to prove Eminescu's up-to-dateness, passing his work from one philosophical system to another and making it able to modulate on all concepts, according to some philosophical wind. The formula is simple and productive: you read a philosopher's work, summarize it, write a sort of breviary out of his concepts, and apply this to Eminescu's work. The results are usually enthusing because one can notice that Eminescu's work can be modulated on every (or almost) philosophy or even on the most contrary philosophies at the same time. This results are not only encouraging but also accurate; and with good reason too, because there is rarely a philosophy that cannot match a work (if this one does not have a certain ideological offer, but even then, the obvious part of the ideology can be repudiated in favour of the immanent part, bringing into relief the unconsciously buried philosophy). If it is so, if the excellent merit of poetry is to devote some philosophy, then it is known that poetry is much philosophical than philosophy itself, because the imagery that poets usually work with, have a certain philosophical grace (poli- and pluri-); they are not a mere philosophy, but a philosophical "fascicle" that can be simultaneously divided into more directions. In such situations the exegetic satisfactions cannot be but enraptured, so much more enraptured as interpretation "sticks in the mud". Interpretation is, of course, theoretically, infinite; in practice it often goes through "stopping points" rather than revolutions; an innovating interpretation has to find an inner principle in the work's dynamics in order to change its comprehension and "irradiation"; no outer principle can revolutionize the meanings of a work; these cannot be moved but from the inside of the vision and not through outer

levers, as useful as they can be. Changes of concept, of mentality and taste involve the work in a continuous, current answer that adjusts an inner principle and does not attach a principle from the outside, as a kind of propeller. This is the reason why there are so few “revolutions” in eminescology, and the most recent are the oldest, taking into consideration that the last ones belong to Ion Negoițescu and Ioana Em. Petrescu. For good reason, some eagerness for a new eminescologic turning point, a change in comprehension and interpretation has to become manifest.

The eminescologists’ anxiety is also linked to the possibility that precisely a profane like Caius Dobrescu realizes this decisive hermeneutical turning point. It is a legal and well-grounded fear; Caius Dobrescu’s monograph really makes a stressed turning, but we do not know if it is a crucial one. I’d rather say it isn’t – and this is not for the eminescologists’ peace and calm, but because of the interpretative grid chosen by the author. I quote Paul Cernat (because what he says is true): this grid consists in “rediscussing the work from the point of view of modern themes”. It is, in fact, a deliberate confrontation between Eminescu’s work and these themes. Technically speaking, Caius Dobrescu reveals the work’s up-to-dateness out of a confrontation with an outer principle; technically speaking too, in its mechanical aspect, his initiative resembles more to Edgar Papu’s than Negoïțescu’s (in fact the main discouraged) or Ioana Em. Petrescu’s; Edgar Papu confronted/compared Eminescu’s work to structuralism, Caius Dobrescu – roughly speaking – to poststructuralism. But this outer principle of confrontation (and approach) is subdued to a continuous introspection, and what one perceives at the beginning as a kind of violence (of the type cultural studies) little by little becomes an organic hermeneutical principle. The grid becomes an introspection and merges with ideology and Eminescian vision, so as its precedence seems a simple procedural issue, because at the end the immanence of apparently deliberate themes is much more visible. This passing from theme to vision, from outside to inside could not have been revealed out of the logic of approach and to the same effect, Bogdan Crețu has reason to ascertain the existence of a “thesis prior to argumentation” (then finished through what he calls “a maieutics turned upside down”); and premeditation /intention does not reach conclusions but remains at the level of clear premises and concepts; once they are clearly set forth, the theme is rendered sensual in a refined analysis, and conclusions come out, they are not induced or drawn with authority. It is the point when Caius Dobrescu not only confronts exegetic themes to Eminescian vision, but also makes them organic; what seems to come from the outside, actually results from within poetic vision. Thus, Caius Dobrescu’s monograph may realize the decisive exegetic “leap” and even overturn things.

Caius Dobrescu starts from a premise that is covers his entire monograph and this is his belief in what can be called poetic activism. For Caius Dobrescu, art is an action; from this point of view, it is never innocent, unwarranted or irresponsible. It is a part of a debate and therefore it can be thought as civic implication. Pending bigotry, we cannot bring any charges against this concept. Willing or not, poetry takes part in meaning and cannot do this without developing social connotations of spirituality and without assuming them. Therefore Caius Dobrescu is right when he says that poetry takes public debates till “unfathomable depths of individual consciousness” and that it reveals “utopia or phantoms” which disturb public space (page 5). A more delicate issue is that whether poetry makes a distinction between the two spaces and promotes them in a kind of visionary and perceptive indistinction. Caius Dobrescu does not believe that things are so

confused and that it is only about “continuous transgressions” which, no matter how serious, they “are not meant to suspend the natural limits between the named fields” (idem) – public and private. We can debate upon whether these “natural limits” really work for the poet, but it is enough that they work for the reader. As it is known, a poetry requires at least two, and in this case at least two perspectives are involved.

