

THE SPACE MATTERS. IMAGINING AND MAPPING OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

**Mariana Cojoc, Assoc. Prof., PhD, "Ovidius" University of Constanța,
Ana Maria Munteanu, Assoc. Prof., PhD, "Ovidius" University of Constanța**

Abstract: Acknowledging responsibility for space is a result of debates and alternative definitions of space achieved in diverse scientific areas from sociology to political science and from international relations to cultural theory. According to Doreen Massey, "The impact of these discussions challenges the persistence of a set of problematic associations around space that we have inherited from a set of philosophical lineages and that are constantly articulated in contemporary politics" (1999, 2005). Our analysis starts from the topicality of the concept of space having the purpose to explore how mapping a "region of development"- namely the Area of the Black Sea, as a project facing local conflicts and risk - is obviously more than horizontal mapping of (real) space-. Massey's argument that paraphrases the famous drawing by Magritte „ceci n'est pas une pipe" in „ceci n'est pas l'espace" (fig.11.1, the map of the south-east of England, Massey, 2005) can provide openings not only for space or thinking/ questioning the regional space, but to figure out embedded possibilities and potentialities for future projects.

A multidimensional and relational approach of space in sociology, geography, urban planning and communication sciences (Lefebvre 1973/1991, Virilio, 1977/2006, Castells, 2012, Trift, 2003, Massey, 1999, 2005) acknowledges the cultural complexity of space (cultural practices and discourse, as a "third space") and also affects paradigms of international relations leading to more comprehensive approaches like the Buzan-Jaap de Wilde -Waeaver' Regional Security Complex Theory of Regions (RSCTR).

Keywords: *production of spaces, space responsibility, spatiality, regional cooperation, regional security.*

Introduction

Acknowledging responsibility for space is a result of debates and alternative definitions achieved in diverse scientific areas from geography and sociology to International Relations (IR), political science and cultural theory. According to Doreen Massey, "the impact of these discussions challenges the persistence of a set of problematic associations around space that we have inherited from a set of philosophical lineages and that are constantly articulated in contemporary politics" (2005)¹. In "The Production of Space", Henry Lefebvre (1991) drew attention to the fact that even in social science "we use the concepts without being fully conscious of what we mean"². Massey stresses that "our implicit imagination is fed by all kind of influences deriving from challenges posed by practical socio-political space, viewed as a dimension of a simultaneously multiplicity ". Thus, the double aim of her influential book *For Space* (2005) was to simultaneously open up our thinking of the spatial and the political (Anderson, 2008). In our opinion, the present task of rereading the relationship between politics and space as a path for building "a responsible geography" also has to re-evaluate the role of public understanding of a critical engagement with the real relations running through and thereby constituting space (Massey, 1999, 2005). This has to be

¹ Doreen Massey, *For Space*, London, Sage, 2005.

² Henry Lefebvre, *The Production of Spaces*, Blackwell, London, 1991.

based on a critique of everyday life, but including emerging spatialities and de/reterritorialization issues.

Diverse forms of critique, including the three level based analysis of Lefebvre (le perçu, le conçu et le vécu), might be useful in addition to questioning how the concept of space was (1) grounded, (2) structured, (3) related to other concepts, (4) defined and mapped along a series of “unpromising associations” with diverse theories of postmodernity that have influenced political science, global economy and International Relations.

The spatial turn and its dilemmas

In a lecture framing *heterotopia* and the everyday life entitled “Of Other Spaces” (1967), Foucault has anticipated the paradigm shift of the ‘90s:

The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world. [...] The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed.

Epitomizing Foucault’s ideas in “This Space that Gnaws and Claws at Us”, R. Tally Jr. notes “Space is both product, and productive; it produces us, in fact”. Manuel Castells coined the concept of “space of flows” in “The Informational City: Information, Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban Regional Process” (1989) – and established a new task for social science to “re-conceptualize new forms of spatial arrangements under the new technological paradigm”. But at the end of a decade (in 2000), he returns on claims, nuances the stance, and warns on the enormous complexity of representations generated by diverse intersections of the two forms - ‘space of flows’ and ‘space of places’-. “Real-world-time, the space-and-time to which people are accustomed is “the space of places” which is unlike the space of flows because it lacks the three elements of (i) a proper flow medium, (ii) the proper items composing the flow traversing through it, and (iii) the organisational nodes through which these nodes circulate (cit. in Stadler, 2003: 3). Since then, numerous analysis and discussions dedicated to de(re)territorialization processes have made clear both the utility and the traps of the flat world model and the necessity to make a step further in the methodological approach of space.

