

PSYCHO-COGNITIVE, CULTURAL AND DISCURSIVE MECHANISMS IN THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST'S PROFILE

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Abstract: The article discusses the power of mindsets and the ways they may influence intelligence analysis, both positively and negatively. As mindsets cannot be avoided, and their overarching effect on our perception and interpretation of reality cannot be denied, the intelligence analysts must possess a series of attributes, mechanisms to help them cope with the effects of these cognitive structures. These mechanisms are presented in detail below, starting with the cognitive ones and moving to the cultural and discursive ones.

Keywords: *mindsets, cognitive mechanisms, cultural mechanisms, discursive mechanisms.*

Schemata and mindsets cannot be disregarded in intelligence analysis, as the effects they may have on intelligence products and, implicitly, on national and international security are extremely important. Schemata and mindsets essentially represent the organization and categorization of the knowledge that each person has on a given topic. Mindsets are distilled information encapsulated in the cognitive schemata which an intelligence analyst has on a certain issue or on a given situation and which form a prism through which he/she perceives the respective issue or situation and any possible alterations these may undergo. The present article focuses on the way these mindsets affect intelligence analysis, both positively, by helping analysts process a large volume of information in a relatively short period of time, but also negatively, by limiting perspectives, by impeding the correct identification of possible risks and threats, and by leading to errors with grave consequences (e.g. Yom Kippur, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the invasion of Normandy – D-Day, *Fall Gelb*, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, to name just a few). We shall discuss three types of mechanisms that can assist intelligence analysts to control, limit and compensate for the negative effects of mindsets in the production of intelligence reports. These mechanisms are: cognitive, cultural and discursive.

Defining mindsets

Cognitive schemata and mindsets are means and processes of obtaining or shaping representations of objects, entities and events and they form the basis of all thought processes. They guide and determine the way in which we interpret and relate to reality, and, to a great extent, help build this reality. Their active, conscious or unconscious, structuring and categorizing component of the situations people come into contact with is what concerns us when discussing the cognitive profile of an efficient intelligence analyst. As Lakoff^{mmmmmm}, Augoustinous & Walkerⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿ, Curelaru^{oooooo}, Neculau^{pppppp} (to name just a few) have

^{mmmmmm} Lakoff, G., 1987. *Women, fire and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿ Augoustinous, M. & W. I., 1996. *Social Cognition. An Integrated Introduction*. London: Sage.

^{oooooo} Curelaru, M., 2006. *Reprezentări sociale*. 1 ed. Iași: Editura Polirom.

^{pppppp} Neculau, A., 1996. *Psihologie socială. Aspecte contemporane*. Iași: Editura Polirom.

explained that, in order to communicate and interpret information efficiently, people actively interact with the data they receive, eliminate superfluous or irrelevant elements, and decode the messages according to their already-formed conceptual categories. Schemata, according to the definition put forth by Rumelhart^{qqqqqq}, are the “building blocks of cognition”, the fundamental elements that information processing relies on. They guide not only the interpretation of sensory information, but also the access to the data stored in memory, the organization of information, the identification of goals, the allocation of mental resources, and problem-solving techniques. Consequently, their aim is to simplify reality, the in-bound flux of information, which, in their absence, would lead to cognitive blockage. Schemata are cognitive structures of interrelated generic information which could be employed in various situations and which lead to interpretations. In intelligence analysis, the term used by specialists is mindsets and they will further be named as such in this paper.

