COMMUNICATIONAL RATIONALITY AND THEOLOGICAL INSTANCE

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Abstract: This study sustains argues in favour of the thesis according to which the theological discourse is based on the communicational rationality, whereas the theological instance makes use of the technique concerned with the communicational revelation. There are several types of rationality: the logico-mathematical rationality, the strategical, instrumental, consensual rationality, as well as the rationality of discussion and communicational rationality. Finally, we can notice that the revelation occurs within the authorized theological interpretation: the believer is notified of the theological text and at the same time of its interpretation. It comes out that the theological hermeneutics is predetermined by the theological communicational instance.

Keywords: communication, rationality, communicational rationality, revelation, theological instance

1. Introduction

According to Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger and Gadamer, the world incapable to think in the absence of the idea of reason. Hegel’s opinion (“Everything real is rational; everything rational is real”) could be turned into an axiom of unlimited rationality of the real, that materializes in the functioning of an “unlimited communication community” (K.O. Apel, 1993). Despite the apparent unfailing expansion of the rational, we must direct the lucidity manifested by the power of reason towards the notion of rationality. Otherwise, we would confront ourselves with several types of reason that credit several types of rationality. The truth reinforced by teh implicit presuppositions in contradiction is the following: there is a reason that can be applied to several types of rationality.

We can discuss here about five types of rationality:

- the logico-mathematical rationality, (minimal and abstract rationality that delas with the principle related to the noncontradiction of sentences and their functions – described by Plato);
- instrumental, or technico-scientific rationality, (rationality that subtends the presupposition of of reciprocity both during the instrumental intervention and the experimental causal analysis – established by the School of Frankfurt);
- strategical rationality, (rationality that deals with the reciprocally mediated implementation of the instrumental rationality to the human communication and interaction);

- consensual-comunicational rationality, (the one that allows for the coordination of the communicational acts on the basis of the cohesive force associated with the validity requirements, fundamental within the communicational events, imposed by J. Habermas);

- the rationality of discussion, configured by K.O. Apel (1993), that simultaneously implies on the one hand to bring up to discussion once again the requirements imposed by the consensual-communicational validity and on the other to honour by reflection the abidance to the principle of performative noncontradiction the one that argues by means of the consensual communicational rationality is subjected to.

A lateral and oblique examination of these types of rationality, the clearness of delimitation is shaded by the absence of a criterion of derivation or integration. The super determining abstract also deals with the fact that what today is called “make an experiment, experiment something” and “offer one’s experience of something” predominate over the act of reflecting on something. The postmodern primate of the practical over the theoretical makes the connection between reason and the existential instances, so that we can comprehend Heidegger’s position (1996), that used to make out of the discourse, (communication) one of the fundamental “existential,” decisive categories of the Dasein.

Consequently, the generating rationality is communicational rationality. It is similar from this point of view to the logico-mathematical, instrumental and strategical rationality. It includes the so-called consensual rationality and the rationality of discussion. By communion and faith, the theological discourse falls into the category of the communicational rationality. Furthermore, the religious instance brings about, propagates and uses the communicational thinking.

2. The functioning of religious instance

Theology is an axiomatic domain, where the principle of intelligibility stands for its faith, (“believe and do not doubt”): faith as individual act and faith in the historical experience of the Church. Faith is determined by the comprehension of the founding texts, as well as of the Christic message. The theological comprehension is an axiomatic comprehension, formulated by the accredited hermeneuts, authorized by teh Church. Consequently, the believer is acquainted not only with the basic theological corpus, (the Bible), but also with its oral or written interpretation. In other terms, the believer is familiarized with a theological pre comprehension. He receives the already interpreted Scriptures (Osborne, 1991, Terec-Vlad & Andrieş, 2014; Craig, 2015; Sandu, 2016).

The theological method promotes the so-called hermeneutical circle. The believers read the Bible on the pedestal of a historical pre interpretation. The textual object and the believer-interpreter are connected by an implicit engagement. The believer experiences the interpretation as a fact of life he is already part of. Theology is basically self interpretation, whereas the believer stands for an employee within the axiomatics of the Christic message.
The Christian phenomenon self-organizes repetitively: the already interpreted world reaches the believer (Thiselton, 1997). The return to the objectivity of the canonical texts is not a closed road, but the theory of creation, being induced by pre-comprehension, remains a purely axiomatic theory. The Christian experience is rendered by means of the trust confessions, of the systems of theological integration, of the dogmatic definitions and of the magisterial decisions. All these elements make up the so-called theological horizon. An instance stands for law: prosecution of a case, for a place of decision. It always includes a horizon of expectation, a set of presuppositions, as well as a pre intentional background.