Since the early ‘90s, Gerard Toal (G.Ó. Tuathail), professor of political geography at Virginia Tech University, has been influenced by postmodern and structuralist theories. In his study co-authored with T. Luke „Present at (Dis) Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order³”, he announced the end of geopolitics, critical geopolitics, highlighting the importance of cyberspace, of communication, rather than centuries traced by a history rich in conflicts. On the other hand, Matthew Sparke, professor at

³ G. Ó Tuathail, Timothy W. Luke, *Present at (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order* Co-authored with Dr. W. Luke, in „Annals of the Association of American Geographers”, 1994, 84, pp. 381-398; *Ibidem*, *At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Pluralizing Problematic at the Century’s End, Alternatives*, in „Social Transformation and Humane Governance”, 22, 1, pp. 35-55; C.T. Dahlman, T. Williams, *Ethnic enclavisation and State Formation in Kosovo*, in „Geopolitics”, 2010, 15 (2), pp. 406-430.

the Department of Geography, University of Washington (Seattle), addressed in turn the concepts of geopolitical and geo-economic analysis but asserting that they do not support a chronological periodization of the International Relations System. Therefore, he mapped the historical sequence marked by the danger of a nuclear war, followed by opportunities and economic growth, mainly in terms of types (and stages) of geostrategic discourse⁴. In 2005 Doreen Massey assumed a critical engagement with space and formulated an urgent priority of research: "What is needed is to uproot 'space' from that constellation of concepts in which it has so unquestioningly so often been embedded (stasis; closure; representation), and to settle it among another set of ideas (heterogeneity; relationality; coevalness ... liveliness indeed) where it releases a more challenging political landscape". Sparke defines Massey's essay as a "provocatively experimental' attempt to re-imagining and revaluating space" and "to forge accessible arguments that repeatedly remind readers of the real relations running through and thereby constituting space" (Sparke, 2007:3). He addressed the imbalances between the social and spatial dimensions in the production of the real (space), arguing that "even the spatial turn in social science and humanities yet occurred, a such elite 'responsibility ' is underpinned ad nauseam by flat world geographical conceits (e.g. Friedman, 2005), ontological assertions about flattened or borderless or smooth global space hardly comprise a model of responsible geography". In that context, "her point is a simple one that is now echoed in a critical literature on cartography – that hegemonic types of mapping (my italics) represent space as a 'completed horizontality' – in which the dynamism of change is exorcised in favour of a totality of connections (p.227). Massey's arguments might be grouped into a set of three intertwined propositions which defines the four dimensions of the concept of space: (1) Space is the product of interrelations; thus we must recognize space 'as constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny' (Massey, 2005: 9). (2) Space is the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity; that is space 'as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore of coexisting heterogeneity' (Massey, 2005: 9). (3) Space is always under construction; 'it is always in the process of being made. It is never finished; never closed' (Massey, 2005: 9).

The “renarrativisation” of space. The impact on International Relations

Bergson in "Matter and Memory" (1911), tells us that the mind is spatially oriented but the everyday creative, expansive and teeming with energy life element is not. He urges "to break with the spatialisation imposed by mind in order to contact with the core of true living". Similarly Gross asserts that the representation of space is an attribute of the rational mind, and there are two modes of representing space, (1) as a spatialisation of an activity, and (2) as setting things one by one. Therefore the cognitive functioning of the mind can be figured as a movement which consists in passing from a point to another, while connecting these points leads to (cognitive) maps. Laclau warns on the crisis of representation of space and the necessity to improve its stance through recognizing space framing as constitutive rather than mimetic" (quoted by Massey, p.24).

⁴ Matthew Sparke, *Geopolitical Fears, Geoeconomic Hopes and the Responsibilities of Geography*, in „Annals of the Association of American Geographers”, 2007, 97 (2), pp. 338 – 349.