The most objective, or better said, less subjective and most efficient interpretation of reality (and then implicitly of vulnerabilities, risks and threats to security) is the main goal of any mindset. This process is efficient and operational due to the fact that, as Fiske & Taylor^{rrrrr} explain, people are “cognitive misers”, meaning that they try to decode the situations they come across in light of these patterns and thus reduce the cognitive effort as much as possible. Mindsets offer explanations for various situations, but, at the same time, as R. George cautions, they can become “a fatal trap” in intelligence analysis because, in their simplest definition, they represent “a series of expectations through which a human being sees the world” and through which they model the events so that they are in synchrony with their expectations, intentions, abilities, and value systems^{ssssss}. The same view is held by Jervis^{ttttt}, MacNulty^{uuuuuu}, Micu & Vilceanu who also add the idea that new events which are in consonance with already-existing patterns are easily incorporated in them, thus encouraging “mental inertia”^{vvvvvv}, while the ones that appear to contradict these patterns are ignored. Moreover, Heuer^{wwwwww} states that, beyond their positive properties of organizing information into recognizable and operational patterns, mindsets also give rise to a series of negative consequences: people exhibit the tendency to reject what they do not expect to perceive; mindsets are easily formed, but are almost impervious to change; they predispose people to assimilate new information into already existing knowledge; initial exposure to ambiguous and incoherent stimuli may affect proper perception even after new, clearer information is

^{qqqqqq} Rumelhart, D., 1980. Schemata: the building blocks of cognition. In: R. B. B. & B. W. Spiro, ed. *Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension: Perspectives from Cognitive Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence and Education*. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 33-58.

^{rrrrr} Fiske, T. &, 1978. Saliency, attention and attribution. Top of the head phenomena. In: L. Berkowitz, ed. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. New York: Academic Press.

^{ssssss} George, R., 2004. Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-sets: Alternative Analysis. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 17(3), p.386.

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^{vvvvvv} Micu, M. & V. C., 2011. Factori care determină/influențează procesul analitic. Limite psihologice și erori de analiză. In: I. Nițu, ed. *Ghidul analistului de intelligence*. București: Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații „Mihai Viteazul”, p.42.

^{wwwwww} Heuer, R., 1999. *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. s.l.:Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

obtained. Intelligence analysis' main goal is to identify the unknown, possible risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and, consequently, it mainly deals with situations with varying degrees of ambiguity in interpretation, in which mindsets play an overwhelming part.

To limit the effects of mindsets on the validity on intelligence analysis, R.George^{xxxxxx}, Jervis^{yyyyyy}, Heuer^{zzzzz}, Moore^{aaaaaaa}, Ciobanu^{bbbbbbb}, Condrea^{ccccccc} claim that analysts need to possess a series of traits: imagination (to see beyond their own mindsets), curiosity (to analyze all scenarios fully), humility (not to consider that the first answer is the best), teamwork, and, implicitly, accepting feedback from other team members, critical thinking.

However, it is our view that the issue of the intelligence analysts' competencies and socio-psychological profile is more complex and can be approached on three levels: the cognitive mechanisms that analysts employ and that they should be aware of and control; the cultural mechanisms that they must master and comprehend because the information they come into contact with and analyze often presupposes cultural constructs different from their own; and, last but not least, discursive mechanisms which function behind any intelligence report and which so far have not been addressed in discussions of intelligence analysis, but whose importance is crucial. Each of these mechanisms will be analyzed in depth in the following sections.

Cognitive mechanisms

In his book, *The Psychology of Cognitive Mechanisms*, M. Zlate identifies and defines a series of complementary thought processes, which are activated depending on the problem that must be tackled. Thus, the first set of complementary processes is represented by *directed* and *undirected thinking*. The former is "systemic and logical, deliberate and intentional, aim-oriented, and with its aid people solve problems, formulate laws, achieve set objectives."^{ddddddd} The latter, undirected thinking, is the "free spontaneous flow of thoughts, and it is not oriented towards a goal or plan."^{eeeeeee} This latter one is the basis of imagination, fantasy and the generation of new ideas.

The second set is made up of *algorithmic* and *heuristic thinking*. Algorithmic thinking overlaps, to a great extent in our opinion, directed thinking as it is based on "preconfigured, conservative, habitual operations, on rigorous passages from one state to another in a compulsory temporal sequence, on the correct performance of a step, necessarily leading to

^{xxxxxx} George, R., *op.cit.*

^{yyyyyy} Jervis, R., *op.cit.*

^{zzzzz} Heuer, R., *op.cit.*

^{aaaaaaa} Moore, D., 2009. *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*. Washington D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College.

^{bbbbbbb} Ciobanu, C., 2011. Tipologia analistului de informații. In: I. Nițu, ed. *Ghidul analistului de intelligence*. București: Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații „Mihai Viteazul”.