Once the autonomy of fields is done (no matter how precarious), Caius Dobrescu takes them one by one, starting from the spaces of privacy to those of socialization, seen, of course, in a permanent relation and correlation. There are four imaginative methods of privacy: “that of *idyll*, that of *fairy baroque*, that of *the complex naturalism-art for art’s sake* and that of *analytic novel in verse*” (page 19). As we notice, Caius Dobrescu was not too fond of the unity of criterion in “christening” these four spacial-imaginative units, preferring a heterogeneous list, but more adequate. The trouble is (poets always make troubles to monographs) that “the four structures, no matter how different they are, coexist, and more than this, they interreact or borrow each other their features” (page 20). Caius Dobrescu thinks this could represent “a specific feature of Eminescu’s imaginary” (idem). Without hesitating and so much the less checking, I’ll immediately say this is a feature of all poets. And not because of some poets who can be scrupulous in delimiting the imaginative methods, but because of imagination as such, that jumbles together all references and refuses to work with different classes. It seems that Caius Dobrescu liked better the idea that poetry itself should suggest this clear systematization instead of the idea that he should pull it out of the visionary ambiguity and of the so complicated imaginative diachrony. Some kind of complexity in front of the ambiguities and mainly in front of the contradictions is all the time revealed and it goes til the end of the monograph. Caius Dobrescu is always astonished by the lack of categorical, linear features and option of Eminescian vision; at least this comes from the fact that it always underlines the contradictory feature of Eminescian vision as a somehow particular fact, rather exceptional than natural: “Apparently incompatible visions and symbolic solutions do not replace one another, but simply coexist, as many times in Eminescian intellectual universe” (page 245). That’s it, it seems that Eminescu himself was not fond of accuracy and coherence of ideas and “symbolic solutions” in his poetry; he did not care about whether he would be considered a philosopher, an ideologist or an essay-writer of strict articulation or, on the contrary, an ambiguous and obscure one. But isn’t this for the exegetes’ benefit who can drag him everywhere? As we can notice, in poetry Eminescu acted like all poets in a nonchalant ideative way. This brings Caius Dobrescu’s interpretation to a pass, in the excerpts where it tries to give coherence to the poetic vision and especially to this one in comparison with journalist ideology. Obviously, he often succeeds in this kind of harmonization or at least congruentization (at least with a part of Eminescu’s poetry and in a certain imaginative way), but with enough exegetic cleverness. A real trick is the way Caius Dobrescu solves things, such as “the dilemma of the poet’s consciousness” in the case of “alegorical politics” in *Scrisoarea III*, where the poet secretly praises the independence war, against the journalist (p. 245-260). Clean or dirty, the trick is believable by its excess of fineness, as all Caius Dobrescu’s “text interpretations” are, many of them demonstrations of reinterpreted virtuosity. In all these microanalyses and interpretations Caius Dobrescu is right to expel any arbitrariness and imotivation of signs, but at the same time he exceeds in the scrupulosity with which he wants to give ideative (and sometimes ideological) coherence to imaginative freedom

and ambiguity. Sometimes the contradictions (especially those between the journalist and the poet, but also those between the poet and the poet) are so blatant and irreducible that even Caius Dobrescu cannot “tame” them – or at least justify them – but with the help of a *deus ex machina*. It is exactly the dramatic case of “the dramatic incompatibility between a pessimistic vision of *absolute* biological determinism /.../ and the intensity Eminescu teaches with in his articles a liberating ethics of work, of constructively methodical and constant endeavour” (p. 275). And how can Eminescu and Caius Dobrescu get out of this dilemma? They get out surreptitiously, in two ways: first through the public’s dual personality, his division in castes (an opportunity to make the ideative connection between Eminescu and Weberian ethics) and then through the cancellation of castes in favour of the modernization paradox, that belongs to Max Weber too (p. 275-283). Of course if Caius Dobrescu had tolerated a space of uncontrollable and unconventional poetic freedom in immediate coherence (and not only imaginative), he wouldn’t have complicated so much; or if he had tolerated at least the autonomy of journalistic and poetic fields. But his monographic art doesn’t ever choose the convenient solution, but, on the contrary, the defiance of all difficulties, and some of these come from the homogeneousness of the concept of poetic activism and from the imperative of the coherence of all layers, including the firm incoherence. The acceptance of an irrepressible wildness of vision and of an inviolable nature of ambiguity does not represent the exegesis or an exegete’s weak point; the exigency to give everything coherence is, in fact, a sign of oppression of the work; interpretation dreams to become manipulation through excessive justifications and explanatory reasons; and this is a case of fatal ambition, not *hybris*.

But how can eminescology not make a victim of Eminescu? Especially because it seems not to make Eminescu’s work vivid, but just to sing gravely at its funerals. Little by little, but more and more consistently, the change of perspective brought by Caius Dobrescu becomes a change of interpretation, of comprehension. At the end of the monograph we see an Eminescu who walks through the European contemporary issue with the Schengen visa, as Nietzsche’s friend of idea or at least of intuition and a friend of other modernist writers. It’s true that he does not have eminescologists’ visa yet, but this is only because of inherent bureaucratic formalities in any creed organization.

AI. CISTELECAN

Cornel Munteanu, *Românii din Ungaria I, Presa*, Editura Noi, Gyula, 2006

In the argument to the book “Romanii din Ungaria I, Presa” Cornel Munteanu begins with the idea of tradition that Romanian press from Hungary has, a phenomenon favoured both by the representants of the Romanian journalism and by the ones who these publications are addressed to. One can refer to the Romanian press in Hungary between the years 1950-2005. The three chapters of Cornel Munteanu’s book contain dense appreciations of the forms of written journalism, about the interferences between the written journalism and the audiovisual journalism and about the part that the press plays in maintaining and consolidating the identity of the Romanians from Hungary, in the first chapter; the second chapter contains a description, of analytic nature, of the written press, from the publication of the first journal, in 1950, “*Libertatea Noastra*”, with