In this sense Massey coins the syntagm of “spatializing the history of modernity” that she qualifies as “a surprising and insouciant recent recognition of the geographical nature of the society” (p.62). A “renarrativisation of space occurs and displaces the “story” of capitalist modernity from its European centering to its dispersed global peripheries (Eisenstadt, 2000, Massey, 1999, 2005). As a result, the ‘colonisation’ becomes more than a kind of a secondary product of events in Europe and the challenge was to “recognize the multiplicity of trajectories that imply different definitions of an extended, ruptural world historical event” (Hall, 1997:249). Pleading for connotational characteristics of space converges with Lakoff and Johnson’ perspective in “Metaphors we live by” against the abstraction view that claims there is a single, very general and abstract concept of representation, and the argument that “we understand concepts of one kind in terms of concepts of another kind at all”(Lakoff, Johnson, *On cognitive metaphors*, 1980) . Ben Anderson (2005) notices that “instead of thinking space as the very condition of and for radical contemporaneity, that is the sphere of co-existing multiplicity, space is being tied to the chain stasis/closure. Consequently, the relational thinking takes a number of quite different forms.

Harvey, a former student of Lefebvre, advocates a type of dialectical materialism and argues that space is made by biological, physical, social, cultural processes and these processes are themselves constituted by relations between very different kinds of entities (1996). Thrift (1996), advocates a ‘modest’ style of theory that he terms non-representational, and conceptualizes space as a site of becoming that has to be constantly performed in and through numerous everyday practices. In spite of different approaches relational thinkers agree on the point that discrete spaces and places are permanencies that are only ever provisionally stabilized because of the multitude of entities in relation that they are constituted from.(Anderson, 2005: 227)

From the beginning of twentieth century to the present, scientific research in the United States and Western Europe have shaped the characteristics (and gaps) of the new global settlements: regional conflicts, ethnic conflicts, ethnic enclaves, space mapped by the obsession of borders⁵. Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s study “International System in World History Remarking the Study of International Relations” (2000)⁶ is based on the methodology of Gordon W. Allport, regarding the extendable concentric circles model, a multiple levels analysis, used in International Relations (IR). The authors reconceptualized and transformed the diagram of concentric circles into a spiral which narrows toward its base. At the bottom of the spiral is the individual⁷, and at the top, the member-state of the international community⁸. The five levels of analysis are: 1) individuals and interactions among them; 2) the International System; 3) International Subsystems; 4) the Units; 5) the Subunits⁹. The debate about the number of levels of analysis is at the forefront of International Relations as well as

⁵ Michel Foucher, *L’Obsession des frontières*, Perrin, 2007.

⁶ Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii. Reconfigurarea studiului Relațiilor Internaționale (International System in World History. Remarking the Study of International Relations)*, Oxford University Press, 2000, translation: Simona Soare, Iași, Publishing House Polirom, 2009.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 85.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

the interactions between levels. Comparing to these troubling dynamics, the words of Zygmund Bauman who quoted an executive at the Nike company - "the only people who will care about national boundaries are politicians"¹⁰ - seems both an equation and a strange paradox.

Space complexity and security complexes

A complex, comprehensive definition of regional security was elaborated by Buzan, Wæver and Wilde¹¹ based on Barry Buzan's book, entitled "People, States and Fear" (1981). The concept was developed by the author a couple of years further in "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century" (1991)¹² in the preface to the second edition of the work. The author, self-critical to items listed in the first edition, kept the concept intact, and integrated in the Regional Security Complex Theory of Regions (RSCTR)¹³. Buzan defined the region as a "special type of subsystems"¹⁴ grouped on geographical criteria and leading to the creation of regional groupings¹⁵, the regional concepts being designed and promoted by the Copenhagen School¹⁶. Regional security issues are framed in terms of interaction, and "how human communities relate to each other when it comes to threats and vulnerabilities"¹⁷. Obviously, history has shown that national states have considered their own neighbours as "a main security vulnerability", thus neighbourhood was defined by Joseph S. Nye¹⁸ as a cornerstone of security together with location. He said "location and neighbourhood will tell us a lot about how states behave."¹⁹ Starting from this idea Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde considered as "normal pattern of interdependence in the international system (...). Security complexes form distinct regional patterns"²⁰. Their approach of individual security complex assigned to these security issues (like a national fear) a durable but not permanent character. In fact, a specific national anxiety - as a permanent collective state of mind towards neighbours – can develop a politically complex rationale to legitimize a pattern of behaviour as institutionalized dimension of national security. For instance, the national fear - as a

¹⁰ Zygmund Bauman, *Comunitatea. Căutarea siguranței într-o lume nesigură* (*Community*, first published in 2001, Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd.), translation: Aurelian Ardeleanu, Publishing House Antet XX, p. 42.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 10.