Condrea, C., 2011. Profilul psiho-profesional al analistului. In: I. Nițu, ed. *Ghidul analistului de intelligence*. București: Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații „Mihai Viteazul”.

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^{ddddddd} Zlate, M., 2006. *Psihologia mecanismelor cognitive*. Iași: Editura Polirom, p.274.

^{eeeeeee} *Idem*, p.274.

the integral and certain solving of the problem.”^{ffffff} We would claim that, while directed thinking maintains constant the orientation towards the goal of the undertaking, the algorithmic one doubles it to validate the steps made to attain that goal. In the case of intelligence analysis, these two types of thinking are vital to direct and organize the flux of information into a coherent and rigorously worked-out discourse.

Heuristic thinking, on the other hand, reflects to a certain extent undirected thinking in that it is “flexible and as yet undetermined.”^{gggggg} But once a direction has been identified, heuristic thinking is also guided by a set of rules. As M. Golu explains, while “algorithmic thinking is routine-based, mastering already conquered territories, heuristic thinking is an evolution, and optimizing process, discovering new territories. Algorithmic thinking is associated with cautionary, comfortable attitudes which support the status quo of the relationships between events, while heuristic thinking is founded on attitudes of initiative, independence, inventiveness, daring.”^{hhhhhh} Heuristic thinking is, however, at its starting point, easily influenced by errors such as the one mentioned by Daniel Kahnemanⁱⁱⁱⁱⁱⁱ: anchoring, representativity and availability, which may cause problems especially in the field of intelligence analysis as this type of thinking as well as undirected thinking contribute to the generation of new hypotheses that will then be validated.

Two other complementary types of thinking are the *divergent* and *convergent* ones. The former presupposes looking for as many solutions as possible, investigating in multiple directions in order to find a solution; in other words, it starts from the uniqueness of a problem and heads towards a plurality of solutions. Convergent thinking is based on the opposite process, from diversity to unity, with a view to identifying one solution.^{jjjjjj} In intelligence analysis both types of thinking are necessary. Once a hypothesis is generated, in order for it to be confirmed or infirmed, the analysts must look for as many sources from as many directions as possible because the ambiguities are numerous and the only way to obtain as high a degree of certainty as possible is to examine as many solutions as possible. Convergent thinking, although it does have its uses (a report cannot present everything the analysts have ascertained, be it relevant or irrelevant for the suggested hypothesis), namely that it synthesizes the products of divergent thinking, may also present traps. The analysts can choose to eliminate from their synthesis certain aspects that they consider irrelevant but which, in fact, may matter, either to clarify the situation or to indicate possible shortcomings of the presented hypothesis. The two types of thinking require analysts to maintain a balance so that limitations may be compensated and the best possible results may be produced.

The following types of thinking form a triad: *inductive*, *deductive* and *analogical* thinking. The first represents the move from the particular to the general by extracting the common characteristics and eliminating the inconsistent ones; “inductive thinking facilitates the extraction and the formulation of a general conclusion from a multitude of particular instances.”^{kkkkkk} But certain products of this type of thinking are never completely certain as

^{ffffff} *Idem*, p.275.

^{gggggg} *Idem*, p.276.

^{hhhhhh} Golu, M., 1975. *Principii de psihologie cibernetică*. București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, p.166.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱⁱⁱ Kahneman, D., 2012. *Gândire rapidă, gândire lentă*. București: Editura Publica.

^{jjjjjj} Zlate, M., *op.cit.*, p.280.

^{kkkkkk} *Idem*, p.284.

they presuppose from the very beginning that certain irregularities are excluded. Deductive thinking is the opposite of induction starting from the general and moving towards the particular. “Deduction consists in extracting a particular truth from a very general principle, which requires the general principle to be in and of itself true; a particular truth is itself contained in the general principle.”^{lllllll} It is the best means of verifying and controlling inductive thinking, due to its rigorous and systematic nature.