its successive denominations (“Foaia Noastra”, “Foaia Romaneasca”), up to the other periodical publications (“Cronica”, “Simpozion”, “Lumina” etc.). The third chapter of the book is devoted to the audiovisual press, concretized in the tv and radio broadcasts from the territorial studio of Seghedin. The author of the book structures the substance of its research in accordance with two essential criterion: the diachronic criterion, visible through the presentation of the evolution of some journalistic phenomenon or cultural events of bigger or smaller resonance and the synchronic criterion, assumed through the detailed analysis of the contribution of the Romanian journalists from Hungary. The documentary material that Cornel Munteanu used is undoubtedly, vast and difficult to take an account of, to classify and typologize. This is actually, the novelty of the book: the efficient synthesizing of all the journalistic Romanian manifestations in Hungary, in an effort to classify them, to explain the cultural events and at the same time to underline the role of the press in keeping the ethnical identity of the Romanians from this country. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of the book, Cornel Munteanu clearly underlines this: “Both the written and the audiovisual press have an overwhelming role in keeping and enriching the identity dowry for the Romanians from Hungary. It passed its complexes and the lack of means through a frontal and global approach of the matters concerning the comunitary identity. It did not stop at the informative aspect, but approached the major problems of the Romanians with a high degree of professionalism. Besides, the journalism from Hungary also led to the constitution of a valuable homogenous group of journalists; their professional activity, uncertified officially at the beginning or recovered afterwards through a profile training, was done with stateliness and the experience of direct facts in press. The radio-tv broadcast’s audience, just like the constant readers of the Romanian journal, is a proof of the respect the community has towards this group of journalists, identified by their own receiver”.

Objectivity, as an essential rule of the research, is assumed by the author from the very beginning. Referring to the features, the purpose and the finalities the Hungarian press has proposed, Cornel Munteanu underlines the moral force of such institution, the ethic authority its manifestations reveal, but also its position of “instrument of formation of the national conscience, with the purpose to form the public receiver, to induce some values and to activate the civic spirit.” Obviously public opinion plays an important role in Romanian press in Hungary, through the effect of regularization that it justifies and encourages: “As a beneficiary of the press and metronome which measures efficiency and press evolution during its history, the public opinion becomes the act of maturation of the press, the mirror that journalists take as a guide in their job. In comparison with the two references: the public, on one hand and the official power on the other, the press knew how to find out the adequate solution of movement, despite all kinds of compulsions from the two. A compulsion of the public opinion towards which the press could not have compromises and failures, because the public is its main ally, but also a bitter and conjugated compulsion of official power, that can reach the control and the severe censorship of political system, that can impose the publishing line, the politics’ line or the content of articles and broadcastings. Between these two opposed compulsions, in matter of action, a free, open, permissive, alternative one, and the other restricted, closed, limited, official, the press knew to confederate with the public, thus being enforced for a common “battle” in front of official power, till gaining its right to independence and freedom of opinion”. Report, documentation, education of the public – these represented

the desiderata of Romanian press from Hungary, that had to assume a more militant, more firm and at the same time an imperative condition of moral resources. Identity through language and cultural identity of the Romanians from Hungary are other two desiderata that Romanian press of this geographic space assumed. In his approach, Cornel Munteanu is also concerned about multiple, benefic, profitable interferences that were established during the history between written and audio-visual press, or he dwelt on genres and publicistic forms that found their expression in Romanian press from Hungary: news, article of opinion and attitude, interview, portrait, study, reportage and to a low degree, inquiry.

Referring to written press, Cornel Munteanu makes a thematic classification, distinguishing the report press (“Foaia românească”, “Cronica”, “Jurnal”), magazine-press (“Calendarul nostru /românesc”), cultural and scientific press (“Conviețuirea”, “Almanah Lumina”, “Izvorul”, “Simpozion”, “Annales”), other forms of written press (“Licenii”, “Timpuri”, “Informatorul”, “Săptămâna română din Ungaria”). Obviously, in order to underline the profile of these periodicals, the author makes a presentation of the editorial staff, but also of the evolution of those newspapers and periodicals during the time, highlighting the hesitations and the first soundings, the the experiences of some periodicals, introducing some editors and contributors, sometimes using too many details and facts (not necessarily benefic). The stress of the approach is on “Foaia românească”, a prestigious periodical of the Romanians from Hungary, with a decisive role in assuming and illustrating their consciousness and defining identity mark. Cornel Munteanu is right when he asserts that “nowadays one can speak of high Romanian intellectuals, already constituted and mature, who turns their cognitive and formative abilities to the best account, becoming themselves producers of values. The mirror that accompanied this major act of birth and maturation of these intellectuals’ spirit is the Romanian periodical in its entire semicentennial history”. Audio-visual press is illustrated by *Aici, Radio Seghedin*, the Romanian broadcast and *Ecranul nostru*, a tv broadcast of territorial studio of Seghedin. Referring to the importance and stateliness of audio-visual press, Cornel Munteanu underlines that “more than the written press, forced to face some ideological pressures of the time and inherent to some compromises in organizing and distributing periodicals, the audio-visual press (radio and tv) enjoyed a value influence that gave a qualitative impulse from one stage to another (...). not last of all, the specific forms of audio-visual had allowed the journalists to move in a larger extent in organizing programmes, enabling editors’ individual initiatives in selecting materials and choosing the subject of radio or tv broadcasts. The junction between written and audio-visual press that we spoke about in the first chapter, works even today, encouraging the journalists’ mobility between the two areas and even the use of some materials common to both mass- media forms of communication”. Turning an extremely wide and diverse documentary material to the best account, Cornel Munteanu catalogues, for the first time, in his book, in an efficient and necessary synthesis, the modalities of manifestation and existence of Romanian press from Hungary. His approach astonishes through amplitude of vision, through sufficiently sure mastering of the investigated material, through propensity towards synthesis that can be seen in subsidiary and finally through interpretative-analytical resources that the author has.