¹² Barry Buzan, *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 431-451. Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

¹³ Idem, *Popoarele, Statele și Frica. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece* (*People, States and Fear*), Second Edition, Introduction by Barry Buzan, translation: Vivia Săndulescu, Chișinău, Publishing House Cartier, p. IX.

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză* (*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*), translation George Jiglău, Cluj Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011, p. 24.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Matt McDonald (University of Warwick, U.K.), *Securitization and the Construction of Security*, în „European Journal of International Relations”, SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 14(4), 2008, pp. 563–587. <http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563>

¹⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea...*, Cluj Napoca, p. 26.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Descifrarea conflictelor internaționale* (*Understanding International Conflicts*), Publishing House Antet XX Press, pp. 40-44.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea...*, Cluj Napoca, p. 27.

security complex - of Romania towards Hungary - more or less justifiable and rooted in early Middle Ages until today, -, or towards Russia, whatever political form – imperial, soviet-communist or federative-this power developed from the beginning of modernity to the dawn of the Third Millennium²¹. Interestingly, however, is how Buzan, Waever and de Wilde explain the lack of security complexes both through internal /external factors, either due to a lack of capability to imagine the own state form, or to an external condition of "coverage"²², when "direct presence of foreign powers in a region is so great that suppresses the dynamic of security complexes of local states"²³.

In "World Politics. Trend and Transformation" (1999)²⁴, Charles W. Kegley and Shannon Blanton imagined a model of three levels based conceptual analysis of world politics. The first level refers to individuals - "individual level of analysis"- being defined in terms of "average citizen's behaviour". Individuals are considered a part of the International Relations system whose present and future depend on its directions of motion. The second level is the "state level of analysis" which takes into account diverse variables-decisions of state actors, public policy, forms of government and how state leaders and community leaders manage diverse situations arising from the implementation of decisions taken. The third is "the global level of analysis", mapping contexts of interaction between various actors on the global stage, defined as state/ non-state cooperation or conflict situations. The regional level was positioned by Kegley-Wittkop between the first and second levels of their model. Multiple analysis of the causes and effects of processes and events on the global stage have used over time the theoretical framework of the IR either addressing multilayer structures, top-down or bottom-up analysis, while (neo) realists approaches highlighted the pre-eminence of the system level comparing with analytic cuts²⁵.

Mapping the Black Sea Region of Development

In June 2004, Mustafa Aydin (Associate Professor of International Relations from Ankara University) published the volume *Europe's next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement*²⁶, in which the author mentioned that the region of the Black Sea includes the riparian states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, the area being affected (influenced) by the „nearby states”: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, but also by the ongoing events at the edge of this area, more precisely the space of South-East Europe but also, the Caspian one. Therefore, the author used in this volume several expressions to indicate the Black Sea region: "*Black Sea region*", "*Black Sea area*" or "*wider Black Sea*". Thus, "*the Black Sea basin*" includes

²¹ Mariana Cojoc, *Regional Perspective for International Relations. The port of Constanta in the war time (1916)*, in *National Military Museum King Ferdinand – 90 years in The Service for The Military Historiography and The Museology 1923-1213*, Studia Collection, Dr. Olimpiu Manuel Glodarencu (coordinator), National Military Museum King Ferdinand Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, pp. 376-409.

²² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea...*, Cluj Napoca, p. 28.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Eugene R. Wittkop, *World Politics. Trend and Transformation*, seventh edition, 1999, pp. 11-12.

²⁵ Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *op.cit.*, p. 87; Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, 1959.

²⁶ Mustafa Aydin, *Europe's next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement*, published by the European Union, Institute for Security Studies, No 53, June 2004.

about 2 million km² and 19 countries: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro (see also EU Commission, Press Release, Brussels, IP/01/1531, October 31, 2001).