Analogical thinking consists in “establishing similarities among different objects, phenomena, events, ideas, etc. where they do not seem to exist, in the transfer of information from a known and incorporated object to an unknown and unassimilated one.”^{mmmmmmmm} Its role is integrative and innovative at the same time. Novel elements are accepted and integrated in the cognitive system by establishing relationships between them and already-existing ones.

Another set is represented by *vertical* and *lateral thinking*. Lateral thinking has many traits in common with creative thinking (which will be discussed further on) as well as with undirected thinking. It is defined, according to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* as “the attempt to solve problems with apparently illogical or unorthodox methods.” The difference would be that lateral thinking is not focused on the generation of new hypotheses, but on solving problems in innovative ways which are not subject to the conventions of formal logic. Lateral thinking presupposes overcoming or even ignoring old patterns in order to generate new ones, operating with elements that may appear irrelevant at first sight, but which, in the mechanics of this type of reasoning, gain relevance and produce new and possibly unexpected solutions. Vertical thinking is carefully structured, it orderly constructs argumentative and justified lines of reasoning in a similar way to deductive and directed thinking.

A final complementary set is made up of *critical* and *creative thinking*. The literature on intelligence analysis has focused on these two types of thinking. The reasons for this focus are explained by Heuer, “imagination and creativity play important roles in intelligence analysis as in most other human endeavors. Intelligence judgments require the ability to imagine possible causes and outcomes of a current situation. All possible outcomes are not given. The analyst must think of them by imagining scenarios that explicate how they might come about.”ⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿ Therefore, the role of creative thinking is to free the mind of rational and argumentative constraints, to stimulate it to produce new hypotheses, ideas and perspectives.

Critical thinking is defined as that “mode of thinking – about any subject, content, or problem – in which the [solitary] thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them.”^{oooooooo} Or, as David T. Moore^{pppppppp} explains, critical thinking is both a cognitive and a meta-cognitive process that examines not only the idea, but also the reasoning process that produces it. Its goal is dual: to improve the reasoning mechanism and to find a

^{lllllll} *Idem*, p.286.

^{mmmmmmmm} *Idem*, p.286.

ⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿⁿ Heuer, R., *op.cit.*, p.75.

^{oooooooo} Paul, R. & E. L., 2004. *The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools*. 4th ed. Dillon Beach: The Foundation for Critical Thinking, p.1.

^{pppppppp} Moore, D., *op.cit.*

correct solution. The role of critical thinking is to oversee the production of new ideas and to validate or invalidate them.

There is, however, an emotional component that must not be ignored, in our opinion, as critical thinking implicitly entails an analysis of the values around which a group's identity is centered. The change in perspective that critical thinking presupposes occasionally means accepting completely different and sometimes unacceptable points of view as premises for a certain inference. Detaching oneself from one's own values in order to understand those of other cultures' members, although necessary, may lead to emotional reactions that the analyst must be aware of.

The review of these types of thinking leads us to the following conclusion: essentially, they can be grouped in two classes: (1) *prospective*, meaning unconventional, exploratory, innovative and unstructured – undirected, heuristic, divergent, inductive, lateral and creative thinking; (2) *productive*, or conventional, argumentative and structured – directed, algorithmic, convergent, deductive, vertical and critical thinking. We would argue that in intelligence analysis both classes play equally important roles, but at different points of the analysis process. Firstly, the analysts resort to prospective types of reasoning to produce hypotheses that break the boundaries of their personal mindsets and which can shed a new light on and often clarify certain situations. After the working hypotheses have thus been generated, the analysts resort to the second class of productive types of thinking to justify, validate or invalidate the hypotheses in order to construct the argumentation that supports the hypothesis step-by-step. At each stage in the argumentation process, critical thinking plays the most important role as it is the one that, unlike all the other types, also has a meta-cognitive component which is oriented towards the process itself, not solely towards the result. Employing all these cognitive mechanisms at their disposal, analysts may alleviate some of the negative effects produced by mindsets in intelligence analysis.

Cultural mechanisms

As previously mentioned, cultural aspects play an extremely important role in intelligence analysis. A basic component of individual mindsets originates from the fact that every analyst belongs to a certain culture, which automatically and implicitly means a more or less conscious adherence to a set of values. These values make people view the world through a lens that more often than not they are not even aware of.