Iulian BOLDEA

G.G. Gruică, *Moda lingvistică 2007. Norma, uzul și abuzul*, Editura Paralela 45, 2006

Published in 2006, at Paralela 45, professor G.G. Gruică's recent work is a *radiography* of present-day state of language and has the following subdivisions: The market of words, Politeness at Romanians, Linguistic laziness, Cardboard subjects, The naughty participle, Many and not too small, Anacoluthons, pleonasm and cacophonies.

The favourite sphere of investigation is the written press language (but also audio-visual). The author analogically prefers "linguistic fashion" out of an inner belief that inside the system of a language "the same game between immutable and ephemeral is working, between innovating adventure and traditional obedience, in the same atmosphere of frantic mimesis, but also of vehement appeal" as in fashion (Foreword). From the perspective of Romanian grammatical code, in the form received in EU, the book consistently divides the terms, the linguistic code (the standardized aspect) from the common use, underlining everytime the difference between the two fundamental dimensions: if in Grammatical Code, the future with *o* keeps this auxiliary unchanged, most of the time the written press favours the plural form *or să*, or for the standardized forms *succedă și precedă*, the use of language naturalized the structures: *succede și precede*. We read in the foreword that the Lexical Code also contains: "too many definitions in collision with the use, a fact that makes comprehension difficult and also the equivalence in the lexical code of other languages spoken in EU", no matter whether we keep in mind the older parts of language or the neological sphere. Communication is also difficult because of the aberrant syntactic structures, placed outside logic and grammar, such as anacoluthon. Present-day state of language develops slowly, almost insignificantly and towards the "wooden language" as "the public discourse is too much diluted, false, resorting to the same cowardly grammar, with frequent refuges in impersonal wordings, without an identifiable subject (...) with generalizing noun infinitives (...) with dehydrated phrases or phrases packed with epithets and crammed metaphors. The custom to hide under the word remained and it is still powerful", the author asserts.

The attention of the study is headed towards the sphere of loan translation, highly productive in the process of language resemanticization; its direction is towards the "basis" of Romanian "linguistic pyramid": the semantic initiative, on French "channel" is "consolidated" through English loans in the past few years: *a realiza* < Engl. *to realize*, with a large meaning: *a conștientiza* (to be aware), *a nominaliza* < Engl. *nominalize*, meaning *a propune* (to propose, to suggest), copied from American English, or *locăție* < Fr. *location* that was Americanized by a semantic addition. Having a model in Saussure's structural dichotomies, the study deciphers the semantic identity, the power of derivation and word formation in the case of some fashionable opposable series; sometimes the assertion is diachronic, and reaches the etymological form: European- nonEuropean (even antiEuropean), professional-dilettantism, amateurism etc.

The journey inside the miraculous world of meaning and form metamorphosis is spectacular in G.G. Gruică's book, through the integrant perspective, through the propensity towards universal and symbolic nature of words. And we quote a fragment from the book: "The life of words is (...) much more restless than it seems, and the competition is harsh in here, with strange marginalizations, but also spectacular rehabilitation, with heroes and victims" (page 30). The words have their destiny that

“depends on some inner laws of linguistic system, but also on many different, external, unforeseeable causes that are linked to the development of linguistic community in all forms: social, economic, psychological”. There are situations when “the adventure of word” eludes logic explanations, staying in an area of bad luck or luck (...), is taken out in the world at special occasions, by weak minded intellectuals” (page 31).

The public discourse is rendered suggestive in this book through the practice of sportive metaphor, metonymies “of transition” that invaded the general language, in the author’s opinion. The chapter *Politețea la români (Politeness at Romanians)* underlines not only the semantic identity of two coreferent pronouns (*dânsul, dumnealui*) but also the perspective of an exhaustive approach (*ab initio* they belonged to a system that did not allow innovatio; their metamorphosis is linked to dialectal variants; from total synonymy, the final semantic innovation was that *dânsul* receives a meaning of politeness, but only after “the attraction of personal gender takes place”. Contemporary Romanian language uses the form *dânsul* with triple value: regional-archaic (a total synonym of *he*), official (this synonymy is reduced to personal gender, without any kind of politeness), variant in offensive (*dânsul* – personal pronoun of politeness with double interpretation: *dumnealui* – inside the ternary system – *dânsul, dumnealui, domnia sa* and *dânsul* as an equivalent of *dumnealui* and *domnia sa*).

The order of words family name + Christian name, apparently harmless, can create some problems in the context of individual – society – European macrostructure relations, the Romanians’ education showing “a deficit at this level”. And even so, through interactive broadcasts “where the participants tell their name the way they were taught in schools, in the army”, the author’s opinion is that we are “on the right road, but we still have a lot of things to do”. The words with a strong case government (unmarked genitive and dative) are thought to be real attacks to the linguistic system, besides evading the norm, also showing “linguistic laziness”.

The analytic study of “linguistic market” subtly passes from paradigmatic classes and aspects more or less approached in this area, to syntagmatic structures in pragmatics, in the communication act. “Jocul fracționarelor exacte” (“The game of exact fractionals”) - “Replica fracționarelor nedefinite” (“The retort of indefinite fractionals”) brings up-to-date the category of exact fractionals with grammatical subjects, from the perspective of the relation language - thinking and the noun *parte* (*part*), representing the indefinite fractionals, both from the norm, the government point of view and from the semantic-functional, stylistic point of view (“one can speak about every speaker’s subjective preference”).