On June, 25, 1992, the Pact for Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea Region was signed in Istanbul. The countries that signed the pact were: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldavia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and 12 years later, Serbia (on April, 2004). The objectives of the Declaration of Istanbul aimed both the economic and political cooperation through promoting good neighbourhood relations between members²⁷. Obviously, the importance of this construction is beyond question. It covers an area of 20 million km² with 350 millions of inhabitants. It is a space recoding requirements for almost all economic sectors, being rich in resources of the soil and subsoil, a 2nd world provider of petrol and natural gas after the Persian Gulf region²⁸.

In order to imagine the complexity of the Black Sea Region, it might be useful to mention that many other countries had a status of observer at BSEC: Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia, USA, as well as the partners for sectorial dialogue – Hungary, Iran, Japan, Korea, Montenegro, Slovenia, Black Sea International Ship owners Association (BINSIA), Black & Azov Seas Ports Association (BASPA), Union of Road Transport Association in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSEC-URTA), the Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders and Ship repairers (BRASS), Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN), Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), Danube Commission, International Network for SMEs (INSME), World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). Some other international organizations developed diverse programs, for instance, the United Nations (UN), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UN/FAO), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), Energy Charter Secretariat, Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), Intergovernmental Commission Traceca (IGC TRACECA), The Central European Initiative – Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES)²⁹.

Vladimer Papava published in May, 2010, under the auspices of The International Centre for Black Sea Studies, the study “The economic development complex in the Black Sea Area: The impact of the global financial and economic crisis”³⁰. The conclusions clarify the political and economic features in more precise terms:

-10 among 12 nation states from the Black Sea Region (the twelve states in OCEMN) have experienced totalitarian regimes, except Greece and Turkey;

²⁷ *Summit Declaration On Black Sea Economic Cooperation*, Istanbul, 25 June 1992 <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul1992.pdf>

²⁸ Organization Of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation <http://www.bsec-organization.org/Information/Pages/Information.aspx>

²⁹ *Ibidem* <http://www.bsec-organization.org/partners/Pages/intorganization.aspx>

³⁰ Vladimer Papava, *The economic development complex in the Black Sea Area: The impact of the global financial and economic crisis*, No 9, Xenophon Paper, The International Centre for Black Sea Studies, 2010.

- Romania and Bulgaria as member states of the UE and the other having a distinct routes Turkey, member of NATO, but non- member EU);
- Russia succeeded in promoting itself (our note) as an influent global actor³¹.

Given the evolution of events in Ukraine, the situation can be related to a series of factors, including political instability and financial crisis, having a grave impact on this country³².

If we consider the expanded circles method of analysis mentioned above, we may assert that the Black Sea region is a complicated regional space. This method allows us to complete the diverse levels of analysis, including the actors, the International Relations system, as well as the security complexes of that region.

In the article *Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy*³³, George Friedman highlights some geostrategic factors:

“The rational move for countries like Romania, Hungary or Poland is to accommodate Russia unless they have significant guarantees from the outside. Whether fair or not, only the United States can deliver those guarantees. The same can be said about the Shia and the Kurds, both of whom the United States have abandoned in recent years, assuming that they could manage on their own. The issue the United States faces is how to structure such support, physically and conceptually.

There appear to be two distinct and unconnected theatres and American power is limited. The situation would seem to preclude persuasive guarantees. But U.S. strategic conception must evolve away from seeing these as distinct theatres into seeing them as different aspects of the same theatre: the Black Sea.

When we look at a map, we note that the Black Sea is the geographic organizing principle of these areas. The sea is the southern frontier of Ukraine and European Russia and the Caucasus, where Russian, jihadist and Iranian power converge on the Black Sea. Northern Syria and Iraq are fewer than 650 kilometres (400 miles) from the Black Sea”.

Conclusions:

The Black Sea Region is a space mapped by multiple, interrelated relations and factors:

- 1) The complexity of current time and events,
- 2) International actors involved in diverse interactions,
- 3) A present dynamics far from a suspended, frozen regional blockage
- 4) A capability to create and export stability/security as well as insecurity

According to Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, the regional security complex can be annulled, even if Friedman’s discourse clearly assumed pragmatic interests of USA.

On the other hand, taken into account „the direct involvement of foreign powers in a certain region”³⁴, a suppression of the security dynamics of the local states may occur”³⁵.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 67.

³² *Ibidem*, p.63.