One of the methods most commonly used by intelligence analysts, especially in situations with a high degree of uncertainty, is *data immersion*^{qqqqqqq}. This is based on the review of information without trying to fit it into patterns, thus allowing at a certain point for an explanation to arise, for a hypothesis to be generated that can then be verified. Using this method implies eliminating/ignoring personal opinions and preconceptions in order to aspire to as high a degree of objectivity as possible. But, as Heuer explains, this is impossible as “information cannot speak for itself”^{rrrrrrr}. It starts making sense when it is incorporated into a context of interpretation and this context is given by the analyst in the guise of “a set of

^{qqqqqqq} Heuer, R., *op.cit.*, pp.40-2.

^{rrrrrrr} *Idem*, p.41.

assumptions and expectations concerning human and organizational behavior.^{sssssss} Consequently, data immersion should be doubled by an awareness of preexisting mental attitudes which may affect interpretation. They exist and inexorably work, and the only measure the analyst may take to limit their impact and to diminish his/her subjectivity is to make them explicit, to examine them openly, not to ignore them.

However, this is easier said than done, but it is not an insurmountable issue because self-education plays an important role, as MacNulty also argues. She encourages getting to know one's enemy with two major goals in mind: to anticipate their actions, meaning to understand also "why" not only "what" and "how" they are willing to do, and to be able to influence their actions or to be able to communicate with them.^{tttttt} In other words, intelligence analysts may educate themselves to detach themselves from their personal mindsets in order to understand other cultures' mindsets. This education process is based on analyzing the social and cultural dimensions that form the basis for an understanding of the ways in which the members of different cultures perceive, reason and act in the context of certain events. These dimensions form the basis of mindsets and if they are not openly examined, they will affect the intelligence analysis process. According to MacNulty^{uuuuuu}, these dimensions are: epistemologies; ways of thinking; values, beliefs, and motivations; approaches to life; approaches to understanding; approaches to power; measure of achievement; religious beliefs; concern about honor; concern about shame; strategic time; tactical time; group orientation; assertiveness; attitude towards death; reactions to foreigners.

The combination of these dimensions calibrates the way in which the members of different cultures see the world and interact with it. Firstly, intelligence analysts must make use of these dimensions to become aware of and evaluate their own mindsets, and, only then, those of their adversaries. Thus, they may obtain that meta-cognitive capacity which facilitates not only the production of hypotheses and reasoning but also the validation of the production process itself.

Discursive mechanisms

The term discourse has received different definitions in the literature, but those that are of interest to the present research are focused on the societal and constructive aspects of discourse. Jäger^{vvvvvv} and Fairclough^{wwwwww} focus on them, defining discourse as the flux on societal knowledge stored in time and which lead to actions being taken both at an individual and at a collective level. This flux has a formative effect on society as it allows the exercise of social power.^{xxxxxxx} In Fairclough's perspective, discourse is the product of semiosis by the representation and self-representation of social practices. "Discourses are ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings and beliefs, and the social world. (...)

^{sssssss} *Idem*, p.41.

^{tttttt} MacNulty, C., *op.cit.*, pp.2-3.

^{uuuuuu} *Idem*, p.25.

^{vvvvvv} Jäger, S., 2001. Discourse and knowledge: theoretical and methodological aspects of critical discourse and dispositive analysis. In: *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-62.

^{wwwwww} Fairclough, N., 2003. *Analysing Discourse*. London: Routledge.

^{xxxxxxx} Jäger, S., *op.cit.*, p.33.