The public discourse, the written press gives the author material and opportunity to ponder, to argue, but also the pleasure to make a dissertation. The titles and subtitles built on analogies or oppositions, as the entire essence of the book, are illustrating: *Insule și peninsule în geografia verbului, Dânsul- singur împotriva tuturor, Adverb+participiu = love (Islands and half-isles in the geography of the verb, He – alone against everybody, Adverb + participle = love)*. The last paragraph seems to contain the whole message of the book: “The cacophony does not have to be expelled from the Romanians’ linguistic education, but in its approach one must be moderate, must have resilience and a little realism (...) the monster’s size, his malefic power is in our mind and it had been inculcated upon us through imprudent education. The politics of peaceful living together with some mutual concessions is much more wise here than the total war, damaging for everybody (...) Some “perl fishermen” boast with finding cacophonies in texts that belonged to famous

linguists or even in some normative studies. But none of them tried to unravel the real meaning of these situations” (page 234).

Moda lingvistică 2007 makes you know the norm, but it also urges you to education in knowledge, the politics of a “peaceful living together” with the language use, in the context of ternary relation: norm – use – abuse, to temperance, resilience in linguistic education.

Doina BUTIURCĂ

Vasile Dem.Zamfirescu, *The philosophy of the unconscious*, Ed. Trei, 2001

We shall approach the subject in the title by a hermeneutical exercise on the book of Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu, *Filosofia inconstientului / The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, structured in three stages: the possibility of building a psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics, the function of religion in psychoanalytic meaning, the relation spirit-soul in the philosophy of the unconscious. 1. About the ways of comprehension any significant phenomenon (in our case the „text” proposed by the unconscious on the level of the dream or of the symptom), Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu uses the distinction by which Paul Ricoeur draws two ways of transforming Hermeneutics into Phenomenology: a short way, suggested by Heidegger, that is an ontology without the exigence of its own analysis and a long way passing through the analysis of the literary language. The first way seeks the truth by substracting itself from any epistemologic assumption and, therefore, to any scientific vocation; without operating with presuppositions of the objective knowledge, it does not identify itself with a science of nature, but with a direct ontology. Instead of an illusory objectivity, as the object is always a purely rational offer closing significations, we are dealing with a real opening of the existence *in* and towards the proposed significations. The problem of truth is no longer a problem of its understanding, but that of the manifestation of the living being that understands in order to exist *in truth*. The second way the Romanian author adheres to considers the being as a way of existence (and the act by which it understands itself as such, more than a simple way of knowledge). This way may only be established in language. Thus the separation of truth from method is avoided, by passing through several stages which are as many steps of the interpretative methodology (semantic, reflexive, existential). There is no pure understanding of pure significations; the significations belong to the existence of the being that understands them in order to understand itself: „Doar reflecția, says Ricoeur, depășindu-se pe sine în existență poate să ne conducă spre rădăcinile ontologice ale înțelegerii” (*Le conflit des interprétations*, Seuil, Paris, 1969, p.15). The Hermeneutics of this indirect way will be structured around the central subject of multiple-meaning or symbolic significations, following the transfer of meaning as a dynamic relation between latency and manifestation. Therefore any hermeneutic approach (including the psychoanalytical one) will attempt to find a certain architecture of the double meaning, the role of which is to show by hiding.

This is the very definition of the symbol: „orice structură de semnificație în care un sens direct, primar, literal desemnează pe deasupra un alt sens indirect, secundar, figurat, care nu poate fi perceput decât prin intermediul celui dintâi” (*ibid.*, p.16). „Pe deasupra”

(*par surcroît*) means an indirect designation that adds to the direct one, as the literal (visible) meaning refers to another sense (invisible) which it super-dimensions and the existence of which it mediates. Interpretation is therefore „activitatea gândirii care constă în descifrarea sensului ascuns în sensul aparent” (*ibid.*). In and by interpretation, the being discovers something like an *archeology of the subject*; the existence appears in this archeology, but it remains active in the process of deciphering it generates. But existence does not appear as transparent without the intervention of the interpretation that casts light on its significations. Being provoked by the will of existing, the Semantics of will is exactly this harmony between the relations of meaning uttered in an analysis of the textual symbolism. For instance, in the symbolism of the dream we are always in the point of junction (in the *hermeneutic node*) of an erotic and semantic level, and the force of the symbol lies in the fact that the double meaning is the very way the illusion of will is expressed: „Avem simbol, says Ricoeur in a second attempt of definition, când limbajul produce semne de grad compus în care sensul, nemulțumit să desemneze ceva, desemnează alt sens care nu ar putea fi atins decât în și prin intermediul său” (*Despre interpretare. Eseu asupra lui Freud*, Ed. Trei, 1998, p.25). The psychoanalytical theory (metapsychology, as Freud calls it) cannot find anything else than what it seeks, that is expressions camouflaged in representations and effects belonging to the most archaic desires of man. But, like any Hermeneutics, it is always confronted with the risk of interpretation (with the risk of its own impurity, as we shall see). Therefore, the existence it may speak of remains an interpreted existence, that is an existence read like a text.