It is preferable to talk about a religious horizon of expectation. This basically includes a network of presumptions, open to revision and change; secondly, the reader or the commentator may not be aware of everything that is set in motion by the horizon of expectation. Both expectations and presuppositions deal with the type of issues we anticipate within the text and even the way of communication it can make use of. Religious texts are always addressed the appropriate questions: this is the result of the power specific to the religious instance.

The fact that a horizon is by definition so limited and at the same time capable of movement and expansion, as the subject of perception is in motion, emphasizes the dual element of the ‘strange’ and the ‘familiar’ within the processes of comprehension. In order to understand a musical part or an algebraic formula we must know what kind of thing music or algebra is; but we may have never seen this equation or listened to the musical part. Our horizons must contain a space where the text cannot be intelligibly interpreted in terms with previsionsal relations that allow for models of knowledge. On the other hand, the achievement of what seems to look familiar is not really what we have expected it to be. It needs an expansion of our horizons in order to make room for what is new. Thus, the term horizon offers an important advantage over the term “presupposition” (Clitan, 1998), that has unfortunately become familiar to the readers as a technical term introduced by Rudolf Bultmann (1960) in his well-known essay: “Is exegesis without presuppositions possible?” Bultmann uses here especially Dilthey’s term, namely “pre-understanding”. In Dilthey’s opinion (1959), whose paper is discussed by Bultmann, there is a relation of life, preliminary to comprehension. Our pre-conceptive relation to music, mathematics, law or love will influence and provide the operating conditions for how we have come to understand texts on music, mathematics, law, poems, love letters or declarations. However, the term “presupposition” seems to suggest a different meaning. It renders the impression of embedded convictions and doctrines that are not only cognitive and conceptual. The pre-conceptual, behavioural and practical nature of the horizon is also well captured by a term that probably represents the closest equivalent within the broad climate of the Anglo-American philosophy of the language. John Searle (1978) expands upon what he calls “the hypothesis of the background” or the background of the “pre-comprehended.” The meaning is communicated and perceived, Searle argues, not only within the context of a directive coming from the author or the speaker, but also against a series of abilities and social practice. We understand what “to open a door”, “to give rendez-vous” or “to set on fire” mean, but we do not
understand, Searle argues, what such syntagms as “to open a mountain” or “to open the grass” mean, as we do not have any kind of information or mutual practice that could represent the frame of reference necessary to understand the meaning of such formulations.

We understand what means for God to prove His love for us, so that we discern the habits concerned with the act of offering love manifested by God, in the public tradition of Israel. However, this comprehension is inevitably coloured by the different experiences of people’s love for us and by our own capacity to love the others (LaCocque & Ricoeur, 2003).

The pre-intentional horizon and conditions are thus a network of revised expectations and presuppositions that a reader brings to the text, borrowing the models shared by the behaviour and conviction, where the process of interpretation and comprehension becomes operational (Voinea, Opran & Vlăduțescu, 2015; Dumitru, Motoi & Budică, 2016). The term horizon draws our attention on the fact that our situation, finite in time, history and culture defines the limits specific to the present moment of our world in expansion, or more strictly saying, the limits of what we are able “to see.” The term “background” underlines the fact that these limits hold not only what we can emphasize in the conscious reflection, but also the precognitive dispositions or the competences, which are possible by our participation in the practice of a historical and social world. These two examples draw our attention on the value of the following terms: “horizon,” “pre-comprehension,” “presupposition” and “pre-intentional background.” Hans-Georg Gadamer reminds us that there are two constituent elements of the notion “horizon:” the first, represents a point that limits the possibility of vision… The horizon is the vision that includes everything that can be seen from one advantageous, particular point of view. The second element speaks about the possible expansion of the horizon, the openness towards new horizons… Horizons change for one person in motion. This is part of the process where the texts transform the readers: the essence of the religious text.

Generally speaking, learning comes from the teacher (Herrmann, 2016; Grad & Frunza, 2016), whereas the Scriptures is integrated as a test of the thoroughness of learning. Moreover, with a view to lecturing the Scriptures, the tradition to understand it is inculcated into the believer. As a consequence, between the believer and the textual object of his faith, there are two kinds of axiomatics, not just one: magister dixit and traditio dixit.

The fundamental statements of faith are unverifiable. The only promised verification in the field of theology is the verification of the systems of interpretation.

The theological methodology is axiomatic and it rejects problematization or the act of doubting, of putting under question, but it admits the hypothetical, when this is part of the tradition, or it is legitimized by the teacher (Paunescu, 2015; Muntean & Cojocaru, 2016). This thing has made possible the maintenance and development of both science and philosophy in the Middle Ages: as tools of theology, as arguments of the omnipotence of science.
3. Conclusion

Faith is obtained by revelation (Ricoeur, 1977). The theological practice is based on revelation. There is, on the other hand, a communicational and theological reason that brings and describes the arguments necessary to the maintenance of the force status of theology.

References