Different discourses are different perspectives on the world, and they are associated with the different relations these people have to the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities and the social relationships in which they stand to other people.^{yyyyyyy} Wodak also brings to the discussion the linguistic component and its role in shaping our worldview, as discourse is a combination of sequential speech acts that produce and mould reality.^{zzzzzz}

The role of discourse and discursivity in intelligence analysis has been less explored so far, although its importance has never been denied. As Hatlebrekke & Smith^{aaaaaaa} explain, failures in intelligence analysis have two components which reflect cognitive and discursive failures that the two researchers define as “the failure to identify, analyze, and accept that a significant threat exists.” A possible cause of discourse failure is the human need for facile, easily accessible explanations, which alleviate or eliminate instability and uncertainty and which are in tune with existing mindsets. This idea supports to a certain extent Jervis^{bbbbbbb} view according to which new information is more easily integrated into the analysts’ discourse if it comes to confirm already held beliefs. He also reinforces the idea that the human need for certainty plays an important role in accepting or rejecting evidence.

Hatlebrekke & Smith^{ccccccc} state that discourse failures are caused by the need to have a clear answer, to reach a definite conclusion, to have certainty; they represent “a human defense mechanism, which attempts to assert that matters exist in a distinct order, structure and stability.” As MacNulty^{ddddddd} notices, the human mind reacts to patterns which are familiar although, more often than not, they are activated by incomplete information, as the available discourse does not provide all the elements to justify resorting to these patterns.

The analyst devises a scenario based on the events which have taken place previously and this scenario dictates possible outcomes. More than that, we would add, the aim of forming a coherent narrative may lead to the elimination of certain data that could affect this coherence, but that could be relevant to the event itself. Once the analysts take on the narrative role, they also assume a certain mindset that comes with this role. This mindset hides two possible pitfalls: the first, mentioned previously, refers to the exclusion and undermining of incongruous details; the second entails the use of imagination to fill in for missing information that could affect the coherent flow of the narrative. These two pitfalls combined may affect the conclusion itself by eliminating the plurality of hypotheses in favor of that one single hypothesis which has proven to be the most coherent from a narrative standpoint.

For these reasons, in order to suspend the effects of this narrative mindset, the analysts must write their reports being aware of the fact that, even though causal explanations are the best binder for a narrative, they are also a fallacy. Even if certain events do not seem to be connected causally, this does not mean that the analyst does not perceive this link and

^{yyyyyyy} Fairclough, N., *op.cit.*, p.123-4.

^{zzzzzz} Wodak, R., 2001. The discourse-historical approach. In: *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.

^{aaaaaaa} Hatlebrekke, K. & Smith, M., 2010. Towards a new theory of intelligence failure? The impact of cognitive closure and discourse failure. *Intelligence and National Security*, 25(2), p. 148.

^{bbbbbbb} Jervis, *op.cit.*

^{ccccccc} Hatlebrekke, K. & Smith, M., *op.cit.*, pp.148-9.

^{ddddddd} MacNulty, C., *op.cit.*

should strive to provide it, but that they may actually be random events and should be treated as such.

This human need to uncover causality and coherence in any event is hard to suppress, especially when dealing with written reports. In oral communication, their lack may be more easily tolerated, but in writing it is perceived as a mistake to be corrected. Intelligence analysts, however, once they become aware of this propensity towards interconnected as a means of achieving coherence, can master and overcome it, but not without explicit training on discursivity, narratives, and the techniques characteristic to both. This meta-ability, of thinking about discourse not only in point of content but also of form is vital in order to produce valid and useful intelligence reports.

Given the complex and highly uncontrollable nature of mindsets, the three mechanisms presented above become necessary to control and compensate for their effects. These mechanisms must become an integral part of the psychological and socio-cognitive profile of the intelligence analysts and they are the weapons that analysts can wield to produce valid and coherent reports. Cognitive mechanisms, by combining the various types of thinking, will allow them to overcome cognitive blockages and will ensure well-constructed and organized reasoning that produces as valid and as realistic hypotheses as possible. Cultural mechanisms will help the analysts both to become aware of the aspects of their own culture that may affect their representations regarding an enemy belonging to a different culture, as well as their ability to foresee this enemy's possible courses of action. Discursive mechanism will come into play last, after the hypotheses have been formed, but their role is not less important. Discursivity accompanies the analysts at all levels of their analysis and plays an overwhelming part when analysts write their reports. If these three mechanisms, analyzed in the present article, work together and interact efficiently, they could compensate for the negative impact of mindsets.

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