But according to the desire of existential understanding (the interpreter understands in order to understand himself), the philosophic reflection on the psychology – says V. Dem. Zamfirescu – forces philosophy to move the significations beyond the immediate subject, beyond consciousness. The Cogito, in this case, no longer has the assumption that it may put itself; „el apare ca *deja* pus în ființă” (P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit...*, ed.cit., p.25). The archeology of the subject performed by psychoanalysis, considering existence as desire, establishes some sort of ineity of the cogito, which – on the level of the unconscious – is pre-existent to its own self-assertion. *I desire, so I am thinking, thought.* „Această regresie a sensului spre dorință este indicația unei posibile depășiri a reflecției înspre existență” (*ibid.*, p.24). But what is important is the fact that the psychoanalytical archeology (like the subiacent teleology of the phenomenology of religion) does not appear but „in the interpretative movement that understands a figure by another figure”. In other words, the interpretative act implies, as a defining element, the comprehension of a dialectical relation: the passing from one figure to the other and of one figure through another. Therefore, underlines V. Dem. Zamfirescu, „hermeneutica psihanalitică include o tehnică de descifrare a deformărilor”, the passing of a figure in and by its disfiguring manifestation. Thus the „condition of the possibility of psychoanalysis as a Hermeneutics” is put, as the hidden meaning of the dream or of the symptom is the very hermeneutical act of psychoanalysis, its therapeutic vocation. If the latent meaning and the manifest meaning interfere on the level of the last, we are dealing with an effort of deciphering – in the interior of this dual structure – of an equivocal code.

And this equivocity is the fertile field of hermeneutic interpretation.

2. But how does psychoanalytical Hermeneutics interpret the origin of the religious phenomenon and, generally speaking, the function of religion, considering the difficult relation between the archeology of the subject it considers as an object (or even the ethiology it follows) and the teleology defining the phenomenology of religion? The

answer given by Freudian metapsychology is that of religious representations the economic function of which are exercised by the cultural function. Freudian reductionism (the “hidden” meaning of religion is only the nostalgia refulated in a paternal complex) is the classic expression of any scientific rationalism which, as Jean Borella says in *The Crisis of Religious Symbolism / Criza simbolismului religios*, is defined by the neutrality of the religious symbol, considered even by Hegel as “an alienated figure of the consciousness” and “acceptable to reason”. The critical method, accepting a religious zone of the spirit, denies transcendence, interpreting it as an illusion outside of the consciousness. Religion, says Freud, is only “a universal obsessional nevrosis”. In this perspective, notes V. Dem. Zamfirescu, „conținutul manifest nu este *nimic altceva* decât o metamorfoză [o deformare, *n.n.*] a conținutului latent, spiritul este doar o prelucrare a sufletului inconștient”. „Dumnezeu, says Freud, nu este *nimic altceva* decât un tată transfigurat” (*Totem și tabu*), that is its way of manifestation of a spirit, in the sphere of the paternal complex, a metamorphosis or transformation of the latent filial attitude, of the unconscious soul which „creates” according to its own figure the figure of the father. This reductionism is of a psychological order, by the refusal of any metaphysical interference. In a way, Jung is more honest – and more profound – when, trying to circumscribe the presence of God, he recognizes himself the limits of psychologism. What can be done, he says, is only to prove „prezența unei imagini arhetipale a lui Dumnezeu și aceasta este, după mine, tot ceea ce putem spune psihologic despre Dumnezeu”. According to a much more complex and permissive perspective than that of his former master, the postulation of this archetype – central in religious experience – has the features of the numinosity. The dream, adds Jung, in almost- anti-freudian terms, is the image of a degenerate religion, „of religious sentimentality instead of the numinous of divine experience. This is the well-known mark of a religion that has lost its mystery”.

In addition, another side of Freudian psychoanalytical reductionism is found in the difference of attitude towards art and religion, the first being considered in itself and the second subordinated to the paternal prototype and therefore minimized. It is significant how Freud treats the figure of Moses as a work of art (in *Moses by Michelangelo*) and as religion (in *Moses and Monotheism*); „pe acel Moise – spune Ricoeur – trebuia să-l glorifice ca fantasmă estetică, iar ca fantasmă religioasă să-l nimicească” (*Despre interpretare...*, ed.cit., p.263).

The explanation could result from Freud’s distinction between sublimation and refulation. The artistic works integrate, by sublimation, instinctual energies, solving them positively in culture, while religious symbols are the expression of “the return of the refulated”, manifesting primary (natural) tendencies which are not culturally accepted, and therefore dissolved since they translate an unsolved conflict between nature and culture. Religion is therefore exclusively put under the sign of refulation and soul, refusing a religious sublimation and, by closing the religious in the sphere of the soul, any possibility of it to culturally integrate, to spiritually transfigure. Partly, this is a consequence of Freud’s positivistic rationalism, as, in *Viitorul unei iluzii / The Future of an Illusion*, says that “there is no instance above reason”. On the other hand, in the relation between religion and illusion, religions *is* illusion, as it originates in the world of desires. Religious representations considered to be illusions derived from desires circumscribe severely religion in the field of the psychic, a field where the transcendent appears secularized, but also un-spiritualized, the essence of the religious phenomenon being sought in the zone

of the soul, which compromises its universality and, nevertheless, refuses its purity. Religious phenomena (originating in the soul) are heterogenous elements – of the unconscious, participating to the psychic's impurity as a whole. Their hidden meaning only occults the manifest meaning, as at the base of religious representations is the paternal protector's desire, „repetarea nesfârșită a dorului de tată” (P. Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, p.271).

Could we speak in this case of a complete deconstruction of the religious phenomenon? We may agree, showing that, besides a no-ethic construction, we are also talking about a no-ematic construction, meaning that, with the secularization of both the form and content of the traditional religious phenomenon, psychoanalysis proposes itself as a counter-religion, in which the self takes all the known divine attributes. But its main deviation touches the religious essence of the presence of God as love; in psychoanalytical perspective, God is not love, but indetermined dynamism, pure energy. Therefore what presents itself as a means of exorcizing complexes for the sake of maintaining spiritual purity (a sort of weak substitute of religious salvation) proves to be, in fact, a principle of impurity itself, the inverted illusion of a decapitation. The same effects are generated by this reductionist approach in all cultural spheres, confronting a paradoxical situation: the tensioned relation between its domain of competence (the unconscious soul) to which it should resume itself, and the field of conscious spirit, that it annexes and in the name of which it seeks to „save” the soul. On one hand, psychoanalysis reduces the superior to the inferior, the objective to the subjective but, on the other, by a programatic methodologic work (of rationalist essence) it does the exact opposite. The ontological legitimacy of such an approach to religion, as well as its utility in the phenomenological field remain under doubt.