³³ George Friedman, *Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy*, Tuesday, September 2, 2014, Stratfor.com, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraine-iraq-and-black-sea-strategy#axzz3FrYfazBM>

³⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea...*, Cluj Napoca, p. 28.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

Our analysis having the purpose to explore how mapping a “region of development”- namely the *Black Sea region* - was, obviously, more than horizontal mapping of a complex, multilayered space. Massey’s argument that paraphrases the famous drawing by Magritte „ceci n’est pas une pipe” in „ceci n’est pas l’espace” (fig.11.1, Massey, 2005) provided fertile openings not only for space or questioning regional space, but to figure embedded possibilities and potentialities for future projects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Alexandrescu, Grigore, Sarcinschi Alexandra, 2005, *Modalități și posibilități de accelerare a cooperării în Marea Neagră*, Editura Universității Tehnice de Apărare”Carol I”, București.
- Anderson, Ben, *For Space* (2005), Doreen Massey, in Hubbard, P., Valentine, G. & Kitchin, R. Key, *Texts in Human Geography*, pp.227-235..
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver (2003), *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, (1991), *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 431-451 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Castells, Manuel, (2012), *The Autonomy of Space, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Cojoc, Mariana, (2013) *Regional Perspective for International Relations. The port of Constanta in the war time (1916)*, in *National Military Museum King Ferdinand – 90 years in The Service for The Military Historiography and The Museology 1923-1213*, Studia Collection, Dr. Olimpiu Manuel Glodarencu (coordinator), National Military Museum King Ferdinand Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, pp. 376-409.
- Cojocaru, Diana, *The Conceptual Framework of Globalisation*, Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., X, 2, p. 150–164, Bucharest, 2013.
- Fischer, Sabine, *European Foreign Policy and the Black Sea Region*, Seminar EUIIS-Harvard Black Sea Security Programme,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_Black_Sea_Region.pdf.
- Foucault, Michel, *Of Other Spaces. Utopias and Heterotopias*, (From Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité, October, 1984; *Des Espace Autres*, March 1967, (Translated from the French by Jay Miskowiec), <http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf>
- Glebov, Sergii, (2010), *Black Sea (In)security: What Should Ukraine Do for the EU’s Regional Policy*, www.balkans.blacksea.org/pub/.../55_109_speech_by_sergii_glebov.pdf
- Hall, Stuart, (1997), *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd
- Kegley, Charles W., Shanon L.Blanton, (2012), *World Politics. Trend and Transformation*, Susan Jeans editor, Wordworth, Boston

- Lakoff, George, Johnson, Mark, (1980), *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago University Press, 1980, Chicago.
- Lefebvre, Henry (1991), *The Production of Spaces*, Blackwell, London.
- Massey, Doreen (1999a), *Power-Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time*, Heidelberg.
- Massey, Doreen (1999b), *Spaces of Politics*, in: Massey, Doreen/Allen, John/Sarre, Philip (Hg.), *Human Geography Today*, Cambridge, Oxford, Malden, pp. 279–294.
- Massey, Doreen (2005), *For Space*, London, Sage.
- McDonald, Matt, (2008) *Securitization and the Construction of Security*, in „European Journal of International Relations”, SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 14(4), 2008, pp. 563–587. <http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563>
- Mustafa Aydin, *Europe's next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement*, published by the European Union, Institute for Security Studies, No 53, June 2004.
- Nye, Joseph, (2004), *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, Longman Publishing Group.
- Stalder, Felix, (2003), *The Status of Objects in the Space of Flows*. University of Toronto.
- Sparke, Matthew, (2005). *Acknowledging Responsibility For Space An essay review of Doreen Massey, For Space*, London: Sage, 2005.
- Ó Tuathail Gearóid, Timothy W. Luke, (1994), *Present at the (Dis)integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order*, Annals of the Association of American Geographers Volume 84, Issue 3, pages 381–398, September 1994.
- Rosenau, James & E. Aydinli (Eds.), (2005), *Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition*, New York, State University of New York Press.
- Tally, Robert, Jr. (2013) *Épistémocritique : This Space that Gnaws and Claws at Us*, Foucault, Cartographics and Geocriticism, Palgrave, Mc Millan, New York,.
- Thrift, Nigel (2003), *Space: The Fundamental Stuff of Human Geography*, in Sarah L. Hollaway, Stephen P., Rice and Gill Valentine, *Key Concept in Geography*, London, Sage, pp. 95–107.