3. Therefore, „what is the use of psychoanalytical Hermeneutics?”

A *first answer* is offered by the very philosophical frame of the relation spirit – soul, as, like V. Dem. Zamfirescu mentions, „the first chapter of a philosophy of the unconscious edified by the support of psychoanalysis, a chapter about „the purity of the spirit”, can only be written if we do not situate psychoanalytic Hermeneutics on the field of the traditional philosophic subject of the relation between spirit and soul”. In Hegel's view (*The Philosophy of the Spirit*), the spirit is the universal, and the soul is associated to the singularity; belonging to nature, „the heart” is subjective and – as a consequence assumed by psychoanalysis – the illness of the spirit (the loss of the universal's autonomy) generates the accentuation of the egocentric determinations of the soul, which represents an attempt to the purity of the spirit and therefore a weakening of spiritual censorship. But this association of the consciousness with the spirit (in a Hegelian perspective) and of the unconscious with the soul created an non-working relation. The fundamental idea of a philosophy of the unconscious based on psychoanalysis is that spiritual impurity does not operate a reduction by a false hierarchy spirit – soul. It only shows the „disguised implication of the soul on the level of the spirit”. It is not as much the functional autonomy of the Freudian super-ego that will represent the object of this philosophy, but the unconscious spirit, the Jungian concept as a dynamic element of the archetypes of the collective unconscious. However, the dialectics of the pure and impure is especially functional on the level of the conscious spirit *affected* by singular elements of the unconscious soul. Therefore, the spirit's impurity result from the fact that, although not derived from the soul, it is not independent of it, but only autonomous, being „carried” by the latter (just like the superior is supported by the inferior); so that the living spirit, the embodied soul, includes „elements that are heterogenous to it”, which produces the

tension between the two levels. By such a dialectic euphemism, „the spirit’s impurity is one of the possible solutions for the tension between spirit and soul”. And than, following L. Klages, whether the spirit becomes impure by embodiment, as this is the only way it is truly alive, a relation in which the soul has a completely secondary role, being united with the body or simply excluded from the equation; or the spirit opposes life, which it tries to destroy or, on the contrary, raise from the individual to the universal. The resulting conclusions fall into the absurd or, in the best case, into paradox. On one hand, the spirit of life is impurity itself, as it keeps itself pure only in the lack of any relation with the soul’s otherness; on the other, being the opposing pole of life (union body *and* soul), it denies it, like any altering otherness, with the assumed risk of remaining outside life. In both cases, the concept results from the hard core of any type of purism. By the mortification and parasitization of the vital principle represented by the soul, the spirit is itself subjected to an de-vitalizing ascension. It protects its purity with the fatal risk of degenerating life. Thus, its purity does not exist; only impurity exists, the *generous* mixture of life.

„Ne vom referi doar la ideea impurității spiritului – says V. Dem. Zamfirescu – , în a cărei dezvoltare și adâncime rezidă aportul hermeneuticii psihanalitice la problematica relației spirit – suflet”. The principles of psychoanalysis as Hermeneutics inherit this problem, harmonizing it with that of the relation between nature and culture. The soul is equaled with the naturalness that is unaccepted by culture (spirit), refulated into the unconscious. „The return of the refulated” under a camouflaged form represent in this context the act by which a latent meaning of instinctual *nature*, over which a manifest (conscious) meaning floats, ends-up in culture. And as the spirit’s impurity assumes the disguised implication of the soul on the level of the spirit, the symptom, as well as the dream, are marked by impurity, as they are manifestations of the ill spirit, corrupted by the insinuating activity of desire. The interpretation gains here a therapeutical function: by descyphring the latent meaning hidden in the manifest one, it reveals the center of a crisis, ends a frustration, rejects a nevrosis. This is a crisis of the subject confronting, on one hand, the rational censorship of a culture of the spirit that protects its purity (or correctness, as we would call it today) and, on the other hand, the return of the refulated, of a „perverted” soul that undermines purity. In other words, psychoanalytical Hermeneutics finds its main object in the field of a conflict, that is the very breaking of the subject exposed to incontrollable disfunctionalities. The logic of this conflict proves to be, in fact, an analysis of the dynamism of meaningful manifestation which, by interpretation, convert their „nature” and, by sublimation, re-integrate into „culture”.

A *second answer* to the question about the object of psychoanalytical Hermeneutics is found in the exigency of objectifying any approach that is specific to the sciences of nature, an approach which should also take into consideration the subjectivity’s impurity. Instead, in the sciences of the spirit, and especially in the artistic or religious representations, the problem of objectivity is only considered in a small measure or, if considered, it is still from the perspective of the sciences of nature which, by using the method, trust that they *find* the *entire* truth, when in fact they only have access to the so-called objective truth, that of the spirit for which nature is a province. In the terms of the philosophy of the unconscious, the goal sought for by psychoanalytical Hermeneutics is „the clarification of the soul by identifying the elements related to the unconscious soul, the infantile soul”. Eventually, it is not the soul itself that is of interest, but the soul’s

health, as it should be able to distinguish what belongs to it and what doesn't. This way, the soul will always remain a stranger to the spirit. It gains its freedom not by repressing the soul, but by the simple fact of consciousness of its existence. Psychoanalytic Hermeneutics, argues V. Dem. Zamfirescu, allows the spirit to grow, „eliberându-l de leștul sufletului inconștient, pe care ar trebui să-l poarte, dacă n-ar ști de el”.

But the purity the soul aspires to is not representable in the real; it is meant to exist „în conștiința dureroasă de a fi non-pur”, according to Vl. Jankelevitch, which introduces the non-sense of pure consciousness, as to be aware of your own purity means in fact to have the awareness of impurity. In other words, the awareness of purity is an impure awareness and purity is always unconscious (unaware). „Conștiința alungă puritatea, iar puritatea dă afară conștiința”, adds the French philosopher in *Le Pur et l'Impur* (Flammarion, Paris, 1960). For the spirit, the soul is different, the other, the *otherness which alters*. It suffers, in relation to the soul, of a fratricide complex; in relation to that „you” which is alike and still different, another, the spirit sets a distance, ca cast difference. To touch the soul means to degrade it and to contaminate it, to overload it with what it does not know. If the spirit cannot be pure, but can be free (in Nietzsche's view), than its freedom has something of the purist dogmatism for which impurity is accidental, a non-substantial appearance which cannot *touch* the *untouchable* essence. In other words, the impurity the soul introduces in the spirit is (psychoanalytically) treated as an anomaly, as a malformation. But the spirit does not only suffer of this complex, but also of a trully hypochondrous complex, attempting to protect itself from any threat coming from the soul, from any confusion. Confusion means mixture, indistinction and regression: shortly said, a principle of error. Taking the place of religion, in modern times, psychoanalysis wants the impurity of the soul to be an extreme solution to the chaos produced by the twilight of the gods „Extremismul modernilor, says Jankélévitch, este un purism disperat”, if not the very violent antidote to the great compromise. Who will find a *modus vivendi* with the impurity of a world the simplicity of which has become a memory and the welfare of which is more than suspect?

To this question, the philosopher of the unconscious will answer: psychoanalytical Hermeneutics, according to which impurity means to substitute it with an intelligible (pure) interpretation. Since the unconscious soul's impurity presents itself as an illusion, the psychoanalytical interpretation becomes a strategy of suspicion and a fight against occultation. The hermeneutical field of the dream in which the interpret captures the symbols of the deflated soul offers itself as a complex of disimulated signification to be descyphered. The work of this interpretation aspires to un-mystify and reduce illusions, a first illusion being that of the purity of consciousness; its fundamental category is „raportul ascuns – dezvăluit sau, dacă preferăm, simulat – manifestat” (P. Ricoeur, *Despre interpretare...*, ed.cit., p.43). But it is not only the unconscious soul that parasitates the spirit, compromising its eminence, but, as a result, the latent meaning manifested in a significant scenery of the illness, in a text that offers itself to interpretation but is nevertheless corrupted by the very act of deflation. If deflation is a manifestation of the impure, the meaning it offers needs the light of suspicion, of doubt over what it *appears* to be. In order to show the „falsity” of the codification of a latent meaning in a manifest, illusory one, psychoanalytic Hermeneutics descypheres by suspicion. To enter the false consciousness means to apriorically interpret it as an impure consciousness, and the meaning manifested by it is suspected to be altered by an unconscious Intentionality. The extension of the field of knowledge (of the free spirit) is only possible by the un-

mystification of the meaning, in other words by the conversion of its otherness („the foreign body” of a meaning that must be „extracted”) into the „healing” light of interpretation. The return of the refuted, of his irrational face, *savage*, becomes inversion, of nature into culture, with an absorption of the soul into the spirit. This conquering spirit is „the free spirit by excelency”, the pure spirit which, according to Nietzsche, „se joacă naiv, fără intenție (s.n.), dintr-un preaplin de belșug și putere, cu tot ceea ce s-a numit până acum sfânt, bun, de neatins” (s.n.). Freedom based on the exorcization of intention responsible for the act of mystification. As intention is an illusion of the untouchable; nothing can be better put into intention than the projection in appearance, as a disimulated perspective of the possible, just as nothing offers better the intention of emptiness (emptying of any signification) than the demasking of its illusion of touching without being touched itself. From here, not only the psychoanalytic Hermeneut’s suspicion but also the suspicion of the free spirit itself, which „are datorita de a fi neîncrezător, de a privi lumea dușmănos din toate abisurile bănuielilor” (*Dincolo de bine și de rău*, 32). The ill look is the non-intentional look, therefore pure as it is untouched; it looks without being looked at by anything. It is, like in psychoanalysis, a free look, *because* it doubts any desfigurating intention. Secularized and un-mythicized (in a different meaning of the term than that used by Bultmann), psychoanalytic Hermeneutics – and the philosophy of the unconscious it gives a method to – attempts to liberate the spirit, reading in the manifest meaning the latent meaning of an impure intention. But the presumed purification is the result of an impure work, that of any desire that has passed through the severe filter of reason, rationality that always has to confront the returned refuted, the stranger who claims his right to difference. The Hermeneutics of impurity is itself impure. These disciplines of the real, argues Ricoeur, may actually miss the gift of imagination and the apparition of the possible - „nu le lipsesc oare harul imaginației și apariția posibilului? Iar acest har al Imaginației nu are el nimic în comun cu Cuvântul înțeleș ca Revelație?” (*op.cit.*, p.46). This question persists, to paraphrase the French philosopher, into finding out the point till which such a debate may be approached in the limits of a philosophy of the unconscious that, in order to honor its hermeneutical exigency, must remain a *reflection* on the ontological roots of understanding. It must assume until the end, as Nietzsche says, the tragic destiny of the one „at which no god looks any more”.

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